Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1992

Ellen Anderson, as personal representative of the
Estate of D.C. Anderson, Ellen Anderson,
personally, Dan Scott and Jeanne Scott v. Eugene E.
Doms and Michael R. McCoy: Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Irving H. Biele; Curtis C. Nesset; Nygaard, Coke and Vincent; Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Appellants
and Cross-Appellees.
Larry R. Keller; Craig L. Boorman; Larry R, Keller and Associates; Attorneys for Defendants,
Appellee and Cross-Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Ellen Anderson v. Eugene E Doms, No. 920653 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3634

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate of D. C.
Anderson; ELLEN ANDERSON
personally; DAN SCOTT and
JEANNE SCOTT,
Case No. 920653-CA
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
and Cross-Appellees,

:ET NO.

v

f MNflC? 3

v.

EUGENE E POMS and MICHAEL R.
McCOY,

Priority No. 15

Defendants, Appellee,
and Cross-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Appeal from a final judgment in the Third Judicial District Court,
in and for Summit County, State of Utah, the Honorable John A.
Rokich, Judge.

LARRY R. KELLER (A1785)
CRAIG L. BOORMAN (A0379)
LARRY R. KELLER & ASSOCIATES
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282

IRVING H. BIELE (A0317)
CURTIS C.NESSET (A4238)
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506

Attorneys for Defendants, Appellee,
and Cross-Appellant.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Appellants
and Cross-Appellees.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate of D. C.
Anderson; ELLEN ANDERSON
personally; DAN SCOTT and
JEANNE SCOTT,
Case No. 920653-CA
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
and Cross-Appellees,
v.
EUGENE E POMS and MICHAEL R.
McCOY,

Priority No. 15

Defendants, Appellee,
and Cross-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

Appeal from a final judgment in the Third Judicial District Court,
in and for Summit County, State of Utah, the Honorable John A.
Rokich, Judge.

LARRY R. KELLER (A1785)
CRAIG L. BOORMAN (A0379)
LARRY R. KELLER & ASSOCIATES
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282

IRVING H. BIELE (A0317)
CURTIS C. NESSET (A4238)
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506

Attorneys for Defendants, Appellee,
and Cross-Appellant.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Appellants
and Cross-Appellees.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

1

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4

FACTS

6

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

11

ARGUMENT

14

POINT I
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARRED DOMS'
COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST BOTH VOLUNTARY AND
INVOLUNTARY PLAINTD7FS

14

POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY ALLOWED
DOMS' COUNTERCLAIM TO PROCEED DESPITE THE
FACT THAT IT DID NOT RELATE BACK TO THE DATE
THAT THE PLAINTIFFS FILED THEm FORECLOSURE
ACTION

17

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT DOMS WAS NOT
ENTITLED TO RESCISSION OF THE WARRANTY DEED
SHOULD HAVE PRECLUDED SUBSEQUENT TRIAL ON
THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF
WARRANTY

21

POINT IV
DOMS COULD NOT MAINTAIN HIS COUNTERCLAIM
BECAUSE THE DEED WHICH HE OBTAINED FROM
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES WAS VOID
i

23

POINT V
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO
DISMISS THE COUNTERCLAIM BECAUSE DOMS WAS
NOT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST IN RELATION TO
THE COUNTERCLAIM

26

POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO DISMISS
DOMS' CASE BECAUSE THE COVENANT AGAINST
ENCUMBRANCES IS A PERSONAL COVENANT AND
DOMS, AS A REMOTE GRANTEE, HAD NO CLAIM
UNDER THE DEED FROM PLAINTD7FS

29

POINT VII
DOMS' ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE AND USE OF THE
ACCESS EASEMENT PRIOR TO THE PURCHASE OF
ROSSI HHXS SHOULD HAVE BARRED HIS CLAIM OF A
VIOLATION OF THE COVENANT AGAINST
ENCUMBRANCES

33

POINT VIII
THE AMOUNT DUE THE ESTATE OF D. C. ANDERSON
WAS SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED EVEN THOUGH DOMS'
CLAIM WAS BARRED BY THE NON-CLAIM STATUTE

37

POINT IX
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY JOINED ELLEN
ANDERSON AND JEANNE SCOTT AS INVOLUNTARY
PLAINTD7FS

38

POINT X
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBSTITUTING ITS
METHODOLOGY FOR FORECLOSURE IN LIEU OF THAT
PROVIDED BY THE CONTRACT AND THE STATUTE

ii

42

POINT XI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY MODIFIED THE
TERMS OF THE TRUST DEED NOTE AND AWARDED
DAMAGES AGAINST THE PLAINTD7FS WHICH SHOULD
NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED

43

POINT XII
THE COURT ERRED BY NOT ALLOWING THE
PLAINTIFFS ATTORNEYS' FEES FOR ALL WORK
EXPENDED IN DEFENDING, DIRECTLY OR
INDKECTLY, THE VALIDITY OF THE PROMISSORY
NOTE AND TRUST DEED, INCLUDING THE DEFENSE
AGAINST RESCISSION WHICH WOULD HAVE
ELIMINATED THE PROMISSORY NOTE AND TRUST
DEED
CONCLUSION

46
50

iii

LAW OFFICES

N Y G A A R D , C O K E & VINCENT, L.C.
BRUCE E. COKE
CRAIG T. VINCENT
IRVING H. BIELE
RANDY B. COKE
JOHN W. CALL
J. SCOTT COTTINGHAM

3 3 3 NORTH 3 0 0 WEST STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 0 3 - 1 2 1 5
TELEPHONE (801) 3 2 8 - 2 5 0 6
TELECOPIER (SOI) 3 6 4 - 6 4 0 3

August 30, 1994

OF COUNSEL

HENRY S. NYGAARD

FILED
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230 South 500 East #400
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COURT OF APPEALS

Anderson, et al. v. Doms, Case No. 920653-CA
New Case on Doctrine of Merger

Dear Ms. Branch:
The recent case of Schafir v. Harrigan, 245 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 supports the
Plaintiffs/Appellants' arguments in relation to the doctrine of merger as it applies to warranty
deeds. The reference is on page 19 of the Advance Reports and supports Plaintiffs/Appellants'
arguments contained in their brief, Point XI, and the discussion of merger as contained on the
bottom of page 44 and the top of page 45 of said brief.
The same doctrine of merger was again discussed in the Plaintiffs/Appellants' brief on
cross-appeal and reply brief of the Appellants, Point I, indicating that the court had properly held
that rescission was not available to Doms and specifically on pages 10 and 11 of said Reply Brief
wherein the case of Stubbs v. Hemert was again cited for the proposition that the deed is the final
agreement and all prior terms, written or oral, are extinguished and unenforceable.
Respectfully yours,
NYGAARD^COKE & VINCENT

X
IHBxd
cc:
Larry A. Keller
Reference Rule 24(j)
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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
230 South 500 East #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Re:

Anderson, et al. v. Doms, Case No. 920653-CA
Response to Citation of Supplemental Authorities

Dear Ms. Branch:
Upon reviewing the letter of October 13, 1994, it appears that counsel for the defendant
and counterclaimant apparently does not comprehend the effect of a mortgage or trust deed and
the foreclosure thereof.
The first case cited, Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, indicates that the court must
determine that there is a debt secured by the lien. In the Anderson v. Doms case, the court
routinely found that there was a debt and ordered the sale by a decree of foreclosure.
He also cites Belnap v. Blain, 575 P.2d 696. In the instant case, Mr. McCoy had an
undivided one-half interest in the property which he encumbered with a trust deed and which was
foreclosed by the court all in accordance with the requirements set forth in Belnap. Also cited
is State Bank of Lehi v. Woolsey, 565 P.2d 413. This case holds a mortgage does not convey
the legal estate but gives the mortgagee a lien on the premises to secure payment of the
indebtedness. This is exactly what happened and the relief was granted by the enforcement of
the lien by the sale of the premises and application of the proceeds on the debt. In this case, Mr.
McCoy, who had an undivided one-half interest, executed a promissory note and a trust deed,
defaulted in his payment and a foreclosure proceeding was completed as against his one-half
interest.
Ignoring the fact that there is no legal support for Mr. Keller's volunteered statement that
Mr. Doms was the fee simple owner of Rossie Hills at the time of the foreclosure sale, it must
be noted that if Mr. Doms had any interest, the interest is subject to the trust deeds which had

Marilyn M. Branch
October 19, 1994
Page -2-

been executed by his predecessors in interest and were in the process of foreclosure. The
citations and the letter merely obfuscate the problems in this case.
Very truly yours,
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

IHBxd
cc:
Larry A. Keller
Craig L. Boorman
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EUGENE E POMS and MICHAEL R.
McCOY,
Defendants, Appellee,
and Cross-Appellant.

)
)

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-3(2)(k)
(Supp. 1992), which grants the Court of Appeals appellate jurisdiction over cases transferred to
it by the Utah Supreme Court. This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Third Judicial
District Court. The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1992). The supreme court transferred the case to this court on
September 30, 1992.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review in this brief:

1.

The statute of limitations barred Doms' counterclaim against both voluntary and

involuntary plaintiffs.
2.

The district court erroneously allowed Doms' counterclaim to proceed despite the

fact that it did not relate back to the date that the plaintiffs filed their foreclosure action.
3.

The trial court's finding that Doms was not entitled to rescission of the warranty

deed should have precluded the subsequent trial on the issue of damages.
4.

The trial court should have found that the deed issued by Domcoy to Doms was

void and therefore Doms had no interest in the property at the time of this action.
5.

The trial court should have dismissed Dom's counterclaim because Doms was not

the real party in interest in the action.
6.

Because the covenant against encumbrances is a personal covenant, a remote

grantee, such as Doms, may not bring an action based on the violation of the covenant.
7.

The trial court found that Doms had actual knowledge of the encumbrances before

he purchased the property, this knowledge should have barred Doms counterclaim which alleged
a violation of the covenant against encumbrances.
8.

The trial court found that Doms' claim against the estate of one of the plaintiffs

was barred by the nonclaim statute, however the trial court did then erroneously setoff Doms'
damages against the estate.
9.

The trial court erroneously joined Ellen Anderson and Jeanne Scott as involuntary

plaintiffs.
10.

The trial court erroneously constructed a remedy for the foreclosure of the trust

deed and trust deed note rather than following the statutorily prescribed remedy which was set

2

forth in the contract between the parties.
11.

The trial court erroneously modified the terms of the agreement between the

parties and awarded damages against the plaintiffs which should not have been allowed.
12.

The trial court failed to award the plaintiffs all of the attorney fees which they

were due under the trust deed and the trust deed note.
Many of the issues presented, specifically issues 1,2,4,5,6,7,8,10,11,12, involve
conclusions of law made or not made by the trial court or an erroneous application of the law
by the trial court. A trial court's conclusions of law and legal interpretations are afforded no
deference by a reviewing court and are reviewed for correctness. State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d
464, 465 (Utah 1991); Scharfv. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
In some instances the issues presented for review concern the trial court's failure to make
findings of fact (for example, issues 1,2,3,4,5,6). A trial court must make findings on all
material facts and failure to do so constitutes reversible error. Ashton v. Ashton, 804 P.2d 540
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Erwin v. Erwin. 773 P.2d 847 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). A trial court has
committed clear error if it ignores uncontested, proven facts. Howell v. Howell. 806 P.2d 809
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Issues concerning the joinder of indispensable parties, such as that raised by the ninth
question above, are reviewed by the appellate court using an abuse of discretion standard. Seftel
v. Capital Citv Bank. 767 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), aff'd sub nom Landes v. Capital
Citv Bank. 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990).

3

STATUTES. RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statutes, rules, or constitutional provisions relevant to the disposition of
this appeal are set forth in the text or addenda of this brief: Revised Statutes of Utah, 1898
§1116; Utah Code Ann. §16-10-74, §75-3-803; Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 15, 17, 19.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs Dan Scott and D.C. Anderson each owned an undivided one-half interest in a
trust deed note in the amount of $194,250.00 dated June 10, 1982. The note, secured by a trust
deed on real property known as Rossi Hills in Summit County, was executed by defendants
Eugene Doms and Michael McCoy. Doms and McCoy failed to make payments required by the
note.
On June 6, 1985, Scott and the Estate of D. C. Anderson filed an action to foreclose the
trust deed as a mortgage. (R. 1-9) Jurisdiction was obtained over the defendants and a default
against McCoy was entered on December 4, 1985. (R. 12) Negotiations for payment of the debt
proceeded for approximately two years after commencement of the action between plaintiffs and
defendant Doms. After negotiations failed and on motion of the plaintiffs, a default judgment
was entered against both defendants on January 21, 1988. (R. 34-40) Four months later, on
April 22, 1988, defendant Doms moved the court to set aside the judgment against himself only.
(R. 49-52) The court granted Doms' motion and on June 20, 1988, entered an order setting aside
the judgment with respect to Doms.1 (R. 126,7)

1

On October 21, 1988, the court issued an order of sale directing the sale of McCoy's
interest. After timely notice and publication, McCoy's one-half interest was sold on
December 12, 1988. After a hearing, an amended deficiency judgment was entered against
McCoy on January 24, 1991. (R. 5146-7) McCoy did not contest the default judgment or
the deficiency judgment and is not a party to this appeal.
4

Before the motion to set aside the default judgment had been filed, Doms filed an answer
and counterclaim on January 29, 1988, (R 41) However, to comply with the default judgment,
]

'

* *•!,-"*

rmliance ^

•»

i-o; -^Ticially accepted" bv me trial u ::;: m M June 1

: * June Lx 1988,

]

)

Subsequently, Doms recer .-<* permission on July 5, 1988, to file a second amended
counterclaim. (.% _. -

.,J seconded amended counterclaim contained causes of action for

rescission, lost profits and fraud. 2 (R. 237)
On June 15, 1988, Doms filed a motion to join both Ellen Anderson and Jeanne Scott

(R. 97-100) Doms claimed that they were indispensable to his countei claim for rescission.
Involuntary plaintiffs Anderson and Scott contested, the trial court's jurisdiction over them..
(R. 307-19) After a hearing on the matter on June 23, 1988, the trial court ordered that both
appear as involuntary plaintiffs. T

]r~

C

A ~4^-50) After --.-!: motion** to dismiss for lack

44, 816-37)
Following motions fc i dismissal and summary judgment

.

;•... \ were d L _ . . ,

plaintiffs demanded that Doms elect his remedy. The demand was supported b^ a j u c i on
election of remedies (R 4124-39) and a seven page supplemental brief to which, were attached
44 pages of supporting cases. (R 4 2 5 9 - 4 3 n ; mcieafter, at the commencement of the trial on

2

Significantly, Doms' second amended counterclaim did not seek damages for breach of
the covenants contained in the deed but referred to the alleged breach only as a ground for
rescission.

April 17, 1990, and during the trial the motion was renewed and Doms elected to proceed on
rescission.3 (R. 7087, 7759) On April 30, 1990, Judge Rokich issued a memorandum decision
in which he held that rescission was not available to Doms. (R. 4244 et seq., Addendum 16)
Over the objection of plaintiffs, the trial court reconvened for the purpose of determining
if a violation of the covenant against encumbrances existed and, if one was found, determining
damages even though Doms had not pleaded the contract action. (R 7753 et seq.) The bench
trial was held on August 21, 1990. On October 4, 1990, the court issued the first of five
memorandum decisions involving the contract claims. (R. 4348 et seq.) Finally, on June 23,
1992, the court issued its final Second Amended Findings and Conclusions and Second Amended
Judgment.

(R. 6874 et seq.; Addendum 16) Appropriate objections to the findings and

conclusions were made and accompanied by requests for additional findings and conclusions.
(R. 5449-59; 6853-65; Addendum 17) Final judgment was entered on June 23, 1992. (R. 69006907)
FACTS
This case involves undeveloped real estate situated in Park City, Summit County, referred
to as Rossi Hills. The property was owned by Dan Scott and D.C. Anderson as tenants in
common. ( Exhibit 27) 4
Eugene Doms, through real estate agent Michael Sloan, made offers on behalf of himself

3

On December 19, 1988, the plaintiffs filed a related action against the defendants and
Summit County seeking to set aside a tax sale, Case #10066 (Supp.R. 1-66) The court
consolidated the case and determined the tax sale was void.
4

All exhibits referred to in this brief were admitted at trial. Exhibit lists are contained
in R7081-82 and R437-38.
6

and Michael R. McCoy to purchase Rossi Hills. (Exhibit 63) Negotiations proceeded and in
due course the property was sold for a purchase price of $276,750.00 on terms and involving
parties differing from '

•

Exhibits 1 S 69) I 'he sale was

consummated and a deed v, as executed by Dan Scott and his wife, Jeanne Scott, and I), C.
Anderson and his wih\ I'lKii ; uitlnsoii, as v : •
each with an undivided one -half interest.

v ^,

• ' "in ml Dnins iiiiill I vli( '"o) , .i". I'luiilccs,

„ *, .* *,*Jum l) 'I he sale was completed

pursuant to a buyers' statement from,, the title company showing the purchase price and the
allocution thereof, ill

L

"

J

•

deed note in the amount ol *

Il

"I """ill III I1"1'"'1 " I i

mini McCoy executed a trust

uu in ravor of "D. C. Anderson as to an undivided one-half

Interest, , and Dan S :::

e

note called for interest at tlu TAIZ of i4 ,. unless Doms and McCoy defaulted, in which case the
interest rate would be 18%.

I he note was secured by a, trust deed executed b> 1 Joins and

McCoy on 'the same date in favor of Scott and Anderson, (UAIUDIL 2; Addendum 3) Neither
Ellen Anderson, nor Jeanne Scott held an interest in the property, or was named as beneficiary
<

Michael Sloan, a real estate agent, testified that he and Doms walked the property in
advance of the sale and ot -set \ ed the loop road and the othei features latei claimed to be
undisclosed encumbrances. (R.6883) Sloan testified that the property was not covered by snow
and that all the claimed encroachments were plainly visible, «'l«'', - <>>,.L, - (>>,!"'>!"", H>bl, '(»<»,.!, i (>(>.*,
7664, 7667, 7686; Addendum 18)
On, October 30, 1981 , five months before their purchase of Rossi Hills, Doms and

7

first meeting of directors was held on November 5, 1981, where stock certificates were issued
to Doms and McCoy. (Exhibit 32; Addendum 6) The corporation held annual meetings for
the years 1983 (Exhibit 35), 1984 (Exhibit 36), 1985 (Exhibit 37). Doms and McCoy, through
Domcoy, conducted a substantial amount of real estate business in of Utah as indicated by their
attorney. (R. 7539-41; 7560)
On August 30, 1983, Doms and McCoy conveyed Rossi Hills to Domcoy Enterprises.
(Exhibit 16; Addendum 4) Shortly thereafter, Domcoy developed a joint venture agreement for
the development of Rossi Hills and other adjacent properties.

(Exhibits 81, 82)

From 1982 Domcoy failed to pay the real estate taxes on the Rossi Hills property, and
in due course a tax sale was conducted. (Notice of Final Tax Sale Exhibit 5 to the Complaint
in consolidated case #10066.)
D. C. Anderson subsequently died, his estate was admitted to probate, and his widow,
Ellen Anderson, was appointed personal representative on November 30, 1982. She filed and
published the required notice to creditors. Doms did not file any claim against the estate and
the time for filing claims expired long before this action was instituted. (R. 7988; Addendum
13)
Doms, McCoy and Domcoy failed to make payments required by the trust deed note and
thus, defaulted under the note. (Exhibit 6)
On June 5, 1985, Anderson's estate and Scott instituted an action to foreclose their trust
deed. (R. 1-9) Pursuant to the trust deed and provisions of the Utah Code, plaintiffs elected to
foreclose the trust deed note and trust deed as a mortgage. After considerable negotiation
between the attorneys for both sides, defaults were taken and default judgment entered. (R. 34-
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40) Subsequently, 'the default and judgment against Doms were set aside. (R. 64-6)
After entry of the default judgment and before it was set aside, Doms filed an answer and
a counterclaim for rescission only on January 29, 1988. (R. 41-44) In Doms' Certificate of
Compliance to the Order Setting Aside the Judgment, he agreed that all filings by him,, were

set aside, on June 15, 1,988, Doms filed an amended c : i int s i :laim requesting rescission, only.
(R 1 02 1 ) Doms thereafter filed a second, amended counterclaim requesting rescission and
damages for loss of profits and fraud. (R. 237 et seq.)
On August 24, 1,988, Summit. County sold Rossi, Hills in a tax, sale to Domcoy. On
Augusl """('I, I""'"' "I! I, iiiiiii)! e (III) ill) il I mi mi IM i m vrfiis iil'lu illllii inmpliiml i i filed iiiiiil nuur Iliiiii M\ vejirs
after the original deed * ; >>
nerefc

is and MeCov, Doms obtained a ucc

.IK/\

i: the fill

Exhibit 17)
some

type of ownership or color of title in the Rossi Hills propert)

At 'the time Doms asked for

rescission, July 6, 1,988, he owned, no interest, in the subject p-operty and did not acquire even
col :)! ;: f title i intil

26. 1,988, c < * 21 one month

"

- ' *nded amended

counterclaim.
1
Addendum

;
oproximatc

(Exhibit 1 7; Addendum©

*

c :* IK* * the deed in favor o! I »oms was executed.

-.

.

..ting

only as an officer (not a director) of 'the corporation despite die fact that the charter had been
terminated and the deed was in favor of Doms himself.

(Exhibit, I*7- ^ e n d u m 8)
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contract could not be rescinded. (R. 4244-50; Addendum 15) The court further determined that
the election to pursue rescission did not constitute an election of remedies and a trial would
proceed at a later date to determine damages for violating the deed covenant against
encumbrances. (R. 7757) Six years and four months had expired before these unrelated causes
of action were pled; therefore, plaintiffs argued that the statute of limitations had expired. (R.
3421-25) Nevertheless, the district court held that under U.R.C.P. Rule 15(c), Doms' unpled
cause of action for breach of contract related back to the filing of the complaint. (R. 4328.)
After trial, the district court concluded that "the Warranty Deed, Trust Deed Note and Trust
Deed do not constitute a single contract" contradicting the basis for its earlier ruling relating
to the transactions and applying Rule 15(c) U.R.C.P. (R. 6890) The court also determined that
Doms, who was a remote grantee of the property by reason of the purported purchase of the
Rossi Hills from Domcoy, was entitled to damages for breach of the covenant against
encumbrances contained in the prior deed to Doms and McCoy who had divested themselves of
Rossi Hills. (R. 6902) The court held that such damages could be setoff in total against the
purchase price of the property that was sold ten years prior to the determination of damages and
all of the purchase and financing contracts should be revised to reflect this setoff, though Doms
only acquired a one-half interest.
Plaintiffs were required to institute an action against Summit County to set aside the tax
sale and determine its invalidity. If the sale was valid, then plaintiffs' rights to foreclose the
trust deed would be eliminated as title would vest in Summit County free of any claim of prior
owners or encumbrancers. The tax case, #10066, was consolidated into this case. The court,
on hearing the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs, determined that the tax sale was invalid,
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thereby reconfirming the title to Rossi Hills in Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. subject to the trust
deed in favor of Anderson and Scott. (R. 6896, 7069) The action was instituted and conducted
f i llii iillomi V'I 1 HI lin plaintiffs in onin lu |iiiuln I Ihnnsrlvcs .mil Poms ;m<] MCCOY Inmi
being divested of all interest in the property by reason of the failure of the defendants to pay the
tii\< '

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appropriate and timely application of law would have saved the courts, the taxpayers,
and the parties to this action substantial time and expense.
Plaintiffs first assert that Doms' counterclaim was barred by flic statute of limitations.
I

•

r

tlv 1 r K p n a l i i m ill illllii Mh, -

year limitations period, Ho'i ever, default judgment agai list Doms had been entered before the
answer and counterclaim, and his Cei tificate of Compliance * itii the order setting aside the
default judgment specifically stated that the answer and counterclaim would not be officially
accepted until a date which was after the expiration of the limitations period,

Subsequent

Plaintiffs allege that the trial court's implied holding that Doms' counterclaim, related
btiii Ho (ilttiiiiili1' original i iimplaiul is t/iioitt:oii

Ihniiii

niLlnikiiui uuiceined a diiicrenl

transaction than plaintiffs' oi iginal complaint. Furthermore, 'the counterclaim involved parties
not engaged in the original action,

The trial court did. not apply the correct, standards in

determining whether the counterclaim related back to the original complaint.
Plaintiffs contest the trial court's proceeding with, a second trial on the issue of damages
at'tei I »inuts had (in Ini lln" rnnnlv of IVSI issnm .iiiiinl diili ill I In iItK Innr nl nirt lion nf irmnlirs

forecloses pursuit of a second remedy when a party has knowingly chosen a primary remedy and
failed in his attempt to attain that remedy.
Plaintiffs contend that at the time Doms filed his counterclaim he had no interest in the
property. Doms did not receive an interest in the property until after the counterclaim had been
filed and the deed which he then received was void. Domcoy Enterprises, which owned the
property, did not meet the statutory requirements imposed upon a dissolved corporation for the
transfer of property. Therefore, the transfer to Doms was a nullity.
Plaintiffs claim that Doms was not the real party in interest to this action. The original
transactions were between plaintiffs and Doms and McCoy as partners. However, Doms did
not include either McCoy or the partnership in his counterclaim as named parties. Case law
from the Utah Supreme Court clearly states that an action must be brought by the real party in
interest.
Plaintiffs argue that as a remote grantee, Doms could not enforce the covenants against
encumbrances contained in the original warranty deed from plaintiffs. While the issue has never
been directly decided by an appellate court of this State, but dicta in Utah cases and many
authorities support the proposition that the covenant against encumbrances contained in the
warranty deed is a personal covenant, not one which runs with the land. Because the covenant
does not run with the land, it does not run to remote grantees such as Doms.
Doms had actual knowledge of any and all encumbrances on the property before he
entered into the transaction which conveyed Rossi Hills to the Doms/McCoy partnership. The
trial court specifically found that Doms possessed such knowledge before entering into the
transaction. This court should hold that it is nonsensical to allow a person, knowing he is

12

buying property with an open and obvious encumbrance, to purchase the property and then sue
the seller for the defect of which the buyer had knowledge.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court, after ruling that no claim had been filed against the
estate of D. C Anderson and therefore, that judgment could not be entered against Anderson's
pel son il reprrsnilrtlh'i

iiii

SSCIKC

JSMn M"«l

ILIUM^CS

a^auisl il I in rliili

Ilir rnnil s ruling

effectively reduced the amount due the estate from Doms even though his claim against the estate
had been barred by the 110:11. claim statute.
Plaintiffs assert that the trial court erroneously joined Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson as
involuntary plaintiffs. Neither Mrs. Scott nor Mrs. Anderson had any interest in the trust deed
«Mi Iiiiiih! 1 I in ill

IIII nil!

*

IIIIIII

III 1. 1 illllii nli|iil nil lllllii niiii'ttiai nuii|ihml (illnil h pliiintilf^

Hie

appellate courts of this state have develop • 2 • :i sp ;: cific tests which must be met before persons can

been, 'the conclusion would have been reached that Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson should not
have been joined in this action as involuntary plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs allege that "the trial court ignored the statutorily provided methods for
foreclosure of a trust deed which were reiterated in the trust deed in this case

Doms' default
•f

foreclosure to be used for that provided by the statute and the contract between the parties.
Plaintiffs conic...

.

.,

e

parties and awarded damages which should not have been allowed, The trial court's conclusions
of law are internally inconsistent. Furthermore, requested fin lings and* or conclusions were not
ni.i ii

f'lim 1 xample Donr; w.is 110I entitled to a setoff for his counterclaim, against "the trust
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deed note because the action which Doms maintained did not involve the trust deed note but
rather the warranty deed.
Finally, plaintiffs argue that the trial court should have awarded them attorney fees for
the defense of Doms' counterclaim. Most of the attorneys' fees incurred by the plaintiffs were
a direct result of the defensive postures taken by Doms. The trust deed and trust deed note
provided for an award of attorney fees should Doms default. Plaintiffs were required to defend
against Doms' counterclaim in order to preserve the value of the trust deed and the trust deed
note. Therefore, plaintiffs should have been awarded attorney fees pursuant to those documents.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARRED DOMS'
COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST BOTH VOLUNTARY AND
INVOLUNTARY PLAINTIFFS.
Financing documents in this case were executed on March 10, 1982, and the sale
document, the warranty deed, was executed on March 10, 1982, and recorded on March 23,
1982. (Exhibits 1,2,3; Addenda 1, 2, & 3) Prior to executing the documents, Doms inspected
the property in the presence of a realtor. Doms and the realtor entered the property using the
loop road which Doms later claimed to be an encumbrance in violation of the covenant against
encumbrances. (R. 7761,2; Addendum 18) Furthermore, the preliminary title report on the
property indicated that the policy did not insure the right of access to and from the land over
existing roads and accepted easements, claims of easements, or encumbrances not shown on the
record. (Exhibit 27) At the time of the execution of both thefinancialtransaction and the sales
transaction Doms was aware of all easements or encumbrances of which he later complained.
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Indeed, the trial court found that in the Fall of 1981, Doms "knew that there were roads and
sheds on. the property" and also found that Doms had "actual notice of the easement
encroachments for the first time sometime between, 'October 22. , 1.1 981 ;iml NovHiibn 7 1081 "
(R. 6883; Addendum 16)

that the applicable limitations period was four years as defined by §7842-25(2). (R. 3422-25).
The court never ruled what, the applicable limitation was, however, the proposed, order, never
signed by the trial court, states that the six-year limitations period of Utah Code Ann. §78-1223(2) is the correct, limitations period
tins isMiiii

illllii i iiHiiiil in vi mi ill iiilniiiiiiinl llln iippliriihlr Imulahim period

previously argued,
Doms

Brrause the trial court,, never issued a. formal ruling on

.

c hmn

.

Howes er, .is plaintiffs

- od is the four-year period or the six-year period,
J outside the limitations period

In Baker v. Pattee. 684 P.2d 682, 686, (Utah 1984), die Utah Supreme Court stated that
an action for rescission ; " ~n equitable action nnc1 is governed by the four-year statute of
limitations defined

, . - . . -

party claiming rescission is aware o\ the problems and tau
r r c o r d u l llu ill
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,
the deed before the deed is
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684 P,2d at 637»38.
Ihims /willed illicit lilt \t\ ycai limitation penod described in Utah Code ; UIH §/K I,'23(2) is the applicable limi'tations period. Indeed, claims of breach of a written contract or
breach of a warranty would be governed by the six-year limitations period.
In this case Dnnv.' ' ii nrul i oiititnvliiiii riTmlnl III liiiiiiiiiiliiliinis. prmwl whrtfini lltr

"

correct limitation period is four years or six years. Doms first answer and counterclaim, filed
January 29, 1988, only sets forth a claim for rescission. Rescission actions would be governed
by the four-year statute of limitations, thus Doms' counterclaim filed five years and ten months
after the warranty deed was recorded when all of the conditions of the encumbrances were
known to Doms at the time of the recording of the warranty deed, would govern and this first
counterclaim would be outside that four-year period of limitations.
Doms' amended counterclaim was not filed until June 15, 1988. (R. 102-05) Finally,
in this document, Doms claimed something more than rescission. However, this counterclaim
was filed six years and three months after the warranty deed which was the basis for the action
was recorded. Therefore, Doms was again outside the limitations period for filing an action
based on breach of warranty.
Finally, if Doms claims that the counterclaim filed on January 29,1988, effectively stated
a cause of action for breach of warranty, he ignores his Certificate of Compliance filed to meet
the requirements to aside the default judgment. On January 21, 1988, the trial court entered
default judgment against Doms.

(R. 20) On June 1, 1988, Doms filed a Certificate of

Compliance with the trial court which stated in pertinent part:
Defendant Doms understands that this Certificate of
Compliance triggers the actual date the default judgment is set
aside, and therefore defendant's answer and counterclaim are
officially accepted by the Court. Defendant Doms understands that
all attorneys involved in the case should work from this date in
complying with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(R. 76-78; Addendum 21) Doms had not filed an answer or counterclaim prior to the entry of
the default judgment on January 21, 1988. Doms ignores the fact that June 1, 1988, was six
years and two and one-half months after the deed was recorded, two and one-half months after
16

the limitations period described by §78-12-23(2) expired.
Furthermore, as noted below, Doms cannot salvage his counterclaim by arguing that Rule
15(c) allows him to relate those claims back to the original complaint filed by the plaintiffs. As
noted in Point II below, Doms cannot meet the conditions imposed by the case law of this state

original complaint and in Doms ^.n;rrcrelaim
opening claim within

-

^rmore

>oms did not file the necessary

w^icr. r^ was precluded, from, arguing that

Rule 15(c) applied in this case.
For the reasons set forth above, the trial court erroneously allowed Doms to proceed on
his counterclaim when his i'tuiiiirrrLiini was h.iinni In tin st.tiniii of limitations ThtrMbn-, lliis
court should reverse those portions of the ji

_

_

its which, are based on Doms'

c

POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY ALLOWED
DOMS5 COUNTERCLAIM TO PROCEED DESPITE THE
FACT THAT IT DID NOT RELATE BACK TO THE DATE
THAT THE PLAINTIFFS FILED THEIR FORECLOSURE
ACTION.
1

and Mrs. Scott and Mr and Mrs, Anderson; however, the trust deed anil trust deed note named
c

ill I In Vndcisoii and esiludwl llitii IAIRS (Inhibit 4, Addendum 2) The trial

court found that the transaction involving the warranty deed was an entirely separate transaction
from that involving the trust deed and the trust deed " ^
original claim of Anderson and Scott was to foreclose Ub
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plaintiffs' original complaint related only to the financing transaction and not to the sales
transaction. Nothing concerning the sales transaction (the warranty deed) was a basis for relief
in plaintiffs' original complaint. The documents for the sales transaction were signed on March
10, 1982. (Exhibits 2 & 3) The warranty deed was executed on March 10, 1982, and recorded
on March 23, 1982. (Exhibit 1)
Doms' answer and counterclaim were filed on January 29, 1988, but pursuant to his
certificate of compliance, the answer and counterclaim were not "officially accepted" until June
1, 1988. Doms' amended counterclaim was not filed until June 15, 1988. (R. 102-05) In the
memorandum of points and authorities in support of the motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs
argued that Doms' counterclaim could not relate back pursuant to Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. (R. 3420-21) Doms argued that his counterclaim did relate back to the
original complaint filed by plaintiff in this case.
The minute entry of the hearing held on this issue states merely, "The court rules as to
the statute of limitations, as having no standing." (R. 4327) Doms subsequently submitted an
"Order Regarding August 13, 1990 Hearing" which stated in pertinent part:
5. Plaintiffs' argument that Defendant Doms' cause of action for
plaintiffs' breach of the statutory covenant in the Warranty Deed is barred
by the six year statute of limitations in U.C.A. §78-12-23(2) is rejected;
and the Court rules that Defendant Doms' Second Amended Counterclaim
relates back to the date Plaintiffs' Complaint was filed and is therefore
within the period of time established by the statute of limitations
aforementioned.
(R. 4331) However, despite Doms' request for a ruling on this order (R. 4463-66), the trial
court never entered a ruling on the August 13, 1990 hearing with respect to the statute of
limitations and whether the counterclaim by Doms in fact did relate back to the original
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complaint filed by the plaintiffs.
A.
This Court Should Not Consider Whether the Second Amended Counterclaim
Filed by Doms Relates Back to Plaintiffs' Original Complaint.
As previously noted, the trial court never issued a ruling concerning whether Doms'
second amended counterclaim related back to plaintiffs' original complaint. Therefore, the trial
court's implied conclusion that the second amended counterclaim was within the statue of
limitations is without record support. This court should not consider an argument by Doms that
the second amended counterclaim relates back because the trial court never issued a ruling on
this issue.

Rather, this court should merely consider whether Doms' second amended

counterclaim was filed within the limitations period; if it was not, this court should overturn any
portion of thefinaljudgment which would be derived from Doms' claims in the second amended
counterclaim.
B.
Even if This Court Considers Doms' Argument concerning Rule 15(c), Doms'
Second Amended Counterclaim Does Not Relate Back to Plaintiffs' Original Complaint.
Rule 15(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleadings
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment
relates back to the date of the original pleading.
This court has stated that Rule 15(c) generally "does not apply to amendments which substitute
or add new parties to those brought before the court by the original pleadings, because such
amendments amount to assertion of a new cause of action and defeat the purpose of the statute
of limitations." Vina v. Jefferson Ins. Co. of New York. 761 P.2d 581, 586 (Utah Ct. App.
1988), citine Doxev-Lavton Co. v. Clark. 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976). The court noted
however that an exception to the rule exists "'where there is a relation back, as to both plaintiff
19

and defendant, when new and old parties have an identity of interest; so it can be assumed or
proved the relation back is not prejudicial.'" Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court cited
with approval a United States Supreme Court case which set forth the criteria to determine if
the new party which has been brought in under the relation back theory would be prejudiced.
In that case, Schiavone v. Fortune. 477 U.S. 21, 29 (1986), the Court set forth the criteria to
make the determination under the rule:
Relation back is dependent upon four factors, all of which must be satisfied:
(1) the basic claim must have arisen out of the context set forth
in the original pleading; (2) the party to be brought in must have
received such notice that it will not be prejudiced in maintaining
its defense; (3) that party must or should have known that, but for
a mistake concerning identity, the action would have been brought
against it; and (4) the second and third requirements must have
been fulfilled within the prescribed limitations period.
In this case, Doms did not meet the criteria set forth in Vina as it concerned Mrs. Scott
and Mrs. Anderson so as to relate back Doms' new claims to plaintiffs' original complaint.
Plaintiffs' original complaint concerned thefinancetransaction, not the sales transaction. Mrs.
Scott and Mrs. Anderson were not parties to the finance transaction.

Therefore, Doms'

counterclaim which concerned only the sales transaction to which Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson
were parties, did not arise out of the same basic conduct set forth in plaintiffs' original
complaint. The first part of the Schiavone test, that the basic claim must have arisen in the
context of the original pleading, was therefore not met. Furthermore, the second and third parts
of the Schiavone test were also not met. Those portions of the test can be invoked when, due
to a mistake in identity, the plaintiff has named a wrong party. However, here Doms knew the
identity of Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson from the instant they signed the warranty deed.
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Finally, Schiavone dictates that the second and third requirements will have been fulfilled within
the prescribed limitations period. In this case, Doms moved to name Mrs. Scott and Mrs.
Anderson six years and three months after the warranty deed had been recorded. (R. 97 et seq.)
Doms therefore failed to fulfill the second and third requirements within the prescribed
limitations period.
In short, Doms simply did not meet the requirements set forth by this court in Vina to
successfully invoke the relation back doctrine of Rule 15(c). Therefore, the action against Mrs.
Scott and Mrs. Anderson should have been dismissed by the trial court and the trial court should
not have considered any of Doms' claims against either. Additionally, because the claim against
Mr. Scott and Mr. Anderson did not arise out of the same transaction but a different transaction,
it also could not relate back to the original complaint.
POINT ffl
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT DOMS WAS NOT
ENTITLED TO RESCISSION OF THE WARRANTY DEED
SHOULD HAVE PRECLUDED SUBSEQUENT TRIAL ON
THE ISSUE OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY.
Doms' final second amended counterclaim requested both rescission and damages for loss
of profits as a result of the alleged breach of warranty against encumbrances in the warranty
deed. (R. 237-42) Because both of these remedies were based on the same cause of action,
plaintiffs requested the trial court to order Doms to elect which remedy he chose to pursue. (R.
4124-39; Addendum 19). Before the trial on the issue of rescission, the trial court required
Doms to elect his remedy. (R. 7087) Doms elected rescission as the appropriate remedy. (R.
7087) The trial court affirmed this decision when it stated, "You can't have it both ways, you
want a rescission and you want in the alternative. On the other hand, you want this court to
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proceed on damages and on the other hand, I ruled against you so you want it both ways. You
can't have it both ways." (R. 7759; Addendum 10) However, after Doms lost on the remedy
of rescission under his allegation of breach of warranty, the trial court allowed him to proceed
on the issue of damages under the same breach of warranty allegations.
In Roval Resources. Inc. v. Gibraltar Financial Corp.. 603 P.2d 793 (Utah 1979), the
Utah Supreme Court defined the doctrine of election of remedies:
The doctrine of election of remedies is a technical rule of
procedure and its purpose is not to prevent recourse to any
remedy, but to prevent double redress for a single wrong. Said
doctrine presupposes a choice between inconsistent remedies, a
knowledgeable selection of one thereof, free of fraud or
imposition, and a resort to the chosen remedy evincing a purpose
to forego all others.
603 P.2d at 796 (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted). In Cook v. Covev-Ballard Motor
Co.. 253 P. 196 (Utah 1927), the Utah Supreme Court defined when a party who elects his
remedy and fails in his action is foreclosed from pursuing the alternative remedy. The court
stated:
The true rule seems to be (1) that there must be, in fact,
two or more coexistent remedies upon which the party has the
right to elect; (2) the remedies thus open to him must be
alternative and inconsistent; and (3) he must by actually bringing
an action or by some other decisive act, with knowledge of the
facts, indicate his choice between these inconsistent remedies ....
With such elements present, an election once deliberately made by
the institution of a suit, by which the remedy is sought to be
recovered, is final, and his failure to secure satisfaction by means
of the remedy which he adopted furnishes no legal reason to
permit him to resort to the other. And this court has held, where
there is a duty of election as a particular remedy, the bringing of
an action based on one remedy constitutes irrevocable election,
except in case of mistake of fact or other legal excuse.
253 P. at 199-200. Thus, the pursuit of a remedy to an adjudication forecloses pursuit of the
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other remedy even if the pursuit of the first remedy proves futile. Mendenhall v. Kingston. 610
P.2d 1287, 1289 (Utah, 1980); Cook. 253 P. at 200.
In this case Doms tried breach of warranty allegation seeking a rescission remedy. The
trial court held that Doms was not entitled to rescission. (R. 4244-50; Addendum 15) Once the
trial court reached this conclusion, it should not have proceeded to trial to determine whether
Doms was entitled to damages. All of the factors listed in Cook were satisfied. Doms had two
coexisting remedies on which he had a right to elect. The remedies open to Doms were
alternative and inconsistent since both requested different remedies based on the same underlying
cause of action, breach of the covenant against encumbrances contained in the warranty deed.
Finally, in open court, Doms elected rescission as his remedy, a decisive act which indicated
his choice between the inconsistent remedies. Therefore, his failure on the breach of warranty
claim when he requested rescission as the remedy should have foreclosed the subsequent action
seeking damages. When the trial court allowed him to proceed seeking damages based on the
breach of warranty, it effectively gutted the election of remedies doctrine. Because Doms
elected his remedy and failed to convince the court that it was appropriate, the subsequent
judgment by the trial court which held that damages against the plaintiffs based on breach of
warranty should be reversed and remanded for dismissal.
POINT IV
DOMS COULD NOT MAINTAIN HIS COUNTERCLAIM
BECAUSE THE DEED WHICH HE OBTAINED FROM
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES WAS VOID.
Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. was terminated by a certificate of dissolution filed on
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December 31, 1986.5 (Exhibit 39; Addendum 7) At the time of the dissolution, Domcoy had
several creditors. (R. 519) One year and eight months after the dissolution, the corporation
received funds from Doms which it used to reclaim Rossi Hills from Summit County. Shortly
thereafter, Doms, acting as the secretary/treasurer of Domcoy, deeded Rossi Hills to himself.
(Exhibits 17, 66) In the trial court, plaintiffs raised this issue via motion for summary judgment
(R. 3430-32, 3974), introduction of the Certificate of Dissolution (Exhibit 7) and objections to
findings and conclusions. (R. 6853, 6865; Addendum 17)
Utah Code Ann. §16-10-101 (1991) allows a corporation to continue after dissolution for
the purpose of winding up its affairs with respect to "any property and assets which have not
been distributed or otherwise disposed of prior to such dissolution." However, the statute does
not authorize deviation from the statutorily required procedure. In Houston v. Utah Lake Land.
Water & Power Co.. 187 P. 174 (Utah 1919), the Utah Supreme Court stated the actions that
a dissolved corporation is allowed after dissolution:
Where a corporation's charter is forfeited in this state, it is
the duty of the directors, who are trustees for the stockholders and
creditors, to assemble its assets, liquidate its indebtedness, and
generally conduct its affairs in such a manner as will properly
expedite the winding up of the corporation's business.
187 P. at 177. Houston imposes an obligation on the directors to wind up the corporation's
business in compliance with the statutory requirements.
Utah Code Ann. §16-10-74 (1991) (Addendum 20) governs the sale of corporate assets
outside the regular course of business. That provision has three requirements: (1) the board of

5

Domcoy, a Utah corporation, was involuntarily dissolved on December 31, 1986,
because it failed to file the required annual report. (Exhibit 39)
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directors must adopt a resolution recommending the sale of corporate assets and directing the
submission of the recommendation to a vote at a meeting of shareholders, (2) written or printed
notice must be given to each shareholder entitled to vote, and (3) the shareholders must authorize
the sale or disposition of corporate assets by a majority vote at the required meeting. In Fair
v. Brinkerhoff. 829 P.2d 117 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), this court stated that where a corporation
proposes to sell all of its corporate assets, there must be an attempt to comply with §16-10-74
in order to render the contract for sale of the assets enforceable. 829 P.2d at 121 citing Davis
v. Heath Dev. Co.. 558 P.2d 594, 596 (Utah 1976). The court's opinion cited other cases
which recognized the importance of complying with the statutory requirement to affect the legal
transfer of corporate property. Lack of compliance with the statutory requirement renders the
transfer void because it is without proper corporate authority. In Fan;, the court held that
because the president of a corporation undertook to unilaterally convey an entire parcel of
corporate property without even an attempt to comply with the statutory requirements, the
conveyance was void. 829 P.2d at 121-22.
In this case, just as in Fair. Domcoy, through its directors, failed to comply with any of
the requirements of §16-10-74 in executing the transfer of Rossi Hills from Domcoy to Doms.
First, the corporation's board of directors never adopted a resolution recommending the
conveyance of the corporation property to Doms. Second, there is no evidence directors called
for or provided notice to Domcoy's shareholders of a meeting wherein the resolution would be
considered. Finally, there was never a vote by the shareholders of Domcoy to authorize the
conveyance.

Rather, Doms, acting only as secretary/treasurer and not as a director or

shareholder, authorized the conveyance from Domcoy to himself. As such, the conveyance was
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without any corporate authority and was void. Therefore, because Doms was not a grantee, he
had no interest in Rossi Hills and could not bring an action on his own behalf to enforce breach
of covenants against encumbrances. The trial court should have dismissed his counterclaim.
See also Sharp v. Eagle Gate Lumber Co.. 212 P. 933 (Cal. 1923); James v. Unknown
Trustees. 220 P.2d 831, 835 (Okla. 1950); Klorfme v. Cole. 254 P. 200 (Or. 1924).
Finally, even if the conveyance of Rossi Hills from Domcoy to Doms was legitimate,
Doms could only assert ownership of one-half interest in Rossi Hills. The district court had
previously sold McCoy's one-half interest in the property. That interest had been reacquired by
plaintiffs. The sale of McCoy's one-half interest had the effect of merging that interest in the
title and uniting the ownership such that the covenant against encumbrance was extinguished.
See e.g. 5 R. Powell The Law of Real Property §679 (1993). At most, Doms could assert a
breach of the covenant against encumbrances for only one-half of the property. However, the
trial court awarded damages was based on Doms' assertion that he owned the entire property.
Because this clearly could not be the case, the trial court's award of damages should be
reversed.
POINT V
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO
DISMISS THE COUNTERCLAIM BECAUSE DOMS WAS
NOT THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST IN RELATION TO
THE COUNTERCLAIM.
At trial Doms testified that he and McCoy were partners in the acquisition of Rossi Hills.
(R. 7627-28; Addendum 11). Plaintiffs moved the trial court to dismiss the counterclaim on the
basis that Doms had failed to join his partner in the counterclaim. The trial court denied
plaintiffs' motion and ignored plaintiffs' objections to the findings of fact which requested that
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a finding be made concerning Doms' failure to include McCoy on the counterclaim. (Addendum
17) Rule 17 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action shall be prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest. (Addendum 20) The requirement imposed by the rule
is not a mere formality. The purpose of the rule is to allow a defendant to have a cause of
action prosecuted by the real party in interest so that a judgment against the defendant will
preclude any action on the same cause of action by another plaintiff and also so that the
defendant may assert all available defenses and counterclaims against the real party in interest
of the cause of action. Shaw v. Jeppson. 239 P.2d 745, 748 (Utah 1952).
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a single partner can maintain
an action in his own name when property was procured by a partnership. In Kemp v. Murray.
680 P.2d 758 (Utah 1984), the court held that the plaintiff, who was a partner in a joint venture,
could not bring an action in his own name without joining his copartner and without naming the
partnership. 680 P.2d at 759. The court stated:
Courts universally hold that an individual partner may not
bring suit in his own name to enforce a liability owed to a
partnership. One partner's failure to join all partners as plaintiffs
is grounds for dismissal for lack of necessary parties.
Under the law of some states a partnership is empowered
to sue in the partnership name. That question has not been
decided in this state, . . . and may not be decided in this case. If
a partnership can sue in its own name, the partnership is obviously
an indispensable party in an action to enforce a partnership claim,
since it is the real party in interest. If a partnership cannot sue in
its own name, it must sue in the name of the partners, and all are
necessary parties, as explained above. In either event, this
plaintiff has failed to join an indispensable party and his complaint
was properly dismissed on that basis.
680 P.2d at 759-60. The court then explained that the interests involved in rule 17(a), judicial
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economy and "fairness to the parties in litigation," protect "the interest of parties who are
present by precluding multiple litigation and contradictory claims over the same subject matter
as the original litigation." 680 P.2d at 760.
In this case, just as in Shaw, the real party in interest was not Doms but rather the
Doms/McCoy partnership. The partnership, not Doms individually, acquired Rossi Hills.6 If
a cause of action could be maintained on the original warranty deed, see Point VI infra, it could
only be maintained by the partnership, not one of the individual partners. Indeed, pursuant to
the warranty deed, Doms could not show that he had suffered a direct individual injury as
distinguished from the injury suffered by the partnership under the warranty deed. Additionally,
as in Kemp, "[allowing [Doms] to go forward individually could subject defendants to multiple
liability and could spawn multiple litigation among the partnership, the individual partners, and
defendants. This would be unfair to absent partners, unfair to defendants, and contrary to
judicial economy." 680 P.2d at 761. Indeed, only the statute of limitations now prevents
McCoy from maintaining the same sort of action which Doms maintained against Anderson and

6

The question arises whether Doms could be the real party in interest because at the time
he filed a counterclaim he had no interest in Rossi Hills. The property at the time of the
counterclaim was owned either by Domcoy Enterprises (Exhibits 16 & 31) or Summit
County by reason of the tax sale. Therefore, as is argued in Point VI infra, at the time of
filing of the counterclaim, Doms was a remote grantee and had no basis for bringing an
action against plaintiffs. If the court decides that Doms was not a remote grantee and that an
action could be maintained under the original warranty deed, then the court must address the
issue of whether Doms' counterclaim should fail because it was not brought in the name of
the real party in interest. Even if the court ignores Doms' failure to bring the action for the
benefit of the partnership, the court should address the fact that Doms had only an undivided
one-half interest as a tenant in common under the terms of the warranty deed and had
divested himself of that interest by his deed to Domcoy. (Exhibit 16). No evidence
indicates that Domcoy, as Doms' grantee, has made any claim against Doms or the plaintiffs
in this case and therefore there is no showing of damages as a result of the claims of Doms'
grantees, and the counterclaim should have been dismissed.
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Scott. This is precisely the type of unfairness which Rule 17(a) seeks to avoid. The trial court
erroneously allowed the counterclaim to proceed even though it was not brought in the name of
the real party in interest.

POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO DISMISS
DOMS' CASE BECAUSE THE COVENANT AGAINST
ENCUMBRANCES IS A PERSONAL COVENANT AND
DOMS, AS A REMOTE GRANTEE, HAD NO CLAIM
UNDER THE DEED FROM PLAINTIFFS.
Plaintiffs originally conveyed Rossi Hills to Doms and McCoy as partners. Doms and
McCoy in turn conveyed the property to Domcoy Enterprises, Inc.

After the original

counterclaim had been filed, Domcoy then conveyed the property to Doms. As such, Doms was
a remote grantee. Doms did not file any action for breach of the covenant against encumbrances
against Domcoy which filed no action against the Doms/McCoy partnership.
Plaintiffs argued to the trial court that as a remote grantee, Doms could not bring a claim
that the covenant against encumbrances had been breached by plaintiffs. (R. 6864; Addendum
17) The trial court did not rule on this issue despite plaintiffs' objections to the contrary.
Plaintiffs asserted in the trial court, as they do on appeal, that the covenant against
encumbrances is a personal covenant and does not run with the land. Plaintiffs also argue that
even if the covenant against encumbrances does run with the land, Mrs. Scott should have been
dismissed as a plaintiff because she lacked privity of estate, an essential requirement in a claim
when a covenant does run with the land.
A.

Mrs. Scott Should Have Been Dismissed Because She Lacked Privity of Estate.
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Mrs. Scott had no interest in Rossi Hills and signed the warranty deed merely as an
accommodation to her husband. (Exhibit 5) Doms claimed his title in this action by reason of
a deed from Domcoy Enterprises. (Exhibit 17; Addendum 8)
Plaintiffs now assert, as they did in the trial court, that the covenant against
encumbrances is a personal covenant and does not run with the land. However, even if this
court were to find that the covenant against encumbrances does run with the land in this case,
plaintiffs assert that a requirement for a covenant to run with the land is privity of estate. Flying
Diamond Oil Co. v. Newton Sheep Co.. 776 P.2d 618, 628 (Utah 1989). In Flying Diamond.
the Utah Supreme Court clearly established that one of the requirements for a covenant to run
with the land is that there be privity of estate between the grantor and the grantee. In this case,
because Mrs. Scott owned nothing, there was no privity of estate and Doms' claim against her
must fail for that reason.
B.
The Covenant Against Encumbrances is a Personal Covenant Which Doms Could
Not Enforce as a Remote Grantee.
Neither this court nor the Utah Supreme Court has directly addressed the issue of whether
a covenant against encumbrances is a personal covenant or a covenant which runs with the land.
If the covenant against encumbrances is a personal covenant, it runs only to the direct grantee,
and not to remote grantees.
The most complete discussion of this problem is found in Soderberg v. Holt. 46 P.2d
428 (Utah 1935). In Soderberg. the property which had been conveyed by the defendant to the
plaintiff had been subject to a tax lien. The plaintiff brought the action which was the object
of the case to recover the amount paid to extinguish the lien claiming that the lien constituted
a violation of the covenant against encumbrances contained in the warranty deed given him by
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the defendant. 46 P.2d at 428. The defendant claimed that the statute of limitations lapsed
between the time the plaintiff obtained his deed from the defendant and the time when the action
was brought. The plaintiff countered by alleging that the covenant against encumbrances was
a covenant which runs with the land and therefore could be sued upon when the holder of the
land was damaged. 46 P.2d at 429. The supreme court resolved the issue by holding that the
covenant against encumbrances, at least as far as money charges, a remediable encumbrance,
is concerned, is to be deemed "an indemnity agreement. . . ." 46 P.2d at 434. In reaching this
resolution, the court carefully distinguished between encumbrances which involved rights of
way, irremediable encumbrances, as opposed to encumbrances which involve merely the
payment of money. In making the distinction, the court seemed to indicate that permanent,
irremediable encumbrances which were present at the time the covenant was entered into were
personal covenants between the grantor and the original grantee and could not be enforced by
remote grantees. After citing several cases which held that the covenant against encumbrances
does not run with the land, the court stated:
In the opinion of [Judge Cooley], a covenant consisting of a right
of way would not run with the land, "but a covenant against the
money charge must attach itself to the title conveyed, and
accompany it, not only for the protection of the covenantee, but
for the protection of his assigns, whom the encumbrance may
eventually indemnify." . . . We believe that there has been more
of a swing to Judge Cooley's view, and that today many respected
authorities consider a covenant against encumbrances, when it
applies to money charges or liens against lands which can be
removed by payment, is to be considered as a covenant to
indemnify. . . .
In the case of a violation of a covenant against
encumbrances, . . . breach really is committed at the time of
conveyance if there is a lien on the premises which the covenantor
covenanted was not there. The damage suffered by the buyer
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because of the necessity to extinguish the charge against the land
was a damage suffered because of the failure of the covenantor to
convey the property without the said charge, and thus arose from
the breach of the covenant, which breach occurred eo instanti at
the time of the conveyance.
46 P.2d at 431, 433 (quoting Post v. Campau. 3 N.W. 272, 275 (Mich. 1879)). The only other
time that the Utah Supreme Court has had occasion to address whether the covenant against
encumbrances is personal or runs with the land was in Beeslev v. Badger, 240 P. 458 (Utah
1925), in which the court clearly stated that the covenant against encumbrances was a personal
covenant "not running with the land . . . ." 240 P. at 458.
Other authorities support the notion expressed in the Soderberg case that the covenant
against encumbrances does not run with the land and therefore does not run to remote grantees.
For example, in 6A R. Powell, The Law of Real Property f900[5] at 81A-150-151 (1993), is
the following statement of the law:
In the case of the first triad of covenants — seisin, right to convey,
and freedom from encumbrances — the covenant speaks as of the
date of conveyance and is breached, if at all, when the deed is
delivered. If it is not breached at that time, there is no longer any
covenant which may be passed to the grantee's successors. If
there is a breach of covenant, the breach generates a cause of
action. Because of the common law repugnance to champerty, this
cause of action historically was not transmissible to the successors
of the grantee. Thus, it did not run with the land. It had to be
prosecuted, if at all, by the immediate grantee. Although the
modern view of champerty is very different from the common law
view, the general rule concerning the first triad of covenants
remains the same. Neither the covenants nor a cause of action
based on their breach will run to the benefit of remote purchasers.
7 G. Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Real Property states:
Under the majority rule the covenant against encumbrances is a
personal one and does not run with the land. It is broken the
instant it is made, thus vesting in the covenantee a chose of action,
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which is nonassignable and therefore does not pass to his grantee
or devisee. The grantee can maintain no action upon it and cannot
assert it by way of estoppel, since he acquired no interest in it....
A covenant against encumbrances is broken on the delivery of the
deed, if an encumbrance on the land then exists.
Thompson at §3185 at 303, §3186 at 306.
All of the authorities agree that the covenant against encumbrances, at least as it involves
an irremediable encumbrance present at the time of the conveyance, is a personal covenant and
does not run with the land. As such, only the original grantee has an action based on the
covenant against encumbrances against the grantor for a breach of the covenant. In this case,
Doms sued on his own behalf and claimed his deed as a warranty deed from the corporation,
Domcoy Enterprises.

Therefore, if there was a breach of covenant against encumbrances,

Doms' action was against Domcoy, not against plaintiffs. Only the Doms/McCoy partnership,
the original grantee under the warranty deed at issue in this case, had a cause of action against
plaintiffs. The trial court should have dismissed the counterclaim on this basis.
POINT vn
DOMS' ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE AND USE OF THE
ACCESS EASEMENT PRIOR TO THE PURCHASE OF
ROSSI HILLS SHOULD HAVE BARRED HIS CLAIM
OF A VIOLATION OF THE COVENANT AGAINST
ENCUMBRANCES.
Doms knew of the existence of the loop road easement because he traveled on it prior
to the purchase of Rossi Hills. (R. 7658-61) The road is the only access to Rossi Hills.
Without the easement, Rossi Hills is landlocked because the prior platted roads had been
terminated and the fee returned to the adjoining owners by reason of Revised Statutes of Utah
§1116 (1898). (Addendum 12) Testimony indicated that the platted streets, even if they could
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be revitalized, could not physically be used in the development of the property. (R. 80, 118-20;
Addendum 14)

Therefore, before the purchase Doms was informed of the backyard

encumbrances (R. 7667) and the loop road (R. 7667-68) and that any development would be
dependent on the loop road. (R. 7672) The realtor, Mr. Sloan, identified Exhibit 77 and noted
that he had seen it or something like it before and that he was aware that the boundaries of the
property extended into the backyards of several houses on Ontario Avenue. (R. 7666-7) He
told Doms about each of those encroachments. (R. 7668) Exhibit 77 details with particularity
the encroachments. The plaintiffs raised this issue in the trial court by objection to findings and
conclusions. (R. 6864; Addendum 17)
In Jones v. Grow Investment and Mortgage Co.. 358 P.2d 909 (Utah 1961), the Utah
Supreme Court held that a private right of way "which diminishes [the value of the property]
constitutes a breach of the covenant against encumbrances in the deed, regardless of whether a
grantee has knowledge of its existence or that it was visible and notorious." 358 P.2d at 911.
However, in a concurring opinion Justice Crockett stated, "If the easement is of such character
and use as to be open and notorious and the purchaser knows of its existence, he should not be
permitted to accept the conveyance and then claim a breach of covenant with respect to
something about which he had full knowledge." 358 P.2d at 912. In Bergstrom v. Moore, 677
P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah 1984), the court seemed to reiterate its position when it stated "mere
knowledge of encumbrances of this nature would not be sufficient to exclude them from the
operation of the statutory covenant against encumbrances." (Emphasis added.) The easements
involved in Bergstrom were sewer and utility easements which are not openly apparent. 677 P.2d
at 1124.
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In Breuer-Harrison. Inc. v. Combe. 799 P.2d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), this court
followed Bergstrom and held that even if a buyer had knowledge of an irremediable but
nonapparent easement, the covenant against encumbrances would be violated. 799 P.2d at 725.
Both the Bergstrom and Breuer-Harrison courts based their holding on Utah Code Ann. §57-1-12
(1990) which specifies the effect of a warranty deed. However, in Breuer-Harrison. Judge Orme
expressed the position that irremediable but apparent encumbrances should not fall within the
purview of the statute. Judge Orme noted that such an exception had not been adequately
addressed by previous case law and reasoned that such an exception should be made because:
If a purchaser has knowledge of an encumbrance that cannot be
removed and enters into a contract calling for conveyance free and
clear, the entire contract is an exercise in futility unless the
operative provision be taken to exclude such an encumbrance.
Otherwise, the purchaser has entered into a contract requiring the
vendor to do the impossible, which would be nonsensical.
799 P.2d at 732-33 (Orme, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).7 Judge Orme noted
that this seemed to be the general rule. LI

7

The basis for Judge Orme's view can be discerned from Jones in which the court

stated:
Some of these cases are decided upon the theory that, whenever the actual
physical conditions of the realty are apparent, and are in their nature
permanent and irremediable, such conditions are within the contemplation of
the parties when contracting, and are therefore not included in a general
covenant against encumbrances.
There seems to be a tendency toward the proposition that certain visible
public easements, such as highways and railroad rights of way, in open and
notorious use at the time of the conveyance, do not breach a covenant against
encumbrances.
358 P.2d at 910-11 (footnotes omitted).
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Other authorities support the position advanced by Judge Orme.

For example, 2

G.Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Real Property §433 at 700-01 (1980 Repl.)
states:
. . . one purchasing property with knowledge of an existing
easement takes subject . . . if the easement is visible, the
purchaser takes subject to it . . . purchasers of servient premises
have been held to take subject to such easements as tile drain,
encroaching structures, water rights, and bill boards.
and
An easement whether public or private, will not constitute
a breach of a covenant against encumbrances where it obviously
and notoriously affects the physical condition of the land at the
time it is sold.
Section 3186 at 309. In Tabet Lumber Co.. Inc. v. Golightlv. 457 P.2d 374 (N.M. 1969), the
New Mexico Supreme Court analyzed the then-extant cases and concluded that only Utah follows
the so-called New York rule which finds open, irremediable easements to be violations of the
covenant against encumbrances. 457 P.2d at 376. The New Mexico court concluded that the
better reasoned and more widely followed approach holds that open, apparent, irremediable
encumbrances (both public and private) are excepted from the covenant against encumbrances.
457 P.2d at 375-76.
In this case, Doms knew, used and planned to use of the right-of-way of which he
complained. A gross injustice would result if Doms obtained the fruits of an easement (the only
access to the property) that he knew existed and also recovered damages because of the existence
of that easement. The conclusion is irresistible that if the visible encumbrance damaged the
estate, that fact was taken into account in fixing the price and Doms has obtained all he
bargained for and all that he paid for.
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As Judge Orme noted, it is nonsensical to allow a person, knowing he is buying property
with an open and obvious easement, to purchase the property and then immediately sue the seller
for the defect of which the buyer had knowledge. This is not fair; it is not equitable; and it is
not good law. This court now has a chance to review the law and conform it to the general and
logical pattern of law. The court should take this opportunity to restate the law correctly so that
a technical trap is not available against a seller of real estate.
POINT Vffl
THE AMOUNT DUE THE ESTATE OF D. C. ANDERSON
WAS SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED EVEN THOUGH DOMS'
CLAIM WAS BARRED BY THE NON-CLAIM STATUTE.
Although the court took judicial notice of the fact that the Estate of D. C. Anderson had
been probated, duly published notice to creditors and no claim had been filed and stated further
that judgment could not be entered against the personal representative (R. 7988; Addendum 15),
the trial court determined the amount of damages and, in essence, assessed damages against the
estate. The effect of the court's ruling was to reduce the amount due the estate from Doms even
though his claim against the estate was barred.
The non-claim statute in the State of Utah is Utah Code Ann. §75-3-803 (1993). The
1975 revision was in effect at the time of this case. That provision states:
All claims against a decedent's estate . . . whether due or to
become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated,
founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis . . . are barred
against the estate, . . . unless presented as follows:
(a) Within three months after the date of the first
publication . . .
The Utah Supreme Court has reviewed the effect of this provision in relation to a
counterclaim to an action by the personal representative who was suing on a promissory note.
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The counterclaim requested setoff. The court stated in Rockhill v. Creer. 189 P. 668, 674 (Utah
1920), "Since no claim was ever presented against the estate to the respondents, no action by
way of counterclaim can be maintained." This case is cited with approval and is in line with
the majority of jurisdictions in the United States in B. O'Byrne, Annotation, Presentation of
Claim to Executor or Administrator as Prerequisite of Its Availability as Counterclaim or Setoff.
36 ALR 3d 693, 711-13 (1971). The Utah Supreme Court also reviewed this statute in relation
to contingent claims in Halloran - Judge Trust Co. v. Heath. 258 P. 342 (Utah 1927). The court
stated, "We cannot avoid the conclusion that the statute is susceptible of no other interpretation
than that contingent claims must be presented to the executor or administrator within the time
required by law and that the plaintiff herein is barred by failure to present its claims in time."
258 P. at 349.
The full amount due the estate of D. C. Anderson as a one-half owner of the promissory
note must be paid without any deduction, setoff or other charge. Further, the estate was entitled
to all attorney's fees and costs expended in this action.
POINT IX
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY JOINED ELLEN
ANDERSON AND JEANNE SCOTT AS INVOLUNTARY
PLAINTIFFS.
Plaintiffs' original action in this case was for foreclosure of a trust deed. Neither Mrs.
Anderson nor Mrs. Scott had any interest in the trust deed note or the trust deed. Doms moved
to join Mrs. Anderson and Mrs. Scott as involuntary plaintiffs because he claimed each "had an
interest in the Trust Deed Note" and each would be "personally liable for sums repaid to" the
defendant if the trial court granted rescission. (R. 98) Eventually, the trial court held that Mrs.
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Anderson and Mrs. Scott should be joined as involuntary plaintiffs because, pursuant to Rule 19
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, each was a necessary party "because in their absence
complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties as they are grantors on the
Warranty Deed which transferred the property which is the subject of the above-entitled lawsuit
. . . ." (R. 249) Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson contend that their joinder by the trial court was
contrary to Rule 19 and that their joinder as plaintiffs allowed Doms to proceed with a
counterclaim which should have been barred by the statute of limitations had they been properly
joined as third party defendants.
In Landes v. Capital City Bank. 795 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court
described the analysis which a trial court should undertake pursuant to Rule 19 before joining
an involuntary party. The court stated that a trial court should first determine whether a party
is "necessary" pursuant to Rule 19(a). 795 P.2d at 1130. In order to determine if a party is
necessary under Rule 19(a), a trial court must consider the two general factors listed in the rule.
First, a trial court may determine that a party is necessary if "in his absence complete relief
cannot be accorded among those already parties." Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1) (Addendum 20).
The trial court may also determine that a party is necessary if,
He claims an interest relating to the subject of this action and is so
situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as
a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that
interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to
a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.
Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2). The supreme court stated that if a trial court finds that a party is
necessary according to either of these criteria, "Rule 19 provides that the parties 'shall be
joined.'" 795 P.2d at 1131. Therefore, under the language of the rule, if a party is necessary
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and joinder is feasible, then joinder is mandatory. If joinder is not feasible, then the trial court
is to proceed to the second part of the Rule 19 analysis and determine whether the party is
indispensable. Id. Finally, and importantly, the supreme court stated that in performing the
Rule 19 analysis, the trial court "should discuss specific facts and reasoning that leads to the
conclusion that a party is or is not necessary under Rule 19(a) or indispensable under Rule
19(b)." 795P.2dat 1130.
In this case the trial court held that Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson were "necessary"
parties to the action because "in their absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those
already parties . . . ." However, in reaching this conclusion the trial court did not cite specific
facts and/or reasoning as required by Landes that led to the conclusion that Mrs. Scott and Mrs.
Anderson were necessary under Rule 19(a). For this reason alone, this court should reverse the
holding of the trial court.
The facts reveal that neither Mrs. Scott nor Mrs. Anderson were necessary pursuant to
Rule 19(a). Doms alleges that both Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson had "a personal interest in
the Trust Deed Note . . . ." (R. 98) However, an examination of the trust deed note indicates
that this is plainly false. The trust deed note was not executed in favor of either Mrs. Scott or
Mrs. Anderson; indeed, neither is mentioned in the trust deed note.
Doms asserted that Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson were necessary plaintiffs because in
their absence "complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties," pursuant to Rule
19(a)(1). Under Rule 19(a)(1) a party is necessary only if in his absence complete relief cannot
be accorded. Doms sought rescission of the entire "contract of conveyance." (R. 98) However,
plaintiffs' original action was an action for foreclosure under the trust deed note. The only
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parties to this note were Mr. Anderson and Mr. Scott and Doms and McCoy. Therefore, if
Doms had prevailed in plaintiffs' action against him, relief could have been afforded to Doms
under the trust deed note against Mr. Anderson and Mr. Scott without the involvement of Mrs.
Scott and Mrs. Anderson.
In Young v. Buchanan, 259 P.2d 836 (Utah 1953), the Utah Supreme Court stated that
to be joined as an involuntary plaintiff, a person "must have some interest, affirmative or
negative, which is beneficial or detrimental to the interest of the party desiring to so join the
recalcitrant person." 259 P.2d at 878. Furthermore, the court noted that the inability of a
potential involuntary plaintiff to bring an action against the defendant also indicated that the
person could not be joined as an involuntary plaintiff. Id. The lack of a contractual relationship
between the defendant and the potential involuntary plaintiff is another factor indicating that a
person is not an involuntary plaintiff.
In this case, neither Mrs. Scott nor Mrs. Anderson had any interest, either affirmative
or negative, which was beneficial or detrimental to Doms under the trust deed note which was
the basis for the initial action. Neither Mrs. Scott nor Mrs. Anderson could have brought an
action against Doms under that document. No contractual relationship existed under that
document between Doms and either Mrs. Scott or Mrs. Anderson. Therefore, neither should
have been joined as an involuntary plaintiff.
Because neither Mrs. Scott nor Mrs. Anderson had any contractual relationship with
Doms nor interest in the trust deed note, Rule 19(a)(2) is also inapplicable. In essence, that rule
prevents multiple adjudications on the same claim. However, because Mrs. Scott and Mrs.
Anderson had no interest in the trust deed note, they could not have filed an action against Doms
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and therefore Doms should have been prevented from bringing them into the action as
involuntary plaintiffs.
Finally, if Mrs. Anderson and Mrs. Scott should have been joined at all, they should
have been joined as third party defendants on Doms' separate and distinct claim for rescission.
Doms alleged that Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson were necessary because if the court granted
rescission and awarded interest, costs and attorneys fees with regard to sums paid to purchase
the property and obtain a deed, both Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson would be "personally liable
for sums to be repaid." (R. 98) Both Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson signed the warranty deed
for Rossi Hills, even though only Mrs. Anderson's signature was required on the warranty deed.
Therefore, Doms' only claim against them was as signatories to the warranty deed, not under
the trust deed note as claimed in Doms' motion. However, as Doms must have realized, he
could not join Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson as third party defendants because his claim against
them would have been barred by the statute of limitations. Therefore, Doms surreptitiously
joined Mrs. Scott and Mrs. Anderson in order to circumvent the rules for proper joinder.
POINT X
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBSTITUTING ITS
METHODOLOGY FOR FORECLOSURE IN LIEU OF THAT
PROVIDED BY THE CONTRACT AND THE STATUTE.
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-23 (1990) provides for two methods of foreclosure of a trust deed.
The first method is the standard method of trust deed foreclosure as provided in paragraphs 14
and 15 of the Trust Deed. (Exhibit 6) The second method found in paragraph 16 of the Trust
Deed states that, "beneficiaries shall have the option to declare all sums secured hereby
immediately due and payable and to foreclose this trust deed in the manner provided by law for
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the foreclosure of mortgages on real property. . . . " The statute gives the trust deed beneficiary
the option of which method to use. The election by the plaintiffs to foreclose in a manner
provided for foreclosure of mortgages is authorized by both the trust deed and the statute and
was approved in Security Title Company v. Pavless Builders Supply, 407 P.2d 141 (Utah 1965)
which noted that the obligor could not object to the attorneys fees resulting from the judicial
foreclosure.
Doms' default has been previously discussed. The court erred when it substituted its
judgment as to the method of foreclosure for that provided by the contract between the parties
and the statute. The district court should be directed to allow the plaintiffs to proceed with
special execution and sheriff's sale as provided by the statute and the trust deed and without
complicating this foreclosure with any problems that may arise from the separate action against
the grantors under the warranty deed.
POINT XI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY MODIFIED THE
TERMS OF THE TRUST DEED NOTE AND AWARDED
DAMAGES AGAINST THE PLAINTIFFS WHICH SHOULD
NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED.
Doms' counterclaim requested only rescission and/or damages for lost profits and/or
fraud. (R. 237-242) Nothing in the counterclaim requested modification of the terms of any of
the instruments. However, several of the trial court's conclusions of law had the effect of
modifying the terms of the trust note. For example, the trial court concluded that plaintiffs had
a duty to eliminate any encumbrances before giving the warranty deed (R. 6891; Addendum 16;
paragraph 17 and 18 of Conclusions of Law); and that the defendant's measure of damages for
breach of covenants against encumbrances related to the date of the warranty deed. (R. 6891;
43

Addendum 16; paragraph 20 of conclusions of Law) The latter ruling by the trial court resulted
in the trial court's allowing Doms to set off thousands of dollars in interest against the trust deed
note to which he was not entitled. Furthermore, in allowing the setoff against the trust deed
note the trial court ignored its own conclusion concerning the separateness of the transactions.
Plaintiffs objected to the trial court's proposed conclusions. (R. 6919) The trial court overruled
plaintiffs' objections and incorporated these conclusions.
In conclusion No. 6 (R. 6890; Addendum 16), the trial court concluded that the warranty
deed and the trust deed and trust deed note did not constitute a single transaction. The court
also concluded that the trust deed and trust deed note were not part of the contract to purchase
the property and were documents executed to secure the payment of the property "and have no
bearing upon whether the property is free and clear of any encumbrances."

(R. 6890;

Addendum, 16; Conclusions of Law #9) However, the court contradicted these conclusions by
allowing Doms to set off the damages incurred for the breach of covenant against encumbrances
against the trust deed note. (R. 6891; Addendum 17, paragraph 20) Once it concluded that the
financing of the property was separate from the purchase of the property, the trial court
improperly changed the financing agreement by setting off the amount of damages against the
financing agreement and thus revising the amount due and the interest chargeable under the
financing agreement.
The trial court's conclusion that plaintiff had an obligation to remove encumbrances
before the deed was conveyed to Doms and McCoy is also erroneous. No preexisting contract
existed between plaintiffs and Doms and McCoy. Various earnest money agreements were
proposed, but they all differed in some significant aspect from the final contract for the purchase
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of the property. Furthermore, all preliminary negotiations were merged by the execution of the
deed as the trial court concluded in Conclusion #7. (R. 6890) See, e.g., Dobrunskv v. Isbell.
740 P.2d 1325, 1326 (Utah 1987) (the deed is the "final repository of the agreement which led
to its execution.") Logically, a prior agreement to remove encumbrances cannot be breached
because it is merged into the final deed. The only agreement that is effective is the agreement
evidenced by the deed.

The deed contained a covenant against encumbrances which, if

breached, would allow an action against plaintiffs. If a breach of a covenant contained in the
deed occurred, damages may have been an appropriate remedy but the deed covenant does not
create a contract to eliminate encumbrances. Therefore, the trial court's conclusions No's. 22
and 23 which adjust the amount due under the trust deed note are erroneous. (R. 6892-93;
Addendum 16)
Furthermore, the trial court's adjustment of the interest rate called for in the trust deed
note was erroneous. Clearly, the terms of the trust deed note had been violated by the failure
to pay required payments due under the note and by the failure to pay taxes. The note was in
default and therefore the default interest rate called for in the note, 18%, should have been
applied from the date of default. However, the trial court ignored the default interest rate and
allowed interest at the rate of 14%. (R. 6904; Addendum 17; Judgment, paragraph 11)
Generally, "to warrant a setoff for counterclaim in an action, the demands must be
mutual, that is, the setoff or counterclaim and the action must be between the same parties in
the same capacity or right, and there must be mutuality as to the quality of the right." 20 Am
Jur 2d Counterclaim. Recoupment, §74 at 291-92 (1965). The general rule is stated in Johnson
v. Citv of Aberdeen. 266 P. 707, 709 (Wash. 1928):
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But it is the rule that demands, to be the subject of set-off,
must be mutual between the parties; that is to say, the demands
must be due to and from the same parties in the same capacity,
and be of such nature that had the defendants sued upon the setoff, the plaintiff could claim his cause of action in that the suit was
a setoff.
See also, Western Securities v. Spiro. 221 P. 856 (Utah 1923); Workman Motor Co. v. Pacific
Finance Corp.. 26 P.2d 961 (Utah 1933).
In this case, mutuality simply did not exist. For example, Doms' counterclaim is made
against four plaintiffs whereas the initial complaint involved only two plaintiffs. Furthermore,
the district court determined that the sale and the financing involved two different, separate
transactions, therefore, setoff was not appropriate and should not have been permitted. See also
Spratt v. Security Bank of Buffalo. Wyoming. 654 P.2d 130 (Wyo. 1982).
By ordering setoff, the trial court actually awarded prejudgment interest which was not
allowable in this case.

The damages in this case, if any, were not ascertainable with

mathematical precision and therefore should not have been subject to an allowance of
prejudgment interest. Anesthesiologists Assoc, v. St. Benedict's Hosp.. 212 Utah Adv. Rep.
28, 33 (UtahCt. App., 1993).
POINT XII
THE COURT ERRED BY NOT ALLOWING THE
PLAINTIFFS ATTORNEYS' FEES FOR ALL WORK
EXPENDED IN DEFENDING, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, THE VALIDITY OF THE PROMISSORY
NOTE AND TRUST DEED, INCLUDING THE DEFENSE
AGAINST RESCISSION WHICH WOULD HAVE
ELIMINATED THE PROMISSORY NOTE AND TRUST
DEED.
The original action by Scott and Anderson was to foreclose a trust deed. Doms added

46

additional plaintiffs and counterclaimed seeking rescission. Clearly, plaintiffs were required to
defend against the rescission action, otherwise the promissory note and trust deed would have
been eliminated by the rescission. The trust deed and trust deed note provided for attorneys'
fees to collect on the note. Plaintiffs now contend, as they did in the trial court, that defense
of the rescission action was tantamount to defense of the trust deed and trust deed note and that
attorneys' fees should have been awarded for the successful defense against the rescission action.
The trial court did not award attorney fees for the defense of the rescission action. (R. 6886;
Addendum 16; Findings of Fact, #64b) Plaintiffs contend that the fees were incurred in defense
of the validity of the note and as such the plaintiffs must be compensated for payments made
under the specific agreement to pay attorneys' fees. To rule otherwise would encourage any
party who had an obligation under a trust deed note to create as many impediments, whether
justifiable or otherwise, to the collection of a trust deed note in order to render worthless their
duty to pay attorney fees.
A significant portion of plaintiffs' attorney fees resulted from Doms' efforts to avoid his
obligations under the trust deed and note. Paragraph four of the trust deed (Exhibit 11)
required Doms to "appear and defend any action or proceedings purporting to affect the security
hereof, the title to the property . . . ." Paragraph five of the deed required Doms, "to pay at
least ten days before delinquency all taxes and assessments affecting said property . . ."
Paragraph sixteen stated t h a t " . . . beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums secured
hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this trust deed in the manner provided by law
for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property . . . and recover all costs, expenses incident
thereto including reasonable attorneys' fees . . . " The trust deed note (Exhibit 12) provides, "If
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this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either
with or without suit, the undersigned jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses
of collection, including reasonable attorneys' fees."
In this case most of the attorneys' fees incurred by the plaintiffs were a direct result of
the defensive postures undertaken by Doms. Plaintiffs had to reply to and defend against the
counterclaim. Doms' final amended counterclaim requested rescission and/or damages for lost
profits and/or damages for fraud. (R. 241) If Doms had prevailed on any of these theories, the
trust deed and note would have been either diminished in value or worthless. However, Doms
did not prevail on any of the theories contained in the final counterclaim.
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988), is instructive in this instance.
The court detailed the requirements imposed on plaintiffs counsel by the defendants'
counterclaim:
Counsel. . . detailed the efforts he had expended . . emphasizing
that most of what he did was a direct result of the defensive
posture undertaken by the Brackens. He had to meet the motion
to dismiss. He had to reply to the counterclaim. He had to
defend depositions taken by the Brackens, and he had to take their
depositions in view of the magnitude of their counterclaim. . . .
764 P.2d at 987. The court then held that defendants' tactics were responsible for the size of
plaintiffs attorney's fees:
First, while the bank's fee is large relative to the amount
of its claim, it is small relative to the counterclaim interposed by
the Brackens. The Brackens' litigation strategy converted the
action from a routine collection action of a magnitude such that
it might have been brought in circuit court into a brouhaha of
much larger proportions.
Second, and more importantly, the fees incurred by the
bank were increased several-fold over what they should have been
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by the tactics employed by the Brackens. . . . It was the Brackens
who asserted unmeritorious counterclaim. . . . The attorney fees
incurred by the bank were clearly much higher than they should
have been in this case; but they were higher because of the
inconsistent and unmeritorious positions taken by the Brackens—not
because of any extravagance or "overkill" on the bank's part.
764 P.2d at 991 (emphasis added).
The present case is comparable to Dixie State Bank. Doms has done everything he
possibly could to avoid his obligation creating immense discovery, research and trial problems.
As heretofore outlined, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover for the legal services rendered in this
matter and to do otherwise would be to encourage useless, unproductive litigation. The district
court found that the hourly rates charged by the counsel were reasonable (R.6874 et. seq.) but
determined that the plaintiffs were not entitled to compensation for the time spent in defending
any of the causes of action contained in the second amended counterclaim (R. 6874 et seq.) and
awarded only $41,975.00 in attorneys' fees when the plaintiffs were required pay in excess of
$260,000.00 for prosecution and defense of this action. (R. 6369-6437; exhibits 3P & 5P)
In Cabrera v. Cottrell. 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985), the court stated:
The total amount of the attorneys fees awarded in this case
cannot be said to be unreasonable just because it is greater than the
amount recovered on the contract. The amount of the damages
awarded in a case does not place a necessary limit on the amount
of attorneys fees that can be awarded.
Furthermore, contrary to appellant's contention that
attorneys fees should be determined on the basis of an equitable
standard, attorneys fees, when awarded as allowed by law, are
awarded as a matter of legal right.
(emphasis added). Recently, in Saunders v. Sharp, 818 P.2d 574, 579 (Utah Ct. App. 1991),
this court stated that a trial commits error if it awards attorney fees more limited in scope than
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the underlying contractual provision. As indicated in Hoth v. White. 799 P.2d 213, 220 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990), "Where the evidence supporting the reasonableness of requested attorney fees
is both adequate and entirely undisputed, the court abuses its discretion in awarding less than
the amount requested. . ."
Defendants in the financing portion of this transaction contracted to pay the fees incurred
in collection and defense of title and they should not be heard to complain when they created the
massive expenses and attorneys fees that were incurred in this case.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this brief, plaintiffs request that that portion of the judgment
based on Doms' counterclaim be reversed and that the case be remanded to the trial court for
dismissal of Doms' counterclaim and entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, including an
award of all requested attorneys' fees.
DATED this

^7

day of June, 1993.
Respectfully submitted,
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

I&VffiGjj/BIELE
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants and
Cross-Appellees
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A

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLANTS was either hand delivered or mailed by United States Mail, postage prepaid this
jy

day of June, 1993, to the following:
Larry R. Keller, Esq.
Craig L. Boorman, Esq.
LARRY R. KELLER & ASSOCIATES
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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ADDENDUM 1

RECC-^F03.-;?3-£2 ef 3.V0..M Page.

RECK-

SUMAtyl CO. Wilt

Recorded at Request of
at

©RDEf
INDEXED

M. Fee Paid $_

A»-Ta f.r.T

^ ^y. ^

"

"

•

. Dep. Book,

by

Page
Ref.:
_
,-.
2850
Ocean
Park
Boulevard,
Suiuo
300
Grantee / M. M^Coy
Mail tax notice to_
AHHrpsg Santa Monica, California 90405
(SPECIAL)

WARRANTY DEED
DeWAYNE C. ANDERSON aka D.C. ANDERSCN aka DEWEY D.C. ANDERSON and ELLEN R.
ANDERSON, h i s w i f e , and DAN SCOTT and JEANNE SCOTT , h i s w i f e ,
grantor s
Park C i t y , Utah
Summit
of
f County of
f s t a t e o f U t a h , hereby
CONVEY and WARRANT to
EUCENE E. DOMS and MICHAEL R. McCOY, a s t e n a n t s i n cannon

grantee
for the sum of
~ DOLLARS,

0£

Santa Monica, C a l i f o r n i a
TEN AND NO/100(and o t h e r good and v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s )
the following described tract of land in
Summt
State of Utah:

County,
INDEXED:

GRANTOR: - ^
GAANTZE:

—.=^-^-

S7A>I"L^:

/.

SEE ADDENDUM ATTACHED TO AND MADE A PART HEREOF:
—

v*5, tt#

t§ EXHIBIT: •

"50KJK.T

TO IHE GENERAL PROPERTY TAXES FOR THE YEAR 1982 AND THEREAFTER, AND
ANY SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS NOW DUE OR TO BECOME DUE.
EXCEPTING ALL OIL, GAS AND/OR OIHER MINERALS WHICH WERE PREVIOUSLY RESERVED.

WITNESS, the hand
M
u
March

of said grantor

, this
, A. D. 19 82

10th

day of

Signed in the Presence of
iTjSCOJT (Jeanne)"
De^IAYNE C. .ANDERSON aka D.C. ANDERSON aka
ELL£N P. ANDERSON
STATE OF UTAH,
County of "Summit

the^fnHp

*#avSk
March
, A. D. 19 8 2
p*"\DeVfflteNE C. ANDERSON , aka D.C. ANDERSON , aka
^ E % E N « . ANDERSCN, h i s w i f e ,
within instrument,ijvho duly acknowledged to me that t n e v executed the

same.

: e - m i s s i o n F.stf ••'-- *

On the
personally ap
DEWEY D.C

>J

v

&

Notary Public.
9-28-82

My commission expires^
BLANK £ 1 0 1 — W A R R A N T Y D I E D —

J

£

c t M

.Residing in

Park C i t y , Utah

PTG. CO. — s2'5 so 2000 EAST — SALT LAKE CITY

B00KM215PAGE44 7

ADDENDUM

/
PARCEL NO. 1: All of lots 17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,
and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey, according to the
amended plat thereof, as filed and of record in the office
of the Summit County Recorder.
•

PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City Survey, according
to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of record in the
office of the Summt County Recorder, excepting therefrom any
portion located within the railroad rights of way as described
in those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book
C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, and
Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Summit County,
Utah.
PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, according to the
Amended Plat thereof, as filed and of record in the office of
the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any portion
located within the County Recorder, excepting therefrom any
portion located within the railroad rights of way as described
in those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book
C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, and
Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Summit County,
Utah.

v

Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and water lines
over the Southerly five feet and Northerly five feet of the following
described Lots.
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City Survey according
to the amended plat thereof as filed and of record in the office of the Summit
County Records.
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STATE OF Wra&EttJG

•

COUNTY OF MiAxAx^

)

_)

On t i e
g ? ^ / t ^ - g C _ d a y of
^Ll^,k^~
> A.D., 1982 personally,
appeared before ate ffiN SCUTT ar^'KSmii'^^IT
the signers of the within
instronent,
who duly acknowledged t o me i&t.&^Mfeated
the same.
/ • • • • •

My Camtission e x p i r e s :

f

.

•

*

*

.

* V~ ; ' > f

My Commission expires January 8,1984 \
\

'

^

\

\

/

^ \ '-f ^>C&J-£/^U^ &,
U

XJ

\
3U
/;J
Notary Public ; /
!
V **••.
.• , ''>;^ Residing a t ; /ArU/l<ut&^
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ADDENDUM 2

TRUST DEED NOTE
DO

N O T DESTROY THIS NOTE:

When paid, this note, with Trust Deed securing same, must be surrendered

to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made.

ParkCity, .Utah.

$l?4f250.00

March 10,

, 19-
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FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of
D.C. ANDERSON as to an undivided one-half interest and DAN SCOTT as to an
undivided 1/2 interest
0 ^ H^^^^N

($..194/250.00

together with interest from date at the rate of.. FOURTEEN
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows:

..per cent ( f

%) per annum on

TTO THOUSAND IWO HUNDRED SIXTY SIX AND 25/100 Dollars ($2,266.25) towards
interest only on the 10th day of April, 1982, and a like amount to interest
on the 10th day of each and every month thereafter to and Including January
10, 1985.
The entire unpaid principal, together with interest is due on January 25, 1985.

Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal Any
suchl installment not paid when due sishall bear interest thereafter at the rate o f . . „ . . . ^ ™ ? : .
per
cent (.18~.Q.%) per annum until paid.
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued inttitst

due and

payable.
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either with
or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including
a reasonable attorney's fee.
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand
and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals,
waivers or modifications that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other provisions of this note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution.
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith.

EUGENE E . DQMS

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

3
" VS3?
B L A N K NO.

)
813

© GEM PTG CO — 321s so
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ADDENDUM 3

WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO:

Space Above This Line For Recorder's Use

TRUST DEED
With Assignment of Rents
1U
THIS TRUST DEED, made this . . .10th
.?\

between

day of

, 19 82

A*1™

*^??;.3....LPf?. . . ^
as TRUSTOR,

whose address is

2850

0 c e a n

Park

B l v d . , S u i t e 300, S a n t a Monica, C a l i f . ,

(Strwt and numbtr)

(City)

^ * ^ . . 9 ? ^ . . ^

90405
(StaU)

, as TRUSTEE,* and

1

01 1

6

?>«0 • _ .^^^rTP^fr*^ _'^. *. .^S? .f^T?. .V^Tl^r^J^^r^ ^. . .S?^*^—^w=aJ.^ i n t n r a s t and QrNtf 9CCTT a s to « n
^ j M ^ . . ^ . . ^ ^

3

^ ^

, as BENEFICIARY,

WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST,
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in
County, State of Utah:

t,tV

&**&%

KMT22L NO. 1 :

All of Lots 17,13,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,23,29,30,31
an! 32, Ulock 5C, I'arJc City Survey, according to tha amnded
plat thereof, a* filad and of wxxA in the offio« of the
Siarrlt Cc*x\tj :iaooruer,

Pk.TC£L \K>. 2:

•11 cf iczz 17 ayuT. 10, Jlcvk 3(\ V*& City 'Vin' \ *r^nlirtg
t:. is.* -m- V«1 Oiit. " ^ r r o i % ;r. r 4 I V V i ; f>4' ** onr". 1- *h«
• • f ^ - " <'r: r \ r - M : ^ " • > ; T - w V * - >\xr*-.*tX'; t-V*tvfT»T»

any portion looatad vdthin t±« railroad rights of %*y »
ceocriboi la tl^nc certain docunaita tooardsd em Sfttry NO.
317f, in Dock C «t Png» 401, Entry No. 13316 in Boc* H «t
Page 326, and Entry NO. 13610 in Book R at Page 373, records
of SizxxzdLt Crxrrty, Utah.
PAPCEL NO. 3T

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

All of lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey, according to tha
tasrtiad Plat tharaof, as f l l a i and of record in the office of
tho Submit Courty Feooctter, cwaapting th^rafron any portion
located within the railroad rights of way as daeadbeu in
these certain docinrrts iBuunSad as artry NO. 8176 in Book C
at Page 401, Sntry Ho. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, and 2ntry
No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Srimtt County, Utah*

2339
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of
way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances
thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoved with said property, or any part thereof,
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the nght, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits;
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a pro194,250.00
j v
missory note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $
, made by
Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner nnd with interest as therein
set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of
each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as
hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest
thereon as herein provided.
• N O T E : Trustee must be a member of the Utah State Bar; a bank, building and loan association or savinp
and loan association authorized to do such business in Utah; a corporation authorized to do a trust business in
Utah; or a title insurance or abstract company authorized to do such business in Utah.

—

»••»»* ' " ^ i

u t t u , TKUSTOR

AGREES

1. T o keep said property in cood condition and r e p a i r not to remove or demolish a m building thereon to
complete or restore promptly and in good a n d w o r k m a n l i k e m a n n e r a m building which max he constructed
d a m a g e d or destroyed thereon, to r o m p l v with all l a « s c o v e n a n t s .inoW«Mrictio t l > ..(leeim- s.n,| propertv not
to commit or |>ormit waste thereof, not to commit, suffer o r p e r m i t anv act upon said property m violation of l a * tr
do all o t h e r a r t s which from the c h a r a c t e r or use of said pro|x*rtv m a v Iw rca*nnahl\ necessary the specific
e n u m e r a t i o n s herein not excluding' the g e n e r a l : a n d . if t h e loan secured herehv or anv part Hereof is being obtained for the purpose of financing construction of u n p n n r n i . - n N on s a r i pro|N>rly T r u s t o r lurtln-r agrees(a) T o commence construction p r o m p t l y a n d to p u r s u e s a m e with reasonable diligence to completion
m a c c o r d a n c e wiih plans and qK-cificatiotis satisfactory to Beneficiary, and
(b)

T o allow Beneficiary

to inspect said p r o p e r t y at all times d u r i n g construction

T r u s t e e . U|>on presentation to it of an affidavit sigmsl l»y Beneficiary, setting forth facts slwmin^ a default
by T r u s t o r u n d e r this numbered p a r a g r a p h , is a u t h o r i z e d to accept a s t r u e and conclusive ail fatt^ and statements therein, and to act thereon .hereunder.
2. T o p r o v i l r and m a i n t a i n i n s u r a n c e of such t y p e or types and a m o u n t s as lieneliciarv mav require, nn
the i m p r o v e m e n t s now existing or lierealter erected or placed on said propcrtx Su< h insurance -hall he carried
in c o m p a n i e s approved l»v Iteneficiarv with Joss p a y a b l e clau-.es m | . ( \ o r <•» ami m I'-rui a. . e p i a b l e lo l l e n e l n i a r v
In event of loss. T r u s t o r shall give irume<liale notice to l l e n e l n i a r v who mav m.tk. proof ,,| |..«.> .IIHI . a. h inMir.imr
c o m p a n y concerned is herehv a u t h o r i z e d and directed to m a k e pavnietii lor MH II IOS- ihrectlv to It. neficiary
instead of to Trustor and Bciieliciarv jointly and the in>uranee proceeds, or anv part thereof. mav In- applied
by Beneficiary, at its option, to redut lion of t h e i n d e b t e d n e s s herehv »ecured or to the restoration <»r r e p a i r ot
the property damaged
.1 T o deliver to. pay for and m a i n t a i n with Beneficiary until the indebtedness secured herehv is paid in full,
such evidence of title as Beneficiary m a v require, i n c l u d i n g abstracts oi title or jM»hcies oi title i n s u r a n c e a n d
a n y extensions or renewals thereof or s u p p l e m e n t s thereto
4 T o appear in ami defend any actum or pr<»ceeding purj>orlmg to aflecl MM security hereof, the title to
said property, or the rights or tMiwers of Beneficiary or Trusl«*e; a n d should Beneficiary or T r u s t e e elect to
also appear in or defend any such action or p r o c e e d i n g , to pay all costs and exj>cnses. including cost of evidence of title and attorney's fees in a reasonable sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee
,^jR T o pay at least 10 days before delinquency all taxes and assessment* affecting said property, including
ail assessments upon water c o m p a n y stock and all rents, assessments and c h a r g e s for water, appurtenant to or
used in connection with said property, to pay. when d u e . all encumbrances, charges, and liens with interest,
on said property or any part thereof, which at any time appear to be prior or superior hereto; to pay all costs,
fees, and expenses of this T r u s t
6. Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act »a herein provided, then Beneficiary or
Trustee, but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing
Trustor from any obligation hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may
d e e m necessary to protect the security hereof, Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon said
property for such purposes; commence, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the
security hereof or the rights of powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay. purchase, contest, or compromise a n y
encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto; a n d in exercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem
necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, a n d pay his reasonable fees.
7. T o p a y immediately and without demand a!) sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee,
with interest from date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum until paid, and the repay*
ment thereof shall be secured hereby.
I T IS MUTUALLY AGREED T H A T :
8. Should said property or any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason o( any public improvement
or condemnation proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other manner. Beneficiary shall be
entitled to all compensation, awards, and other p a y m e n t s or relief therefor, and shall be entitled mt its option
to commence, appear in and prosecute in its own n a m e , any action or proceedings, or to make any compromise or s e t t l e m e n t in connection with such taking or damage. All such compensation, awards, damages, rights
of action mnd proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies of fire and other insurance affecting said property,
a r e hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may. after deducting therefrom all it* expenses, including attorney's fees,
apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby Trustor agrees to execute such further assignments of any
compensation, award, damages, and rights of action a n d proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may require.
9. At a n y time and from time to time upon writtten request of Beneficiary, payment of its fees and presentation of this Trust Deed and the note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation a n d
retention), without affecting the liability of any person for the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby,
Trustee may (a) consent to the making of any map o r plat of said property, (b) join in granting any easement or creating any restriction thereon; (c) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed
or the lien or charge thereof; (d) reconvey. without warranty, all or any part of said property T h e grantee in
any reconveyance may be described as "the person or persons entitled thereto", and the recitals therein of a n y
matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof Trustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's
fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph.
10. As additional security. Trustor hereby assigns Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all
rents, issues, royalties, and profits of the property affected by this Trust Deed and of any personal property
located thereon Until Trustor shall default in the p a y m e n t of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of any agreement hereunder. Trustor shall have the right to collect all such rents, issues, royalties,
a n d profits earned prior to default as they become due and payable
If Trustor shall default as aforesaid,
Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall cease and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without
taking possession of the property affected hereby, to collect all rents, royalties, issues, and profits. Failure or
discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from t i m e to time to collect any such moneys shall not in any
manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authority to collect the same.
Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise of the right by Beneficiary to collect, shall be, or be construed to
be. an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a
subordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option.
11. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder. Beneficiary may at a n y time without notice, either in
person, by a g e n t or by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of
Beneficiary as such receiver), and without regard to the adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby
secured, enter upon and take possession of said property or any part thereof, in its own name sue for or
otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profits, including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, less
costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon a n y indebtedness
secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may determine.
12. T h e entering upon and taking possession of said property, the collecton of such rents, issues, a n d
profits, or the proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking or
damage of said property, and the application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any
default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice.
43 T h e failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as
a waiver of such right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of a n y other
or subsequent d e f a u l t
14 T i m e is of the essence hereof Upon default by Trustor in the payment of a n y indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance of s n y agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become d u e
arid payable at the option of Beneficiary In the event of such default. Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee
to execute a written notice of default and of election t o cause said property to be sold to satisfy the obligabona
hereof and Trustee shall file such notice for record i n each county wherein said property or some part or
parcel thereof is situated Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all documents evidencing
expenditures secured hereby.
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a whole or in separate parcels, and in such order as it may determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to
direct the order in which such property, if consisting of several known lots or parcels, shall be sold), at public
auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United States at the tune of
sale. The person conducting the sale may, for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to
time until it shall be completed and, in every case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration
thereof by such person at the time and place last appointed for the sale; provided, if the sale u postponed
for longer than one day beyond the day designated in the notice of sale, notice thereof shall be given in the
same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed conveying said property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. The recitals in the
Deed of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Beneficiary, may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and
expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's
fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed;
(3) alt sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 10% per annum from date
of expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any, to the person or persona
legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County
Clerk of the county in which the sale took place.
16. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary shall have the option to declare all sums
secured hereby immediately due and payable and fore close this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law
for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceeding all costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be
fixed by the court
17. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County
Recorder of each county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, s substitution of trustee. From
the time the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority
and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law.
18. This Trust Deed shall apply to, inure to the benefit of. and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees,
devisees, adminstrators, executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder are joint and
several. The term "Beneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured
hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever the context requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or
neuter, and the singular number includes the plural.
19. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public
record as provided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other
Trust Deed or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor. Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless
brought by Trustee.
20. This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah
21. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale
hereunder be mailed to him at the addreas hereinbefore set forth.
Signature of Trustor

MICHAEL R. MnCOT

(If Trustor an Individual)
STATE OF UTAH,
COUNTY O F & i m d t
On the

»•

Wtfc

appeared before me

day of

Jiarch

t

^.D. 19...*?., personally

&KENE. . LOMS..TO..^ChA^. R,..rtoQDK

the signer(s) of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that .^.he..Y. executed the
same.

Notary Public residing at:
^ ^ ^ ^
r j t a h

My C o m m o n Exp.res:

SQ1Z

(If Trustor a Corporation)
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF
On the

day of

t

appeared before me
says that he is the

t

A . D . 19

, personally

who being by me duly sworn,

of

the corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument was
signed in behalf of said corporation by authonty of its by-laws (or by authority of a resolution
of its board of directors) and said
to me that said corporation executed the same.

acknowledged

Notary Public residing at:
My Commission Expires:

REQUEST FOR FULL RECONVEYANCE
(To be used only when indebtedness secured hereby has been paid in full)
TO:

TRUSTEE.

The undersigned is the legal owner and holder of the note and all other indebtedness securea
by the within Trust Deed. Said note, together with all other indebtedness secured by said Trust
Deed has been fully paid and satisfied; and you are hereby requested and directed, on payment
to you of any sums owing to you under the terms of said Trust Deed, to cancel said note above
mentioned, and all other evidences of indebtedness secured by said Trust Deed delivered to you
herewith, together with the said Trust Deed, and to reconvey, without warranty, to the parties
designated by the terms of said Trust Deed, all the estate now held by you thereunder.

Dated

19

Mail reconveyance to
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W A R R A N T Y

DEED

MICHAEL R MC COY and EUGENE E. DOMS
of

Salt Lake

hereby CONVEY
of

, grantors

Salt Lake

for the sum of

,State of Utah,

and WARRANT

to

DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC.
• grantee

, County of Salt Lake

,State of Utah,

TEN

DOLLARS ,

the following described tract of land in Summit County, State of Utah,
to-vit:
PARCEL NO. 1: All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25,
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey,
according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of record in
the office of the-Summit County Recorder.
PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City
Survey, according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of
record in the office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting
therefrom any portion located within the railroad rights of way
as described in those certain documents recorded as Entry No.
817C in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page
326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Summit
County, Utah.
PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey,
according to the Amended Plat thereof, as filed and of record in
the office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any
portion located within the railroad rights of way as described in
those certain documents recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at
Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326, and Entry No.
13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of Summit County, Utah.
Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and water
lines over the Southerly Five feet and Northerly five feet of the
following described lots.
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City Survey
according to the amended plat thereof as filed and of record in the
office of the Summit County Recorder.
of said grantor

th i s ^ P d a y of £ w - v

,19*^

of

JOCK
STATE OF UTAH

dlOMtCJO

)
)

S3.

County o f "5 • C •
)
.
On t h e * 2 o day t of. &**"£*"*?'
p e r s o n a l l y appeared before'me ^^Z^^C^^r^^

+ . y ; ^^49£?
****.7.
+* ^v^k—A* fav^T^jXi''1

the s i g n e r * .pf. the above, instrument, s*foo duly acknqwie4§ed tg nte"'Oy.
t h a t vheVA e x e c u t e d the same.
/ J^—-N.
* .
*<*'".'
'
': .

*
My commission expires- (^-7*4 ^55"

*

^

Residing in

••/;•"•. x^i-.C'

"""•' 0'-/"/

^ OH— ••' ^ .r-

•?*PISHTWS
«

EXHIBIT

I

Ik.

STATE OF UTAH

)

County cf Summit

)

I. Aten Spr'rgg3. County Reoordor in and kx Summit County. State of Utah,
do btfieby certify thai the attachod aforegoing « a fuB, truo and con-ect copy
of ilial certain 2 ^ ^ * ^ J £ T
Aj>U^^

which anpoars of record in my office In Book ^
beJng Cntry No. ^^-//^
£ J>-

7^

. Page J>S"<3~~

IN WITNESS WHEREOF. I have hereunto cM my hand and affixed my
official 53a!. this / ^ A t e y of
U^^yc^^^/fff

Sum.n.l CocrMyHecofdoc

(J

ADDENDUM 5

CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION
OF
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC.

/, DA VIDS.MONSON.
certify

that

incorporation

duplicate

Lieutenant
originals

Governor

of Articles

of theState

of Utah,

of Incorporation

hereby
for

the

of
DOMCOY E N T E R P R I S E S , I N C .

duly signed and verified
Corporation

pursuant

to the provisions

Act% have been received

of the Utah

in my office and are found

Business

to

conform

to law.

ACCORDINGLY,
issue this Certificate

by virtue of the authority
of Incorporation

vested in me by law. I hereby

of

DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC.

and attach hereto a duplicate

original

of the Articles

of

Incorporation.

FILE # 0 9 5 1 5 6

IN TESTIMONY

WHEREOF.

I have

hereunto

set my hand and affixed the Great Seal of the
Slate of Utah, at Salt Lake City. fAw?.?*!? day
of

October

_

I.IKl ThMVT <;<>\ KKVIM

jg

81

D in lh#e offtce of the lieulenan? Gy>yr\or
' Slate ofJUtah»n the .

'

A 0 19

-4^-- ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION

S^ MONSON
ovemor
Fees > y

_ t/#

•"

to

DOMCOY ENTERPRISER, INC.
CO

c
We, the undersigned, being natural persons of the
age of 21 years or more, desiring to form a corporation pursuant to the provisions of the Utah Business Corporation A&t
and the acts amendatory thereof and supplemental thereto, S§o
hereby sign the following articles and certify that:
FIRST: The name of the corporation (hereinafter
called the corporation) is DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC.
SECOND:
is perpetual.

The period of duration of the corporation

THIRD: The purposes for which the corporation is
formed are as follows:
Real estate development and property management.
To manufacture, process, purchase, sell and
generally to trade and deal in and with goods,
wares and merchandise of every kind, nature and
description, and to engage and participate in any
mercantile, industrial or trading business of any
kind or character whatsoever.
To apply for, register, obtain, purchase,
lease, take licenses in respect of or otherwise
acguire, and to hold, own, use, operate, develop, enjoy, turn to account, grant licenses and
immunities in respect of, manufacture under and
to introduce, sell, assign, mortgage, pledge or
otherwise dispose of, and, in any manner deal
with and contract with reference to:
(a) inventions, devices, formulae,
processes and any improvements and modifications thereof;
(b) letters patent, patent rights,
patented processes, copyrights, designs
and similar rights, trade-marks, trade
symbols and other indications of origin
and ownership granted by or recognized
under the laws of the United States of

America or„jpf any state or subdivision
thereof/ or of any foreign country or subdivision thereof# and all rights connected
therewith or appertaining thereunto;
(c) franchises/ licenses/ grants
and concessions.
To make# enter into# perform and carry out
contracts of every kind and description with any
person, firm# association/ corporation or government or subdivision thereof*
To acquire by purchase/ exchange or otherwise, all/ or any part of# or any interest in#
the properties/ assets, business and good will
of any one or more persons/ firms# associations
or corporations heretofore or hereafter engaged
in any business for which a corporation may now
or hereafter be organized under the Utah Business Corporation Act; to pay for the same in
cash/ property or its own or other securities;
to hold/ operate/ reorganize, liquidate, sell
or in any manner dispose of the whole or any
part thereof; and in connection therewith, to
assume or guarantee performance of any liabilities, obligations or contracts of such persons,
firms, associations or corporations, and to conduct the whole or any part of any business thus
acquired*
To the extent permitted to corporations organized under the Utah Business Corporation Act,
to organize or cause to be organized under the
lews of the State of Utah, or of any other State
of the United States of America, or of the District
of Columbia, or of any territory, dependency, colony or possession of the United States of America,
or of any foreign country, a corporation or corporations for the purpose of transacting, promoting
or carrying on any or all of the objects or purposes for which the corporation is organized, and
to dissolve, wind up, liquidate, merge or consolidate any such corporation or corporations or to
cause the same to be dissolved, wound up, liquidated, merged or consolidated.
To such extent as a corporation organized
under the Utah Business Corporation Act may
now or hereafter lawfully do, to dof either
as principal/ agent/ and in any other lawful
capacity/ and either alone or in connection

with other corporations, firms or individuals,
all and everything necessary, suitable, convenient or proper for, or in connection with,
or incident to, the accomplishment of any of
the purposes or the attainment of any one or
more of the objects herein enumerated, or designed directly or indirectly to promote the
interests of the corporation or to enhance the
value of its properties; and in general to do
any and all things and exercise any and all
powers, rights and privileges which a corporation may now or hereafter be organized to do
or to exercise under the Utah Business Corporation Act or under any act amendatory thereof,
supplemental thereto or substituted therefor.
To have all other powers granted to corporations organized .pursuant to the Utah Business Corporation Act.
The foregoing provisions of this Article THIRD shall
be construed both as purposes and powers and each as an independent purpose and power. The foregoing enumeration of specific purposes and powers shall not be held to limit or restrict in any manner the purposes and powers of the corporation, and the purposes and powers herein specified shall, except when otherwise provided in this Article THIRD, be in no
wise limited or restricted by reference to, or inference from,
the terms of any provision of this or any other Article of
these Articles of Incorporation; provided, that nothing herein contained shall be construed as authorizing the corporation
to engage in any enterprise, business, pursuit, or occupation
prohibited to corporations organized under the Utah Business
Corporation Act; and provided, further, that the corporation
shall not carry on any business or exercise any power in any
state, territory or country which under the laws thereof the
corporation may not lawfully carry on or exercise.
FOURTH: The aggregate number of shares which the
corporation shall have authority to issue is Fifty Thousand
(50,000), all of which are without par value and are of the
same class and are to be Common shares. Any and all shares
without par value may be issued for such consideration
expressed in dollars as may be fixed from time to time by the
Board of Directors.
FIFTH; The corporation will not commence business
until consideration of the value of at least one thousand
dollars has been received for the issuance of its shares.

SIXTH: Each share of the corporation shall entitle
the holder thereof to a preemptive right, for a period of
thirty days, to subscribe for, purchase, or otherwise acquire
any shares of the same class of the corporation or any equity
and/or voting shares of any class of the corporation which
the corporation proposes to issue or any rights or options
which the corporation proposes to grant for the purchase of
shares of the same class of the corporation or of equity
and/or voting shares of any class of the corporation or for
the purchase of any shares, bonds, securities, or obligations
of the corporation which are convertible into or exchangeable
for, or which carry any rights, to subscribe for, purchase, or
otherwise acquire shares of the same class of the corporation
or equity and/or voting shares of any class of the corporation,
whether now or hereafter authorized or created, whether having
unissued or treasury status, and whether the proposed issue,
reissue, transfer, or grant is for cash, property, or any other
lawful consideration; and after the expiration of said thirty
days# any and all of such shares, rights, options, bonds, securities or obligations of the corporation may be issued, reissued, transferred, or granted by the Board of Directors, as
the case may be, to such persons, firms, corporations and associations, and for such lawful consideration, and on such
terms, as the Board of Directors in its discretion may determine. As used herein, the terms "equity shares" and "voting shares" shall mean, respectively, shares which confer
unlimited dividend rights and shares which confer unlimited
voting rights in the election of one or more directors.
SEVENTH; At a meeting expressly called for the purpose, the entire Board of Directors or any individual director
may be removed from office with or without cause by a vote of
shareholders holding a majority of the outstanding shares, entitled to vote at an election of directors. If any or all directors are so removed, new directors may be elected at the
same meeting.
Shareholders entitled to vote for the election of
directors shall not be entitled to cumulative voting.
The Board of Directors, by resolution adopted by a
majority of the number of directors fixed by the By-Laws, may
designate two or more directors to constitute a committee or
committees, which committee or committees, to the extent provided in such resolution shall have and may exercise all of
the authority of the Board of Directors in the management of
the corporation.
In lieu of setting forth provisions in these Articles
of Incorporation in respect of restrictions on the transfer of
shares of the corporation, such provisions may be set forth in
the By-Laws of the corporation or in a written agreement or
written agreements of the parties involved.

The Board of Directors may mortgage or pledge all or
any part of the property of the corporation; and, in such event,
the mortgage or pledge of all or substantially all of the property or assets of the corporation, with or without good will,
shall be deemed to be made in the usual and regular course of
business of the corporation.
E7GHTH; The address of the initial registered office
of the corporation in the State of Utah is #10 Exchange Place,
Suite 1000, Salt Lake City 84111; and the name of the initial
registered agent of the corporation in Utah at such address is
Jerry Kinghorn.
NINTH; The number of directors constituting the
initial Board of Directors of the corporation is four*
Thereafter, the number of directors from time to time shall
be such as shall be fixed in the By-Laws; provided, however,
that such number shall never be less than the minimum number
prescribed by the Utah Business Corporation Act.
The name and the address of each of the persons who
are to serve as directors of the corporation until the first
annual meeting of shareholders or until their successors be
elected and qualify are:
NAMES

ADDRESSES

Eugene E. Doms

P.O. Box 3614
Mission Viejo, California 92690

Monica Doms

P.O. Box 3614
Mission Viejo, California 92690

Michael R. Mccoy

12650 Meadowlark Avenue
Granada Hills, California 91344

Marguerite Mccoy

12650 Meadowlark Avenue
Granada Hills, California 91344

TENTH;

The name and the address of each incorporator

are:
NAMES

ADDRESSES

Desolee V. Ocampo

5225 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1000
Los Angeles, California 90036

Marion R. Diamond

5225 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1000
Los Angeles, California 90036

Mary Hamboyan

5225 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 1000
Los Angeles, California 90036

ELEVENTH: From time to time any of the provisions of
these Articles of Incorporation may be amended, altered or repealed, and other provisions authorized by the laws of the State
of Utah at the time in force may be added or inserted in the
manner and at the time prescribed by said laws, and all rights
at any time conferred upon the shareholders of the corporation
by these Articles of Incorporation are granted subject to the
provisions of this Article ELEVENTH.
Signed in duplicate on October 14, 1981.

Desolee V. Oqampo, Incorporator
Marion R. Diamond, Incorporator
Mary Haihboyan, Incorporator

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

)
) SS.:
)

I, EMILY PRIOR, a Notary Public for California
hereby certify that on the 14th day of October, 1981,
personally appeared before me DESOLEE V. OCAMPO, MARION
R. DIAMOND, MARY HAMBOYAN who being byroefirst duly sworn,
severally declared that they are the persons who signed the
foregoing document as incorporators, and that the statements
therein contained are true.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand
and seal this 14th day of October, A.D. 1981.
OFFICIAL

SEAL

EMILY PRIOR
NOTARY PUBLIC — CALIFORNIA
PRINCIPAL OFFICE IN
LOS ANCEL£S COUNTY

My Commission Expires September 18, 1984
^WV^^^N

^ f i / w ^ ^ i w » y < w » y y » y y y ^

ublic
My commission expires

ADDENDUM 6

WAIVER OF NOTICE AND CONSENT TO HOLDING
OF FIRST MEETING OF DIRECTORS OF
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC.
A California Corporation
We, the undersigned, being all of the Initial Directors
named in the Articles of Incorporation of the above named
corporation and desiring to hold the first meeting of the
Board of Directors of said Corporation for the purpose of
completing the organization of its affairs, DO HEREBY waive
notice and consent to the holding of said meeting at 12650
Meadowlark Ave., Granada Hills, California 91344 on the 5th
day of November, 1981

at Ten O'clock A.M.

Said meeting shall be held for the purpose of adopting
bylaws, electing officers, adopting a form of corporate seal
and share certificate, selecting an accounting year, issuing
stock, and transacting such other business as maybe brought
before said meeting.

Any business transacted at said

meeting shall be as valid and legal and of the same force
and effect as though said meeting were held after notice
duly given.
WITNESS our signatures this 5th day of November, 1981.

MONICA DOMS
MARGUERITE MCCOY

$

MINUTES OF FIRST MEETING OF
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC.
A Utah Corporation
The undersigned, being the Incorporator(s) named in the
Articles of Incorporation of the above-named Utah
Corporation duly formed by filing of said Articles of
Incorporation in the office of the Utah Lieutenant Governor
on the 30th day of October, 1981, and desiring to hold the
first organizational meeting for the purpose of completing
the organization of its affairs, held such meeting at
12650 Meadowlark Ave., Granada Hills, CA 91344
on the 5th day of November, 1981, at Ten Ofclock A.M. of
said day.
Present at this meeting were: MICHAEL R. MCCOY, EUGENE
E. DOMS, MARGUERITE MCCOY and MONICA DOMS being the initial
Directors named in the Articles of Incorporation.
On motion and by unanimous vote, MICHAEL R. MCCOY was
elected temporary Chairman, and EUGENE E. DOMS was elected
temporary Secretary of the meeting.
WAIVER OF NOTICE
The Chairman announced that the meeting was held
pursuant to written waiver of notice and consent signed by
the Incorporator(s) of the corporation named as such in the
Articles of Incorporation such waiver and consent was
presented to the meeting and upon motion duly made, seconded
and unanimously carried, was made a part of this meeting in
the Book of Minutes of the corporation.
FILING OF ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION
The Chairman stated that the original articles of
incorporation of the corporation had been filed in the
office of the Utah Lieutenant Governor on October 30, 1981.
He presented to the meeting a certified copy of said
articles of incorporation showing filings in the Book of
Minutes of the Corporation.

BY-LAWS
The matter of the adoption of By-laws for the
regulation of the affairs of the corporation was next
considered. The temporary secretary presented to the
meeting a form of By-laws which were duly considered and
discussed. On motion duly made and unanimously carried, the
following resolutions were adopted:
RESOLVED: That the By-laws presented to this meeting
and discussed thereat be, and the same hereby are,
adopted as and for By-laws of this corporation.
RESOLVED FURTHER:
That the temporary secretary of
this corporation be and hereby is authorized and
directed to execute a certificate of the adoption of
said by-laws and to insert said By-laws as so certified
in the Book of Minutes of this corporation, and to see
that a copy of said By-laws, similarly certified, is
kept at the principal office for the transaction of
business of this corporation.
ELECTION OF DIRECTORS
The temporary Chairman stated that the number of Directors
required by the BY-LAWS adopted by the Corporation had been
named in the Articles of Incorporation and advised that these
individuals become the initial Directors for the first fiscal
year of the Corporation or until their successors are elected
and qualify.
RESOLVED: That MICHAEL R. MCCOY, EUGENE E. DOMS, MONICA
DOMS and MARGUERITE MCCOY, continue as Directors for
the first fiscal year of the Corporation or until their
successors are elected and qualify.
ELECTION OF CORPORATE OFFICERS
The meeting then proceeded to the election of a
President, a Secretary, and a chief Financial Officer. The
following were duly elected to the offices indicated after
the names of each at the salary (if Known) as indicated:
PRESIDENT:
SECRETARY:
CHIEF FINANCIAL
OFFICER

MICHAEL R. MCCOY, salary unknown
EUGENE E. DOMS, salary unknown
EUGENE E. DMOS, salary unknown

- 2 -

Each officer so elected being present accepted his office,
and thereafter the President presided at the meeting as
Chairman and the Secretary acted as Secreatry of the
meeting.
ADOPTION OF SHARE CERTIFICATE
The secretary presented to the meeting a proposed form
of share certificate for use by the corporation. On motion
duly made seconded, and unanimously carried, said form of
share certificate was approved and adopted and the Secretary
was instructed to insert a copy thereof in the Book of
Minutes immediately following the minutes of the meeting.
PAYMENT OF CORPORATION EXPENSES
In order to provide for the payment of the expenses of
incorporation and organization of the corporation, on motion
duly made, seconded, and unanimously carried, the following
resolution was adopted:
RESOLVED: that the President and the Chief Financial
Officer of this corporation be, and they hereby are,
authorized and directed to pay the expenses of the
incorporation and organization of this corporation.
LOCATION OF PRINCIPAL OFFICE
After some discussion, the location of the principal
office of the corporation was fixed pursuant to the
following resolution unanimously adopted, upon motion duly
made and seconded:
RESOLVED: That 12650 Meadow lark Ave., City of Granada
Hills, County of Los Angeles, State of California, be
and the same hereby is, designated and fixed as the
location of the principal office for the transcation of
business of this corporation, until changed by
subsequent resolution of the Board of Directors.
ACCOUNTING YEAR
The Chairman suggested that the meeting consider the
adoption of an accounting year, either fiscal or calendar,
On motion duly made, seconded and unanimously carried, the
following resolution was adopted:
RESOLVED:
That this Corporation adopt an accounting
year as follows:

- 3-

DATE ACCOUNTING YEAR BEGINS:

November 1st

DATE ACCOUNTING YEAR ENDS:

October 31st

OFFICERS AUTHORIZED TO CONTRACT
To authorize the officers to contract and obligate the
corporation, in the ordinary course of business, the
following resolution was, upon motion duly made, seconded
and carried, adopted:
RESOLVES: That the following officers be, and the same
hereby are authorized to sign contracts and obligations
on behalf of the corporation:
MICHAEL R. MCCOY, President
EUGENE E. DOMS, Chief Financial Officer and Secretary
ISSUANCE OF SHARES UNDER A CLOSE CORPORATION EXEMPTION
The Chairman announced that resolution concerning the
issuance of corporate stock would be considered next* He
advised the Board that the issuance of shares must be
qualified by permit unless an exemption is available, A
"close" corporation exemption has been provided by Section
2 5102 (h) of the California Corporations Code. In order for
he issuance to qualify for this exemption, an opinion of
the
^ounsel must be forwarded to the Commissioner's office. In
c
order to obtain such an opinion, counsel must be satisfied
that certain facts are found to exist and certain conditions
are imposed on the issuance.
After some discussion, it was deemed to be in the best
interests of the corporation to utilize said exemption and
upon motion duly made, seconded and carried, it was
RESOLVED:
That immediately after the sale and
issuance of the shares hereinafter proposed to be
issued, the issuer will have only one class of stock
outstanding, which will be owned beneficially by no
more than ten persons, and all of the certificates
evidencing such stock will contain the legend required
by Section 260.102.6 of the California Administrative
Code.
RESOLVED FURTHER:
That the offer and sale of this
stock will not be accompanied by the publication of any
advertisement, that no selling expenses will be given,
paid or incurred in connection therewith, and that no
promotional consideration will be given, paid or
incurred in connection therewith.

- 4 -

RESOLVED FURTHER:
That the
to be received by the issuer
consisted or will consist of
in Section 25102(h) which is
page next following.

consideration received or
for the stock to be issued
one of the kinds described
described as shown on the

RESOLVED FURTHER:
That prior to the issuance of said
shares, the secretary shall first obtain an opinion of
counsel that the issuance is qualified for the
exemption provided for by Section 25102(h) and that the
opinion has been executed and either filed or mailed to
the Commissioner^ Office for filing, with proper
affidavit of service by mail retained by counsel and
supplied to the issuer within ten (10) business days
after receipt by issuer of the consideration paid for
the securities being issued,
RESOLVED FURTHER:
That upon receipt of the
consideration described herein, if not already
received, the President and Secretary of this
corporation shall issue the following described shares
to the following named persons for the consideration
described herein:
NAME

NUMBER OF SHARES

CONSIDERATION

MICHAEL R. MCCOY AND
MARGUERITE MCCOY

10,000

$75,000,00

EUGENE E. DOMS AND
MONICA DomS

10,000

$75,000.00

ISSUANCE OF SHARE UNDER INTERNAL REVENUE SECTION 1244
The following plan is hereby adopted to control and
regulate the issuance of the shares of capital stock of the
above named corporation. It is the purpose of this plan to
qualify the stock issued hereunder under Section 1244 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended.
1.

Qualification as a Small Business Corporation
(a)

The amount of stock proposed to be issued
under this plan plus the aggregate of money
and other property received by the
corporation for its stock as a contribution
to capital and as a paid-in surplus does not
exceed $500,000; and

(b)

The equity capital of the corporation,
including the aggregate amount which may be
offered under this plan does not exceed
$1,000,000; and
-

5
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2.

(c)

The corporation has not heretofore received
any gross receipts from any sources, and
contemplates that in the future more than 50%
of its aggregate gross receipts will be from
sources other than royalties, rents,
dividends, interest, annuities, and sales or
exchanges of stocks or securities.

(d)

This plan is adopted before and
contemporaneously with the investment of
funds and attainment of shareholders* status
by the investors.

Plan
(a)

Stock shall be issued only pursuant to this
plan and shall be issued for the same price
per share and only for money or cancellation
of indebtedness or other property (other than
stock or securities) as provided in Internal
Revenue Code Section 1244.

(b)

The aggregate amount of stock which may be
offered under this plan is as follows:

NUMBER OF SHARES

PRICE PER SHARE

20,000

$7.50

TOTAL
$150,000.00

(c)

Such stock shall be offered for a period
ending not later than two years after the
date which this plan is adopted or within
such other period as may be provided in
Section 1244 by amendment thereto.

(d)

No portion of a prior offering is
outstanding.

- 6 -

ADJOURNMENT
There being no further business to come before the
meeting, upon motion duly made, seconded and unanimously
carried, the meeting adjourned*

- 7 -

ADDENDUM 7

6705-120
Rev. 6-64

STATE OF UTAH

;: DEPOSITIOI
i
EXHIBIT'

THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS AND COMMERCIAL CODE CERTIFIES THAT according to the records of t h i s o f f i c e , A r t i c l e s

of Incorporation were f i l e d with t h i s office on October 30, 1981 for D0MCOY
ENTERPRISES, INC., a Utah corporation.

Said corporation was INVOLUNTARILY DISSOLVED

on December 51, 1986 for f a i l u r e to f i l e an Annual Report,
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Mail tax notice to: Grantee c/o La rry R. K e l l e r , 257
faffl S f ^ \
S u i t e 3 4 0 , Box 10, Salt Lake C i t y , UT 84T11
W A R R A N T Y

D E E D

DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC.
grantor
of Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, hereby
CONVEYS and WARRANTS to
EUGENE E. DOMS
grantee
of Mission Vie^o, California
for the sum of
TEN and 00/100
DOLLARS,
the following described tract of land in Summit County,
State of Utah:
PARCEL NO. 1: All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25,
26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32, Block 58, Park City Survey,
according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of record
in the office of the Summit County Recorder.
PARCEL NO. 2: All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City
Survey, according to the amended plat thereof, as filed and of
record in the office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting
therefrom any portion located within the railroad rights of
way as described in those certain documents recorded as Entry
No. 8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at
Page 326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records
of Summit County, Utah.
PARCEL NO. 3: All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey,
according to the Amended Plat thereof, as filed and of record
in the office of the Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom any portion located within the railroad rights of way as
described in those certain documents recorded as Entry No.
8176 in Book C at Page 401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page
326, and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373, records of
Summit County, Utah.
Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and water
lines over the Southerly Five feet and Northerly five feet of the
following described lots:
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City Survey
according to the amended plat thereof as filed and of record in
the office of the Summit County recorder.
WITNESS the hand of said grantor, thisi*_ day of A ^ 2 ^ L _ ' 1988.
Signed in the presence of:
Jean M Henry

DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC., a

Mission Viejo National_Bank_

Corporation by/* p

i/lh^&zL--

Mission Viejo, CA 92691
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

)

COUNTY OF

)

)

ORANGE

EU6ENE>£. DOMS", Secretary/
Treasurer and Authorized Officer
SS .

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this 26th
day of
August
, 19_88, by
?^er^_E_^>oms_
Secretary/Treasurer and Authorized Officer of Domcoy Enterprises,
Inc.
omrui ttAi
JEAN M HENRY
NOTART PUBLIC-CAL FORNA
ORANGE COUNT*
My Comm £ i P ^
27 199?

My Commission E x p i r e s 4-27-92

(*,

///

NOTARY PUBLIC

2^

Jean M W r y
2ltT3---(iuJi}XlSJi.

R e s i d i n g in

. 491.x4G6

100'

F
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ADDENDA ITEM #
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EXTRACT OF TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING ON APRIL 17, 1990.
RE: ELECTION OF REMEDIES
PAGE 007087
Mr. Mcintosh:

We want to make a motion that the defendant elect his remedy at this
time, whether he is going after rescission or after damages. And I think
that he has an obligation to make that election.

The Court:

I thought that election was made. You're going to rescind, are you not.

Mr. Keller:

We are, your Honor, we have three causes of action on our second
amended complaint we are also alleging fraud and breach of contract. I
don't think it is required that we elect our remedy before the trial starts.
Our position is that rescission is an appropriate remedy. However, should
the court determine that rescission is not an appropriate remedy, then we
wish to have the option of falling back on the question of damages which

The Court:

Well, I have no problem with that.

Mr. Keller:

Thank you.

The Court:

This is a bench trial. I'll give you an opportunity to put on your case and
then I'll make a determination.

EXTRACT OF TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING ON APRIL 21, 1990
ELECTION OF REMEDIES
PAGE 007759
The Court:

You can't have it both ways, you want a rescission and you want in the
alternative. On the other hand, you want this court to proceed on
damages and on the other hand, I ruled against you so you want it both
ways. You can't have it both ways.

ADDENDUM 10

ADDENDA ITEM #10
EXTRACT OF TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING ON APRIL 17, 1990.
RE: ELECTION OF REMEDIES
PAGE 007087
Mr. Mcintosh:

We want to make a motion that the defendant elect his remedy at this
time, whether he is going after rescission or after damages. And I think
that he has an obligation to make that election.

The Court:

I thought that election was made. You're going to rescind, are you not.

Mr. Keller:

We are, your Honor, we have three causes of action on our second
amended complaint we are also alleging fraud and breach of contract. I
don't think it is required that we elect our remedy before the trial starts.
Our position is that rescission is an appropriate remedy. However, should
the court determine that rescission is not an appropriate remedy, then we
wish to have the option of falling back on the question of damages which

The Court:

Well, I have no problem with that.

Mr. Keller:

Thank you.

The Court:

This is a bench trial. I'll give you an opportunity to put on your case and
then I'll make a determination.

EXTRACT OF TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING ON APRIL 21, 1990
ELECTION OF REMEDIES
PAGE 007759
The Court:

You can't have it both ways, you want a rescission and you want in the
alternative. On the other hand, you want this court to proceed on
damages and on the other hand, I ruled against you so you want it both
ways. You can't have it both ways.
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I

ANDERSON PIECE OF PROPERTY; IS THAT RIGHT?
THE WITNESS:

YES.

WE DID NOT HAVE A FORMAL

PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT.
THE COURT:

BUT HE WAS YOUR PARTNER?

THE WITNESS:
Q.

YES.

(BY MR. KELLER)

JUST CLARIFY THIS, IF I MAY.

AND NOW, MR. DOMS, LET ME
THIS DEED WAS ISSUED TO

MR. AND MRS. MCCOY AS TENANTS IN COMMON, IS THAT
CORRECT?
A.

YES.

Q.

WHICH MEANS EACH OF YOU OWNED 50 PERCENT OF

THE PROPERTY, IS THAT-MR. BIELE:

OBJECTION TO THE LEGAL

CHARACTERIZATION OF IT.

IT SPEAKS FOR ITSELF AND THIS

COURT CAN INTERPRET THAT-i

THE COURT:

THE CRITICAL ISSUE IS THAT THEY

'

WERE PARTNERS AT THE TIME.

t

TOGETHER, SO HE IS BOUND BY THE ACTS OF HIS PARTNER.

)
)

MR. KELLER:

THEY PUT THIS TRANSACTION

YOUR HONOR, I DISAGREE WITH

THAT.

L

THE COURT:

2

MR. KELLER:

HE JUST TESTIFIED TO THAT.
WELL, WHAT WE WISH TO ARGUE TO

3

YOU, YOUR HONOR, IS THAT THEY MAY HAVE BEEN GENERAL

4

PARTNERS IN THE ACQUISITION OF THIS PROPERTY, BUT

5

PARTNERS ARE NOT AUTOMATICALLY BOUND BY THE OTHER

007328

538

ADDENDUM 12

ADDENDA

#12
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TITLE 25,
H K i i i W . A . o,

- ^^Fi'L
GENERAL PROVISIONS.

1114. Defined. In all counties of this state, all roads, streets, alleys,
lanes, courts, places, trails, and bridges laid out or erected as such by the public
or dedicated or abandoned to the public, or made such in actions for the partition
of real property, "are public highways. [C. L. §§ 2065-9*.
Cal. Pol. C. 12618*. Mont. Pol. C. { 2600*.
Dedication of street*, etc., I 2014. Highways delined, } 2498.
There being in Utah territory no statute requir*
ing any formal acceptance by officers or agent* in
charge of public roads, of land dedicated by owners

for highways, the court is Dot prepared to say that
an acceptance may not be inferred under some
circumstances from the action and use of the public
generally, without any action of the body charged
with the repair of public roads. Wilson v. Hull, 7
U. 90; 24 P. 799.

1115. W h e n d e e m e d d e d i c a t e d . A highway shall be deemed to have
been dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years,- [C. L. § 2066*.
The exteDt of the dedication is determined by
all the circumstances, not only by the part actually
used, but also the width of the highways in the
vicinity and of the system of which the particular

highway is a part Burrows v. Guest, 5 l \ 91; 11
P. 847. Wilson T. Hull, 7 U. 90; 24 P. 799. Whitesides v. Green, 13 U. 341; 44 P. 1032.

1116. C o n t i n u e u n t i l a b a n d o n e d . All highways once established must
continue to be highways until abandoned by order of the board of county commissioners of the county in which they are situated, by operation of lawlwor by
judgment of a court jof^competent jurisdiction; 0 r t * * i r f , ^ ^ l * T g j ^
vojrigd f c ^ V p ^ c ^ l ^ l l v e y e a r s c e a ^ 1 ? r f ^ l i i g h w B y % .[C. i T | 2070*.
Cal. Pol. C. { 2619*. Mont. Pol. C. { 2601*. '

1117. W i d t h of p u b l i c a n d p r i v a t e w a v s . The width of" all public
highways, except bridges, alleys, lanes, and trails, shall be at least sixty-six feet.
The width of all private highways and by-roads, except bridges, shall be at least
twenty feet; provided, that nothing in this title shall be so construed as to increase
or diminish the width of eitlier kind of highway already established or used as
such.
Cal. Pol. C. | 2630*. Mont, Pol. C. J 2802*.

1118.
F o r f e i t u r e of franchise.
bridge, trail, turnpike, or of any plank or
limitation, forfeiture, or non-user, the san
no claim shall be valid against the pub
material comprising such bridge, trail, turnpike.
§ 2069*.

i > *• mse 01 au\ .««i..
< riiad has expired by
"
id
or
j.iar.K ur *<K:CII roa*.
L

Cal. Pol. C. 2 2619*.

1119. L i m i t e d h i g h w a y s . Where roads or streets are laid out tin ought
improved lands, and such lands are not protected by fences along the lines of the
roads or streets passing through them, such roads or streets may, by the board of
county commissioners of the county, be declared to be limited highways. A

HIGHWAYS—GENERAL PROVISIONS.
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notice to that effect shall be posted at each end of such limited highways, and
any person who shall wilfully drive any bands or herds of cattle, horses, sheep,
or hogs over such roads or streets other than during the time that the abutting
lands are thrown open to the public by the owners thereof for grazing purposes,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. [C. L. § 2067.
1120. P u b l i c and p r i v a t e rights in h i g h w a y s . By taking or accepting land for a highway, the public acquires only the right of way and incidents
necessary to enjoying and maintaining it. A transfer of land bounded by a
highway passes the title of the person whose estate is transferred, to the center
of the highway, [C. L. § 2071.
Gal. Pol. C. } 2631*; Mont. Pol. C. g 2G20":.
The easement-acquired by the public in n public
highway vest* in it the mere right of passage, aDd
does not divest the owner of the fee, and he may

continue to make any use thereof not incompatible
*ith the public easement. Whitesides v. Green,
13 U. 341; 44 P. 1032.

1 1 2 1 . H i g h w a y s in cities and t o w n s . Where public highways extend
through any incorporated town or city they shall conform to the direction and
grade and be subject to all regulations of other street4* in such town or citv. [C.
L. § 2082*.
1 1 2 2 . P l a t s of h i g h w a y s to be filed. It shall be the duty of the
board of county commissioners in each county immediately to determine all
public highways existing in its county, and to prepare in duplicate, plats and
specific descriptions of the same and of such other highways as such board may
from time to rime locate upon public lands, one copy of which shall be kept on
file in the office of the county clerk, and the other, said board shall cause to
be filed in the office of the state board of land commissioners.
Duty of county surveyor as to highways, etc., ty 639, 644.

1 1 2 3 . R e s e r v a t i o n of h i g h w a y s from state p a t e n t s . Whenever the
state shall issue its patent for any lands, the same shall be made subject to
the easement or nght of the public to use all such highways as are described on the
plate and descriptions filed in pursuance of the last preceding section; and in
each ca>e the patent shall, as far as possible, contain a specific and detailed reservation of such highways for public use.
1124. U. S. P a t e n t s . H i g h w a y s . Claim for d a m a g e s . Whenever
any person shall aoquire title from the United States to any land in this state
over which there shall at such time extend any public highway that shall not
theretofore have been duly platted, and that shall not have been continuously
used as such for a perux} of ten ye^rs theretofore, he shall, within three months
after receipt of his patent, assert his claim in writing for damages to the board of
county com mission ei*s of the county in >\hich the land is situated; and said
board shall have an additional period of three months in which to begin proceedings to condemn the land according to law. Such highway shall continue open
as a public highway during said periods; but in case no action is begun within
the period above stated by the board of county commissioners, said highway
shall be deemed to be abandoned by the public. In case of a failure by such
person so acquiring title to public lands to assert his claim for damages as aforesaid, for three months from the time he shall have received a patent to such
lands, he shall thereafter be barred from asserting or recovering any damages by
reason of such public highway, and the same shall remain open.
X. Dak. (1895) I 1078*. See R. S. of U. S. J 2477.

1125. S i d e w a l k s on h i g h w a y s . Any owner or occupant of land may
construct a sidewalk on the highway along the line of his land, subject, however,
to such regulations as may be prescribed by the board of county commissioners.
Any person driving or riding on such sidewalk with horse or team without permission of the owner of such sidewalk, is liable to such owner for all damage he
may suffer thereby. [C. L. § 20SO*.
Cal. Pol. C. § 2632*

Mont Pol. C. \ 2621*.
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1

HAVING BEEN USED AS A PUBLIC ROAD?

2

A.

I DON'T BELIEVE IT EVER WAS.

3

Q.

ARE THERE ANY POWER LINES ON MCHENRY

4

AVENUE?

5

A.

NO.

6

Q.

WITH RESPECT TO USING MCHENRY AVENUE AS A

7

RIGHT-OF-WAY, HAVE YOU HAD ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE

8

PARK CITY ENGINEER AS TO WHETHER IT COULD BE USED AS A

9

RIGHT-OF-WAY AND PUBLIC STREET?

10

A.

I HAVE TALKED TO THE PARK CITY ENGINEER AND

11

I-- WE BOTH BASICALLY AGREE BECAUSE OF THE CUT OF THE

12

RAILROAD GRID, THE BANK COMES UP ABOUT 16 FEET RIGHT

13

THERE, EVEN THOUGH IT'S DROPPING DOWN, THE

14

CORRESPONDING GRADE WOULD BE ABOUT HERE ON THE MAP, YOU

15

WOULD HAVE TO LITERALLY DIG THROUGH THIS PORTION BEFORE

16

YOU DAYLIGHTED AND WERE ON THAT GRADE.

17

WOULD AGREE THAT THAT'S-- JUST BECAUSE THAT WAS WHERE

18

THE MCHENRY RIGHT-OF-WAY WAS PLATTED, THAT IS NOT

19

NECESSARILY THE BEST PLACE TOPOGRAPHICALLY SPEAKING TO

20

BUILD A ROAD.

21

Q.

22
23

SO HE AND I

AND DID YOU AGREE THAT COULD BE UTILIZED

ECONOMICALLY AS A PUBLIC
MR. KELLER:

RIGHT-OF-WAY?

OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR.

TO THE

24

EXTENT THAT THAT WITNESS HAS AN OPINION, OF COURSE, IS

25

ADMISSIBLE.

AS TO WHETHER THE ENGINEER AGREED, I

008055
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PROBABLY HAS NEVER BEEN OFFICIALLY ABANDONED.
MR. KELLER:

RIGHT.

THE COURT:

SO WHAT IS YOUR ARGUMENT ABOUT

WHETHER WE ADMIT THIS ?

WHAT IS THE OBJECTION TO THE

ADMISSION?
MR. KELLER:
TO ANYTHING
PROPERTY

I DON'T SEE THAT IT'S RELEVANT

INVOLVED IN THE LAWSUIT.

WE'RE DIVIDING

WHETHER MCHENRY AVENUE WAS ABANDONED OR

VACATED t AT THE TIME IS TOTALLY
THE COURT:

IMMATERIAL.

BUT AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE

TITLE TO MCHENRY AVENUE, IS THAT VESTED IN PARK CITY?
MR. BIELE:

NO.

THE COURT:

IS IT VESTED IN DOMS AND MCCOY.

MR. KELLER:

NO.

WHOEVER OWNS BLOCK 62, YOUR

HONOR.
MR. MCINTOSH:

WE DON'T KNOW WHO IT'S VESTED

IN.
THE COURT:

NO ONE KNOWS WHO IT'S VESTED IN.

MR. BIELE:

AND ONE HALF IS VESTED--

THE COURT:

WAIT.

MR. BIELE:

MCHENRY DISAPPEARS AS A ROAD

WE HAVE TO FOLLOW THE--

BECAUSE IT WASN'T USED FOR FIVE YEARS AND WAS PLATTED
MORE THAN FIVE YEARS BEFORE THE 1911 MAP; THEREFORE,
THE PROPERTY OWNERS ON THE ADJOINING SIDE TO THE MIDDLE
OF M C H E N R Y —

MR. DOMS OWNS ONE HALF INTEREST IN THIS

008126
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PROPERTY AND WE-- I GUESS MR. DOMS OWNS MAYBE A
LITTLE-THE COURT:
KNOW.

MORE INTEREST IN IT NOW.

I DON'T

SO YOUR CLIENTS WARRANT HALF INTEREST OF MCHENRY

TO THEIR GRANTEE; IS THAT WHAT YOU'RE TELLING ME?
MR. BIELE:

WE WARRANTED THE LOTS THAT WENT

DOWN, WHICH TAKES ONE HALF-THE COURT:

MY QUESTION WAS, BASED-- WHAT

YOU'RE TELLING ME IS THAT MCHENRY AVENUE HAS BEEN, FOR
ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES, VACATED; YOUR CLIENTS OWN HALF
AND AT THE TIME THEY CONVEYED THE GROUNDS TO DOMS,
DOMCOY, THEY GOT ONE HALF OF MCHENRY?
MR. BIELE:

YES.

THE COURT:

NOW, WHAT--

MR. KELLER:
NOT TRUE.

YOUR HONOR, THAT IS ABSOLUTELY

MY CLIENTS DON'T HAVE ANY OF MCHENRY.

OUR

CLIENT'S PROPERTY BORDERS ON WHERE MCHENRY AVENUE WOULD
BE AT THE PRESENT TIME, AND YOU CAN SEE FROM THE
SURVEY, THE SURVEY IS RIGHT ALONG-THE COURT:
MR. KELLER:

THAT'S WHAT I SAY.

MCHENRY--

SO OUR CLIENTS DON'T GET ANY

PORTION OF MCHENRY AVENUE, AND MR. DECKERT SUGGESTED
THAT HE WOULD NEVER RECOMMEND A DEVELOPER TO BUILD ON
THIS ROAD UNTIL SOMETHING IS DONE-THE COURT:

THEY SAID THAT THEY DID CONVEY

008127
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1

MR. BIELE:

IN ANSWER TO THE COURT'S

2

QUESTION, NO, THE DEED THAT WE GAVE THEM DOESN'T SAY

3

TOGETHER WITH A ONE HALF.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. KELLER:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. KELLER:

—

8

TBE COURT:

NOW, MR. WALL.

9

MR. WALL:

FINE.

THAT'S A L L -

I HEARD HIM SAY-JUST A MINUTE NOW.
HE DEEDED HALF MCHENRY--

YOU MAY RECALL, YOUR HONOR, THAT

10

ADDRESSED THIS VERY BRIEFLY WHEN I REFERRED THE COURT

11

TO THE CASE OF NORTH TEMPLE INVESTMENT COMPANY.

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. WALL:

RIGHT.
AND IT WAS A CASE VERY MUCH ON

14

POINT WITH THE ISSUE THAT WE'RE HERE DEALING WITH, A

15

SITUATION WHY NORTH TEMPLE INVESTMENT COMPANY, WHO WAS

16

MY CLIENT, ACQUIRED AN ENTIRE TRACT THAT HAD BEEN

17

PLATTED.

18

AND THE PLAT BORE A DATE VERY SIMILAR TO THE ONE WE'RE

19

HERE DEALING WITH.

20

BEEN FIVE YEARS OF NONUSE.

21

ASSERT A CLAIM TO THE ROADWAY WITHIN THAT SUBDIVISION,

22

PLATTED BUT NOT DEVELOPED.

THE STREETS BAD NEVER BEEN DEVELOPED OR USED

23

TBE COURT:

24

MR. WALL:

25

SO THAT PRIOR TO 1911 THERE HAD
THE CITY ATTEMPTED TO

RIGHT.
TBROUGH TBE COMPENSATION THAT WAS

GOING TO BE DERIVED FROM THE ACQUISITION OF THIS TRACT

008129
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OF LAND, THE LANDOWNER, NORTH TEMPLE, TOOK THE POSITION
THAT, AS A MATTER OF LAW UPON THE FACT THAT THE STREETS
HAD NOT JBEEN DEVELOPED FOR FIVE YEARS PRIOR TO THE 1911
DATE, THAT THEY WERE ENTITLED TO THE FULL COMPENSATION,
NOT ONLY FOR THE LOTS, BUT THE STREETS, ON THE THEORY

j

THAT THE TITLE TO THE CENTER OF THE STREET VESTS IN

'

ABUTTING LOT OWNERS AS A MATTER OF LAW.
THE COURT:
MR. WALL:

RIGHT.
NOW, THAT IS THE CONCEPT HERE AND

I SUBMIT WHAT HAPPENED IN THIS CASE, GIVEN THE PLAT IN
QUESTION , IS THAT MCHENRY AVENUE BY OPERATION OF LAW,
ONE HALF OF IT WENT TO THE ABUTTING-- WHOEVER THE OWNER
HAPPENED TO BE OF LOT 57.

CONSEQUENTLY, WHETHER IT WAS

IN THE DEED OR NOT, IT INURES TO THE BENEFIT OF THAT
OWNER, AND CONSEQUENTLY BY REASON OF THE FIVE YEARS OF
NONUSE, MCHENRY DOES NOT EXIST, DID NOT EXIST AT THE
TIME CRITICAL TO THIS CASE.
THE COURT:

RIGHT.

THE FACT REMAINS THERE

HAS BEEN NO JUDICIAL DETERMINATION TO THAT FACT.

THERE

IS NOTHING IN THE RECORD TO INDICATE THAT THE-MR. WALL:

THAT'S THE FINE POINT, YOUR HONOR,

AND THE POINT I'M MAKING-THE COURT:

THAT'S GENERALLY WHAT HAPPENED IN

THE VACATION OF ALL THE ALLEYS.

I DID A LOT OF THAT

AND--

OOSlcO
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MR. WALL:

YES, YOU DID.

THE COURT:
MR. WALL:

AND WHAT HAPPENED, HAPPENED.
THAT'S TRUE.

THE COURT:

BUT THE FACT REMAINS HERE--

WELL-- IF I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING-MR. BIELE:

DID THE COURT WANT TO READ THE

OLD LAW AGAIN AT THIS TIME?
THE COURT:
MR. WALL:

I READ THAT.

I READ THAT.

I THINK THAT IS THE UNDISPUTED

LAW, YOUR HONOR, AND I THINK YOU'RE ON THE RIGHT TRACK.
THE COURT:
UNDISPUTED.

I DON'T QUESTION THAT.

THAT'S

IF THAT''S WHAT HAPPENED-- BUT SOMEHOW OR

ANOTHER-YOU REPRESENT A TITLE COMPANY.

WOULD THEY

INSURE THAT PIECE OF PROPERTY SAYING THAT THESE
GRANTEES ARE NOW THE OWNERS AND THEY OWN IT FREE AND
CLEAR?
MR. WALL:

I THINK, GIVEN THE SCENARIO I LAID

OUT, THEY WOULD.
THE COURT:

HE'S SHAKING HIS HEAD.

THAT

DOESN'T HELP THE RECORD.
MR. KELLER::

MAY THE RECORD REFLECT

MR. LARSON SHOOK HIS HEAD.
(LAUGHTER.)
THE COURT:

OKAY.

I UNDERSTOOD.

AS FAR AS

375
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate
of D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN
ANDERSON, personally, DAN
SCOTT and JEANNE SCOTT,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO.

8339

Plaintiffs,
vs.
MICHAEL R. McCOY and
EUGENE E. DOMS,
Defendants.

ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate
of D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN
ANDERSON, personally, DAN
SCOTT and JEANNE SCOTT,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Third Party Defendant.

This

case

was

tried

Summit County Courthouse in

on April

17,

Coalville,

18, 19, 1990, at the

Utah.

The

plaintiffs

ANDERSON V. McCOY

were

PAGE TWO
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represented by James A. Mcintosh and Irving H. Biele. The

defendant Doms

was

party

defendant

heard

the

evidence,

represented

was

by

represented

testimony

of

read

Memorandums

the

Larry

R.

Keller.

by Brant H. Wall.

witnesses,

admitted

filed

Third

The Court

documentary

herein,

heard

oral

argument, and took the matter under advisement.
The Court now being fully advised, makes its ruling.
The Court finds as follows:
1.

Defendant

Doms

met

with

Mike

Sloan,

a real estate

agent, in the fall of 1981 to discuss the sale and

purchase

of

the Rossie Hills property.
2.
seller

Defendant
of

the

Doms

also

property,

met

with

Dewey

Anderson,

the

once before Doms and McCoy purchased

the property.
3.

Both

Sloan

and Anderson represented that the property

was a prime piece of development property and
best

use

would

be

as

its

highest

and

an integrated development with the two

adjoining parcels referred

to

as

block

62

and

the

Slipper

Parcels.
4.

The plaintiffs

conveyed

the

property

to

defendants

Doms and McCoy on March 10, 1982.
5.

Defendants Doms and McCoy purchased an interest in

Slipper parcel in October of 1982.

the

ANDERSON V. McCOY

6.

PAGE THREE
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The Slipper parcel was purchased by Doms and

further

the

McCoy

to

integrated development of the three parcels and to

equalize their position

with

the

developers

1982

Doms

engaged

of

the

Slipper

parcel and block 62.
7.

In October

attorney,

of

for the

of

block

Kinghorn, an

specific purpose of closing the purchase of

the Slipper parcel and
owners

Mr.

continuing

62

for

the

the

negotiations

with

the

purpose of developing the three

parcels as an integrated development.
8.

Prior

to

Doms7

property, Doms was
development
architect:
9.

of

purchase

shown

the

a

three

of

the

preliminary

site

plan

for

the

parcels of property prepared by the

Mr. Kohler

Doms

knew

or

should

have

known

purchased the Anderson parcel and the Slipper
integrated

Anderson parcel of

development

at

the

parcel

time
that

he
the

of the three parcels had failed because

of the problems with the Anderson parcel and

the

inability

of

the parties to reach an agreement as to credits for each parcel.
10.
the

fall

Doms walked the Anderson property
of

the property.

1981

with

Mr. Sloan

in

and knew that there were roads and sheds on

ANDERSON V. McCOY

11.

Doms

for the

first

November

7,

PAGE FOUR

had

actual

time

notice

sometime

MEMORANDUM DECISION

of the easement encroachment

between

October

22,

1981 and

1981 and had further notice during 1982 and up and

through 1984.
12.

Doms <3id

not

give

notice

of

his intent to rescind

until January of 1985•
13.

Doms'

purchase of the Slipper parcel, the negotiations

to develop the three parcels as an integrated
subsequent
with

the

personal

development,

the

negotiations about credits and defining the problems
Anderson

parcel,

knowledge

affirm

the

fact

that

Doms had

of the road and encroachments no later than

October of 1982.
The

issue presented to the Court for decision is whether or

not laches should apply in this matter.
The

Court

has

found

that

Doms knew of the loop road and

the encroachments as early as the fall
aware

of

the

encroachments

of

1981

and

Therefore, Doms was bound to take

action

time.

that

I£

purchase the Anderson parcel and
parcel

without

viewing

made

and road prior to the purchase of

the Slipper parcel.
after

was

the

remedial

is unbelievable that Doms^would
an

interest

property

and

in

the

Slipper

determining

Anderson couldn't conclude the integration of the three

why

parcels

ANDERSON V. McCOY

for

PAGE FIVE

development.

The Court believes that Doms was aware of the

problems with the
parcel
the

and

loop

credits

that

would

be

allocated

to

each

the problems that may be encountered as a result of

road

and

nevertheless, Doms
in hopes

MEMORANDUM DECISION

of

encroachments

on

the

Anderson

parcel,

purchased an interest in the Slipper parcel

integrating

the

three

parcels

and

making

his

investment more profitable.
The Court is of the opinion that it was
Doms

to

obtain

a

legal

opinion

that

not

the

necessary jfor
loop

prescriptive easement or the shed and fences had a
for

being

tender

on

to

the

Anderson

rescind.

encumbrances, he

Once

should

road was a
legal

basis

property before he could make his
Doms

knew

of

the

road

and

the

have taken action within a reasonable

time to notify the sellers of his intent to rescind or make

his

claim for damages.
Doms contends that Egeter v. West and North Properties, 758
P.2d

361

(Ore. App. 1988), is the applicable law to be applied

to the facts in this case.
among

others

Egeter stands for

the

proposition,

that an unmaintained dirt road that showed little

use and brush and trees had to be moved to drive on it
so

open

or

was

not

notorious that purchasers would be chargeable with

knowledge of its existence.

ANDERSON V. McCOY

This

case

PAGE SIX

is
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readily distinguishable on the facts because

there is no question that the road in this case
and

was

being

used.

The

aerial

has

been

used

photograph of the Anderson

parcel clearly defines the loop road so that there could

be

no

question that the road has been and is still in use.
The Egeter case is also cited for the rule that
seeking

to

rescind

the

contract

must

do

the

so promptly after

Obtaining knowledge of the facts constituting

the

rescission.

required

However,

the

buyer

is

immediately to rescind so long as he acts

not

person

within

grounds

a

to

for
act

reasonable

time.
The Court does not
acted

agree

with

Doms' contention

that

he

within a reasonable time after he obtained knowledge that

that Loop Road and the

encroachments

were

upon

the

Anderson

property.
Doms knew of the Loop Road and
1981

encroachments

early

as

and no later than October of 1982, and yet he did not take

any action to rescind until January of 1985, and
way

as

of

a

settlement

offer

in

lieu

that

was

by

of making the $194,000

payment due on January 25, 1985.
It

was

that Doms

not until plaintiffs7 action to foreclose was filed
filed

his

Amended

Counterclaim

seeking to rescind the warranty deed.

in June

of

1988

ANDERSON V, McCOY

PAGE SEVEN

The Court concludes that Doms
amount
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has

waited

an

unreasonable

of time to seek rescission# therefore, rescission is not

the appropriate remedy in this case.
The

Court

refers

the

parties

to plaintiffs7 trial brief

that supports the Court's conclusion that rescission is not
appropriate remedy in this case.
Dated this

3

6

day of April, 1990.

^JCmk A. ROKICH
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

the

ANDERSON V. McCOY
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I

hereby

of the
this

certify

foregoing
30

that I mailed a true and correct copy

Memorandum

Decision,

to

day of April, 1990:

Irving H. Biele
Attorney for Plaintiffs
3 33 North 3 00 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
James A. Mcintosh
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs
1399 South 700 East, Suite 14
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Brant H. Wall
Attorney for Third Party Defendant
9 Exchange Place, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Larry R. Keller
Attorney for Defendant Doms
257 East 200 South, Suite 340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Gerald H. Kinghorn, Esq.
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Franklin P. Anderson
Deputy Summit County Attorney
P.O. Box 128
Coalville, Utah 84017

Hi

the

following,
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IRVING H. BIELE, ESQ. — No. 0317
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506

Filed District Court
Third Judicial District
Summit County
June 23, 1992

JAMES A. McINTOSH, ESQ. -- No. 219JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C.
A Utah Professional Law Corporation
Suite 14, Intrade Bldg. South
1399 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Telephone: (801) 487-7834

/?

ML

John A. Rokich, Judge

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate of
D. C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON
personally, DAN SCOTT and
JEANNE SCOTT,

SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs
vs.
MICHAEL R. McCOY and EUGENE
E. DOMS,
Defendants
ELLEN ANDERSON as personal
representative of the Estate of
D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON
personally, DAN SCOTT and
JEANNE SCOTT,

Civil No. 8339

Third-party Plaintiffs
vs.

(Judge John A. Rokich)

SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, a

Utah corporation,
Third-party Defendant
CONSOLIDATED HEADING CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

ELLEN ANDERSON, a s p e r s o n a l
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e E s t a t e o f
D. C. ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and
PAUL D. VEASY, T r u s t e e ,
Plaintiffs
vs.
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body c o r p o r a t e
and p o l i t i c of t h e S t a t e of.
Utah; BLAKE L. FRAZIER, i n h i s
o f f i c i a l c a p a c i t y a s Summit
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS
REAL ESTATE, INC., a Utah
c o r p o r a t i o n ; VICTOR R. AYERS;
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, I N C . , a
Utah c o r p o r a t i o n ; EUGENE E.
DOMS; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1 ,
2 , 3 , 4, and 5 ,
Defendants

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
s

C i v i l No. 10066
(Judge John A. Rokich)

:
:

Trial in the above-entitled matter came before the Court April
17, 18, and 19, 1990, and August 21, 22, 23, and 24, 1990.

An

evidentiary hearing dealing with the issues of attorney fees and
costs was held on December 31, 1991. At all times, Plaintiffs were
represented by James A. Mcintosh, Esq., and Irving H. Biele, Esq..
Defendant Eugene E. Doms was represented by Larry R. Keller, Esq.,
and Craig L. Boorman, Esq. .

Third-Party Defendant, Summit County

Title Company, was represented by Brant H. Wall, Esq..

After

hearing the oral testimony of witnesses, reviewing such documentary
evidence

as was admitted,

memoranda

filed by

counsel

herein,

considering the oral argument of counsel, and good cause appearing,
the Court having heretofore on September 9, 1991, signed certain

"Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" and "Judgment;" the
parties having filed certain motions to amend the said Findings,
Conclusions, and Judgment; the Court thereafter on May 6, 1992,
having signed certain documents entitled "Amended Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law," "Amended Judgment," and having further
signed those certain documents entitled "Supplement to Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law," and "Supplement to Judgment;" which
supplemental documents pertain primarily to the issue of attorney
fees and Court costs; the Court desiring to consolidate the said
amended

and

supplemental pleadings;

hereby enters its "Second

Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" as follows:
SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiffs

in

this

case,

as

grantors,

conveyed

to

Defendant Eugene E. Doms and one Michael R. McCoy, pursuant to a
form Warranty deed upon which the word "Special" was typed, Lots
in Block 58 and 59, Park City Survey, State of Utah, and more
particularly described in Plaintiffs' Exhibit IP as follows:
PARCEL NO, 1:

All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32, Block 58,
Park City Survey, according to the amended plat
thereof, as filed and of record in the office
of the Summit County Recorder.

PARCEL NO. 2:

All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City
Survey, according to the amended plat thereof,
as filed and of record in the office of the
Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom
any portion located within the railroad rights
of way as described in those certain documents
recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page
401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326,
and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373,
records of Summit County, Utah.

PARCEL NO. 3:

All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey,
according to the Amended Plat thereof, as filed
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and of record in the office of the Summit
County Recorder, excepting
therefrom any
portion located within the railroad rights of
way as described in those certain documents
recorded as Entry No, 8176 in Book C at Page
401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326,
and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373,
records of Summit County, Utah.
Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and
water lines over the Southerly five feet and Northerly five
feet of the following described Lots.
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City
Survey according to the amended plat thereof as filed and of
record in the office of the Summit County Records.
The property so described shall be referred to hereafter as
the "Rossie Hills Property."
2.

The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase dated

November

12, 1981

(see Defendant's

contract

for

sale

the

of

the

Exhibit

Rossie

63D) , is a valid

Hills

Property,

and

specifically states that the conveyance of said property is to be
by "Warranty Deed."
3.

All subsequent documents of sale involving the parties

in this action leading up to the transfer of the Rossie Hills
Property

by

the aforementioned

Warranty

Deed

referred

to the

documents of transfer as a "Warranty Deed."
4.

The aforementioned Warranty Deed, executed by all four

of the Plaintiffs in this matter as grantors did not have the word
"Special" typed at the top of the document at the time the grantors
executed said Deed nor was it on the Deed when

said Deed was

delivered to Defendant Doms on March 23, 1982.
5.

Said Warranty Deed did not contain any of the language

which could lead the Court to the conclusion that it may have been
a "Special Warranty Deed," even if such were officially recognized
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under Utah law.
6.

Said Warranty deed contained no exceptions or limiting

language with regard to certain encumbrances and easements which
shall be hereafter discussed in these Findings.
7.
McCoy

Access to the Rossie Hills Property at the time Doms and

purchased

the

property

was

via

a

graded

right-of-way

extending in a northeasterly direction from the old rail right-ofway south of Block 59 as shown in Defendant's Exhibit 77D.
8.

After accessing the Rossie Hills property, the roadway

continued to Lot 21 of Block 58, made a loop through what was
designated as McHenry Avenue and Lots 24 and 25. This roadway will
hereafter be designated as the loop road.

(See Defendants Exhibit

77D.)
9.

The loop road which is approximately 10-15 feet wide has

been in use for in excess of 40 years.
10.

Said

loop

road

has

been

used

openly,

notoriously,

continuously, and adversely by the residents who reside on Ontario
Avenue and whose rear property borders, or intrudes upon the Rossie
Hills property, for a period in excess of 40 years as of the date
of March 23, 1982, the date of delivery of the Warranty Deed by
grantors to Defendant doms.

Such use was for ingress and egress

to the rear of their property, and for parking.
11.

Along the westerly boundaries of the lots in Block 58 are

encroachments such as sheds, fences and decks owned and used by
adjoining property owners to the west.
77D.)

-5-

(See Defendant's Exhibit

12.

The encroachments

protrude

from

12-16

feet onto the

Rossie Hills Property.
13.
bordered

These
by

encroachments,

said

fences,

including

had

been

used

the

backyard

openly,

areas

notoriously,

continuously and adversely for a period in excess of twenty years
as of March 23, 1982, by the aforementioned property owners, and
such use continues through present time.
14.

At the time of the delivery of the Deed to the Rossie

Hills Property, Plaintiffs had

knowledge of the aforementioned

encroachments, either directly or through the knowledge of their
agent, Mike Sloan.
15.
aforesaid

Plaintiffs made no effort to remove or extinguish the
encumbrances

prior

to

the

delivery

of

the

Deed

to

Defendant Doms, or at any time thereafter.
16.

Plaintiffs made no effort to quiet title to the Rossie

Hills Property and cause McHenry Avenue to be vacated; therefore,
Plaintiffs made no effort to mitigate Defendant's damages as such
damages related to these aforementioned encumbrances.
17.

The purchase price for the rossie Hills Property was the

amount of Two Hundred Seventy-Six Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($276,750.00).
18.

(See Defendant's Exhibit 69D.)

The Plaintiffs received the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars

($10,000.00) as earnest money in the aforementioned transaction,
and a down payment of Seventy-Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
($72,500.00), leaving a balance due on the purchase price of One
Hundred

Ninety-Four

Thousand

($194,250.00).
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Two

Hundred

Fifty

Dollars

19.

In consideration for the transfer of the Rossie Hills

property by Warranty Deed, Defendant Doms and one Michael R. McCoy
executed a Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed dated March 10, 1982.
(See Plaintiffs1 Exhibits 2P and 3P.)

Said Trust Deed Note was in

the amount of One Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two Hundred Fifty
Dollars (!$194,250.00) and called for interest payments monthly up
to and including January 10,1 985. The Note also provided that the
entire unpaid principal, together with interest, was due on January
25, 1985.
20.

The amount of each*monthly payment was to be Two Thousand

Two Hundred Sixty-Six and 25/100 Dollars ($2,266.25).
21.
be

Said Trust Deed Note provided that "each payment shall

applied

first

to accrued

interest

and

the

balance to the

reduction of principal."
22.

Plaintiffs received the sum of Seventy-Two Thousand Five

Hundred Twenty and 25/100 Dollars ($72,520.25) as monthly payments
pursuant to the aforementioned Trust Deed Note.

(See Plaintiffs1

Exhibit 6P.)
23.

The property conveyed to Eugene E. Doms and Michael R.

McCoy was located in a platted subdivision.
24.
in Block

The Rossie Hills Property as platted showed that the lots
58 and

59 were accessible by McHenry

Avenue.

(See

Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 99P.)
25.

The recorded plat of the Rossie Hills Property was not

a true reflection of the actual physical layout of the land because
of the contour and fact that McHenry Avenue was never constructed
as a roadway.
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26.

The Rossie Hills Property was purchased for residential

development.
27.

At the time the Rossie Hills property was purchased, it

was zoned HR-1, which allowed historical uses and allowed single,
duplex and tri—plex dwellings to be constructed upon the property.
28.

The utilization of all of the Rossie Hills Property is

affected by the contour of the land, the loop road, encroachments
and McHenry Avenue being undeveloped.
29.

Plaintiffs1

appraiser, Mr. Pia, concluded that as of

March 10, 1982, the value of the Rossie Hills Property subject to
the loop road and encroachments

was around Two Hundred

Fifty

Thousand Dollars ($250, 000.00J..
30.

Defendant Doms1 appraiser, Mr. Webber, concluded that as

of March 10, 1982, the value of the Rossie Hills property was One
Hundred

Sixty-Six

Thousand

Dollars

($166,000.00)

if

the

encumbrances and loop road can be relocated and One Hundred Ten
Thousand Seven Hundred Dollars ($110,700.00) if the loop road and
encumbrances cannot be relocated.
31.

McHenry Avenue had not been vacated by Park City or by

a judicial determination.
32.

Plaintiffs did not or could not have conveyed good and

marketable title to any part of McHenry Avenue at the time of the
execution of the warranty Deed to Doms and McCoy.
33.

Defendant Doms met with Mike Sloan, a real estate agent,

in the fall of 1981 to discuss the sale and purchase of the Rossie
Hills Property.
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34.

Defendant Doms also met with Dewey Anderson, one of the

sellers of the Rossie Hills Property, once before Doms and McCoy
purchased the property.
35.

Both Sloan and Anderson represented that the property was

a prime piece of development property and its highest and best use
would

be as an integrated

development

with

the two adjoining

parcels referred to as Block 62 and the Slipper parcel.
36.

Defendant Doms and McCoy purchased an interest in the

Slipper parcel in October of 1982.
37.

The Slipper parcel was purchased by Doms and McCoy to

further the integrated development of the three parcels and to
equalize their position with the developers of the Slipper parcel
and Block 62.
38.

In October of 1982, Doms engaged Mr. Gerald H. Kinghorn,

an attorney, for the specific purpose of closing the purchase of
the Slipper parcel and continuing the negotiations with the owners
of Block 62 for the purpose of developing the three parcels as an
integrated development.
39.

Prior to Doms1 purchase of the rossie Hills Property,

Doms was shown a preliminary site plan for the development of the
three parcels of property prepared by the architect, Mr. Richard
Kohler.
40.
the

Doms knew or should have known at the time he purchased

Rossie

Hills

Property

and

the

Slipper

parcel

that

the

integrated development of the three parcels had failed because of
the problems with the Rossie Hills property and the inability of
the parties to reach an agreement as to credits for each parcel.
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41.

Doms walked the Rossie Hills property with Mr. Sloan in

the fall of 1981 and knew that there were roads and sheds on the
property.
42.

Mr. Sloan informed Defendant doms that the encroachments

would not affect development and an access road to the property
would be in the same place as the loop road.
43.

Doms had actual notice of the easement encroachments for

the first time sometime between October 22, 1981, and November 7,
1981, and had further notice during 1982 and up and through 1984.
44.

Doms did not give notice of his intent to rescind until

January of 1985, and said notice was by way of a settlement offer
in lieu of making the One Hundred Ninety Four Thousand Two Hundred
Fifty Dollar ($194,250.00) payment due on January 25, 1985.

Said

settlement offer in January of 1985 was an offer made to Plaintiffs
through Defendant Doms1

attorney, Gerald H. Kinghorn, in which

Defendant Doms offered to deed back the property to Plaintiffs in
return for Plaintiffs1 cancellation of the aforementioned Trust
Deed Note.
45.

Plaintiffs did not respond to said settlement offer, but

rather filed a Complaint to foreclose on the property in June of
1985.
46.
develop

Doms' purchase of Slipper parcel, the negotiations to
the

three

parcels

as an

integrated

development,

the

subsequent negotiations about credits and defining the problems
with the Rossie Hills property, affirm the fact that Doms had
personal knowledge of the road and encroachments no later than
October of 1982.
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47.

It was not until Plaintiffs1

action to foreclose was

filed that Defendant Doms filed his Amended Counterclaim in June
of 1988 seeking to rescind the Warranty Deed.
48.

Defendant

Doms failed to file his claim

for damages

against the Estate of D.C. Anderson within three months after the
date of the first publication of Notice to Creditors as provided
in Section 75-3-803 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code.
49.

The Original Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment signed

on September 9, 1991, were filed in the office of the Summit County
Clerk on October 22, 1991, which the court finds is the date of
Entry.
50.

The Original Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment were not

"final" because there were several issues to be decided which the
Court had not included in the said documents, which consisted of
several items including determination of attorney fees and costs.
51.

The Court does not believe it should interfere with the

agreements entered into by the client and the attorney for services
to be rendered when the attorneys, as in this case, have fully
apprised the clients of the fees and costs at the outset of the
case.
52.

The attorneys

for plaintiffs and defendant have kept

detailed records of the time spent in the prosecution of this case
and have billed regularly so that the client was always aware of
what was transpiring in the case.
53.

The Court's decision as to fees and costs is not to be

construed as negating the client's obligation to pay the attorneys
in accordance with the terms of the attorney-client agreement.
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54.

The Court finds t h a t the "Earnest Money Receipt and Offer

t o Purchase" which was signed by some of the p a r t i e s in November
1981 was merged into the l a t e r Warranty Deed dated March 10, 1982.
Espinoza v. Safeco T i t l e I n s . Co.. 598 P.2d 346 (Utah 1979).
fa}
of

attorney

?he -said-Warranty-Seed-did not provide for payment
fees in an a c t i o n based upon breach of

warranties

c o n t a i n e d in the said Deed.
55.

The Court finds t h a t purchasers of real e s t a t e are not

e n t i t l e d t o attorney fees absent an express agreement providing
t h e r e f o r e , unless the purchaser commences a separate action against
third

parties

to remove encumbrances.

George A. Lowe Co.

v.

Simmons Warehouse Co., 39 Utah 395, 117 Pac. 874 (1911).
(a)

Doms has not commenced a separate action against

t h i r d p a r t i e s to remove encumbrances.
56.

The Court finds the p l a i n t i f f s 1 complaint in foreclosure

as w e l l as a l l other actions by the p l a i n t i f f s were not i n s t i t u t e d
or prosecuted in bad f a i t h .
57.

The Counsel for p l a i n t i f f s

and Doms a g g r e s s i v e l y and

z e a l o u s l y presented t h e i r c a s e s and n e i t h e r party acted in bad
faith.
58.

The Court finds t h a t Doms i s not e n t i t l e d to attorney

59.

The defendant Doms i s not e n t i t l e d t o any prejudgment

fees.

i n t e r e s t on the $83,000.00 damages.
60.

Doms

is

entitled

to

the

following

costs

for

p r o s e c u t i o n of his Second Amended Counterclaim:
(a)

Service of p r o c e s s on Jeanne S c o t t

$ 12.00

(b)

Service of p r o c e s s on E l l e n Anderson

$ 12.75
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the

61.

(c)

Service of trial subpoena: Mike Sloan

$ 24.75

(d)

Witness fees: Elden and Ella Sorensen

$ 34.00

(e)

Recording fee for corrected Sheriff f s
Deed

$ 18.00

(f)

The said costs awarded to Doms total

$101.50

The issue of plaintiffs being entitled to attorney fees

and costs can be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs because the
provisions contained in the Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed provided
that

all costs and

expenses

of collection

including

reasonable

attorney fees can be charged against the maker.
62.

The

Court

finds

that

counsel

for

the

plaintiffs

and

defendant have expended many hours in the prosecution of this case
and their time sheets so reflect.
63.

The Court finds that hourly rates charged by counsel for

plaintiffs and defendant were reasonable.
64.
Mcintosh,

The

Court

at page

finds

that

Plaintiffs*

12 of his affidavit

dated

counsel,
December

James

A.

6, 1991,

states, "Most of the services rendered were in connection with the
Second Amended Counterclaim."
(a)

The

time

spent

on

collection

of

the

Note

and

foreclosure action by plaintiffs 1 counsel was nominal in comparison
to all the hours expended in this case.
(b)

The Court

finds that plaintiffs

are entitled to

recover attorney fees for the time spent on the collection of the
Trust Deed Note and the Trust Deed foreclosure action but not for
any time spent in defending against any of the causes of action in
the Second Amended

Counterclaim.
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65.

The Court finds the plaintiffs are entitled to attorney

fees for legal services

incurred

in the prosecution

of the

collection of the Note foreclosure action, the motion to set aside
default,

to

compel

sanctions,

setting

aside

the

tax

sale,

intermediate appeal and petition for extraordinary writ to the Utah
Supreme Court.
66.

In addressing the issue of these fees, the Court will

take into consideration the effect of the attorney fees awarded the
plaintiffs by Judge Pat B. Brian in the amount of $4,467.60 as a
condition of setting aside the Default Judgment against Doms.
67.

The Court will also make an award to plaintiffs based

upon Judge J. Dennis Fredericks ruling that plaintiffs were
entitled to a reasonable fee for bringing a motion to compel and
for sanctions before the court.
68.

The criteria for the Court's decision awarding attorney

fees is set forth in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P. 2d 985
(Utah 1988).
69.

The Court understands the amount in controversy can be

a factor in determining a reasonable fee, but the Court is not
putting much reliance on this factor.
70.

The Court finds the plaintiffs should be awarded attorney

fees as follows:
(a) FOR PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL, JAMES A. MCINTQ8H, ESQ,;
(i)

Lawsuit to set aside tax sale

$ 5,245.00

(ii)

Petition for intermediate appeal

$ 2,730.00

(iii) Petition for extraordinary writ

$ 2,160.00

(iv)

For the foreclosure complaint

$12,300.00

(v)

For the motion to compel and for
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sanctions as per Judge Frederick's
minute entries
$ 4,750.00
(vi)
(b)

The total amount to be awarded for
Mr. Mcintosh's fees is
$27,185.00

FOR PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL IRVING H. BIELE, ESQ, :
(i)

Motion to set aside default
(This amount has already been
paid by Doms)

$ 4,467.00

(ii)

Lawsuit to set aside tax sale

$ 1,050.00

(iii) Petition for extraordinary writ
and mandamus

$ 2,740.00

(iv)

For the foreclosure complaint

$10,000.00

(v)

The total amount to be awarded
for Mr. Biele's fees is

71.

The Court finds

the plaintiffs

$13,790.00
are

entitled

to the

following costs:
(a)

Summit County Clerk -- filing Complaint $ 50.00

(b)

Richie Zabriskie —

fee for service

of Third-Party Summons and Complaint
(c)

Summit County Clerk —

filing fee for

Complaint in Civil No. 10066
(d)

Richie Zabriskie —

$ 16.50

$ 75.00

fee for service

of process in Civil No. 10066 on Domcoy
Enterprises Inc.
(e)

Utah Supreme Court —

$ 24.70
docketing fee

for filing Petition for Intermediate
Appeal
(f)

$125.00

Utah Supreme Court —

filing fee for

Petition for Extraordinary Writ of
Prohibition

$ 50.00
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(g) Summit County Clerk —

fee for

certification of order
(h)

$ 3*50

Steve Deckert — witness fee for
attending trial

(i)

$ 30.00

LeRoy J. Pia — witness fee
to attend trial

$ 50.00

(j) The total amount of the said costs
to be awarded to the plaintiffs is
72.

$358.20

The Trust Deed Note dated March 10, 1982, provides for

payment of interest in the amount of fourteen percent (14%) per
annum prior to default, eighteen percent (18%) per annum after
default.
BECOND AMENDED CONCL0810N8 OF LAW
1.

The Deed which transferred the Rossie Hills property was

a Warranty Deed under Utah law and conveyed with it all of the
statutory warranties and covenants contained in U.C.A. Section 571-12.
2.
said

The loop road, sheds, fences, backyard areas bordered by

fences,

and

decks

are

encroachments

and

constitute

encumbrances upon the property.
3.

Said encumbrances existed on the Rossie Hills property

on the date of the delivery of the Deed/ which was March 23, 1982.
4.

Said encumbrances constitute a breach of the statutory

covenants contained in the Warranty Deed pursuant to U.C.A. Section
57-1-12.
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5.

The

aforesaid

statutory

covenants

contained

in the

Warranty Deed were breached upon the delivery of the Warranty Deed
to Defendant Doms on March 23, 1982.
6.

The

Warranty

Deed,

Trust

Deed

Note

and

Trust

Deed

prepared at the same time do not constitute a single contract.
7.
is:

The Court believes that the law applicable to this case

The acceptance of the Deed completes the execution of the

contract, and the Deed become final and conclusive evidence of the
contract under which it is executed (84 A.L.R. 1009).
8.

The Court concludes that the Utah case of Reese Howell

Company v. Brown, 48 Utah 142, 158 P. 684, 689 (1916), sets forth
the controlling law which must be applied in the instant case
regarding the issue as to whether or not the Warranty Deed, Note
and Trust Deed constitutes a single contract.
9.

The fact that a Trust Deed and Note were executed at the

same time does not make them part of the contract to purchase the
property.

The Trust Deed and Note are documents executed to secure

the payment of the property, and have no bearing upon whether the
property is free and clear of encumbrances.
10.

Defendant Doms1 remedy in this case is for a breach of

the statutory covenants of warranty.
11.

The utilization of the Rossie Hills Property is adversely

affected by the encroachments and loop road to the extent that the
value of the property is diminished.
12.

Defendant Doms has been damaged by virtue of Plaintiffs1

breach.
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Defendant Doms1 damages should be measured as of the date

13.

of the breach, which is March 23, 1982, the date of the delivery
of the Deed.
14.

Said

damages

should

be

measured

with

all

of

the

encumbrances in place and as they existed on March 23, 1982.
15.

The proper measure of damages under Utah law is the

difference in the value of the property without any encumbrances
minus the value of the property with the encumbrances.
16.

The loop road does have a beneficial

value for the

development of the Rossie Hills Property.
17.

Under Utah

obligation
because

law,

it

was

to mitigate the damages

Plaintiffs were

in breach

the

Plaintiffs1

suffered
of

burden

and

by Defendant doms

the

statutory

covenants

contained in the Deed at the time the Deed was delivered.
18.

Plaintiffs had the obligation of quieting title to the

Rossie Hills property and causing McHenry Avenue to be vacated; and
if Plaintiffs had done so, Defendant Doms1 damages would have been
mitigated.
19.
Hills

As a result of the encumbrances existing on the Rossie

Property on March 23, 1982, Defendant

Doms has suffered

damages in the sum of Eighty-Three Thousand Dollars ($83,000.00).
20.
Hundred

Defendant Doms is entitled to an offset against the Two
Seventy=Six

Thousand

Seven

Hundred

($276,750.00) purchase price of the property,
Eighty-Two

Thousand

Five

Hundred

represents

the earnest money

Dollars

payment

Fifty

Dollars

in the amount of

($82,500.00),

of Ten

Thousand

which
Dollars

($10,000.00) and the down payment of Seventy-Two Thousand Five
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Hundred Dollars ($72,500.00).
21.

The remaining balance due after said offset of Eighty-

Two Thousand

Five Hundred Dollars

($82,500.00)

is One Hundred

Ninety-Four Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00), which
represents the principal balance of the Trust Deed Note as of the
date of the execution of said Note and the Trust Deed.
22.
offset

Defendant
of

Doms is further entitled

Eighty-Three

Thousand

Dollars

to an additional

($83,000.00),

which

represents the damages suffered by Defendant Doms as a result of
the encumbrances on the property as set forth above.
23.

Therefore, the remaining unpaid balance under the Trust

Deed Note and Trust Deed was One Hundred

Eleven Thousand Two

Hundred Fifty Dollars ($111,250.00) as of March 23, 1982, the date
of the delivery of the Warranty Deed.
24.
interest

From April 0, 1982 through January
payments

under the Trust

10, 1985, monthly

Deed Note were received by

Plaintiffs on an unpaid principal balance of One Hundred NinetyFour Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00), rather than
One

Hundred

Eleven

Thousand

Two

Hundred

Fifty

Dollars

($111,250.00), which the court has concluded was the unpaid balance
due under the Trust Deed Note at that time.
25.

under the terms of the Trust

Deed

Note, the amount

actually due in monthly interest payments on the un paid principal
balance of one Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars
(111,250.00) was Forty-One Thousand Five Hundred Thirty-Three and
44/100 Dollars ($41,533.44).
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26.

Since Plaintiffs received monthly interest payments in

the amount of Seventy-Two Thousand Five Hundred Twenty and 25/100
Dollars

($72,520-25), Defendant Doms is further entitled to an

additional off-set of Thirty Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-Six and
81/100

Dollars

($30,986.81),

which

represents

the

difference

between the interest paid on One Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two
Hundred Fifty Dollars

($194,250.00) and the interest which was

actually due on One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($111,250.00) for the same period.
27.

Therefore, the remaining unpaid principal balance due

under the Trust Deed Note is Eighty Thousand Two Hundred SixtyThree and 19/100 Dollars ($80,263.19), as of January 25, 1985, the
date said principal amount was due under the terms of the Trust
Deed Note.
28.

Inasmuch as Defendant Doms1 damages were not determined

and a Judgment has not been entered for said damages, Plaintiffs1
action for a judgment of foreclosure is premature.
29.

Without

the

necessity

of

refiling

this

action

to

foreclose the Trust Deed, the Court will require Plaintiffs to give
Defendant Doms a Notice of Default and Defendant Doms shall have
the right to pay the entire amount due under the terms of the Trust
Deed Note and Trust Deed, together with costs and attorney fees,
as determined ny the Court, within 90 days from receipt of the
Notice of Default.

The giving of the Notice of Default shall not

take place until after the Judgment is entered and notice can be
served on Defendant Doms and/or his attorney.

Service on the

Defendant Doms may be made by mailing the said notice to the
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Defendant's last known address.
30.

The Court recognizes t h a t t h e r e are two options by which

t o f o r e c l o s e a note and t r u s t deed, a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y or j u d i c i a l l y .
Due t o the circumstances in t h i s c a s e , the f a i l u r e of
to

a s c e r t a i n damages prior

to

proceeding with the

Plaintiffs
foreclosure

a c t i o n , Defendant Doms should be given 90 days 1 notice t o s a t i s f y
t h e Note before P l a i n t i f f s can proceed with the foreclosure a c t i o n .
31.
of

P l a i n t i f f s are e n t i t l e d t o i n t e r e s t on the unpaid balance

Eighty Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-Three

and 19/100

Dollars

($80,263.19) from January 25, 1985, the date the unpaid principal
b a l a n c e was due under the terms of

the Trust Deed Note.

The

i n t e r e s t rate to be used in determining the amount due P l a i n t i f f s
as

i n t e r e s t on said unpaid p r i n c i p a l

balance s h a l l be

fourteen

p e r c e n t (14%) per annum.
32.

If Defendant Doms f a i l s t o pay the balance due and owing

a f t e r n o t i c e , P l a i n t i f f s s h a l l have Judgment of foreclosure upon
filing

an affidavit that Defendant Doms has f a i l e d to pay.

Plaintiffs
Judgment

w i l l have the s o l e
of

foreclosure

The

option at t h e i r d i s c r e t i o n to a

based

either

on

the

administrative

f o r e c l o s u r e proceedings s e t f o r t h in Sections 57-1-23 e t .
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, or the j u d i c i a l

seg.,

foreclosure

proceedings provided in S e c t i o n s 78-37-1 e t . s e g . .
33.

In regard to the i s s u e of whether or not Defendant Doms

was e n t i t l e d to rescind the c o n t r a c t ,

the Court concludes that

Defendant Doms was bound t o take remedial action after the Fall of
1981 which the Court determined t o be the date he was made aware
of t h e encroachments and loop road, and which was prior to the
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purchase of the Slipper parcel.
34.

It was not necessary for Defendant Doms to obtain a legal

opinion that the loop road was a prescriptive easement or that the
shed and fences had a legal basis for being on the Rossie Hills
Property before he could make his tender to rescind.
35.

Once

Defendant

Doms

knew

of

the

road

and

the

encumbrances, he should have taken action within a reasonable time
to notify the sellers of his intent to rescind the transaction.
36.

The Court concludes that the case of Eaeter v. West and

North Properties, 758 P.2d 361 (Ore. App. 1988), is not applicable
to this case in that Eqeter stands for the proposition, among
others, that an unmaintained dirt road that showed little use and
brush and trees had to be removed to drive on it was not so open
or notorious that purchasers would be chargeable with knowledge of
its existence.
37.

Eqeter is readily distinguishable from the facts of the

instant case because there is not question that the road in this
case has been used and was being used.
38.

The Egeter case is applicable to the instant case in the

sense that it stands for the proposition that the person seeking
to

rescind

the

contract must

do

so

promptly

after

obtaining

knowledge of the facts constituting the grounds for rescind so long
as he acts within a reasonable time.
39.

Defendant Doms did not act within a reasonable time after

he obtained knowledge that the loop road and the encroachments were
upon the Rossie Hills Property.
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40.

The

Court

unreasonable

concludes

amount

of

time

that
to

Defendant

seek

Doms

rescission;

waited

an

therefore,

rescission is not the appropriate remedy in this case and is barred
by the doctrine of laches.
41.
the

Defendant Doms presented insufficient evidence to carry

burden

of

proof

that

Plaintiffs

committed

fraud

and

misrepresentation in this matter.
42.

With

regard

to

Civil

No.

10066,

and

Count

I

of

Plaintiffs1 Complaint contained therein, pursuant to Stipulation
of the parties and a previous Order of the court, the May 27, 1987,
Tax Sale of the Rossie Hills Property by Summit County should be
declared to be null and void.
43.

The foregoing Conclusion of Law shall be deemed not to

affect the Trust Deed dated March 10, 1982, in any adverse manner
by the said tax sale. The rights, title, liens and interest of the
Plaintiffs and Defendant Eugene E. Doms and Domcoy Enterprises,
Inc., a Utah corporation, shall not be deemed to be affected by the
said tax sale.

The Court's previous Order invalidating the tax

sale does not in and of itself either validate or invalidate any
subsequent deeds issued regarding the Rossie Hill Property.
44.

The Warranty Deed dated August 26, 1988, in which Domcoy

Enterprises, Inc., as grantor, conveyed the Rossie Hills Property
to Defendant Doms, as grantee, is a valid Deed which transferred
legal title to Defendant Doms.
45.

In regard to Count II of Plaintiffs1 Complaint in Civil

No. 10066, title to the Rossie Hills Property should be quieted in
Defendant

Doms, subject

to

Plaintiffs1
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right

to

foreclose as

previously set forth in these Conclusions of Law.
46.

In regard to Count III of Plaintiffs1 Complaint in Civil

NO. 10066, said Count III has been previously dismissed by the
Court on Motion of Summit County.
47.

In regard to Plaintiffs1 Third-Party Complaint against

Third-Party Defendant Summit

County Title Company in Civil No.

8339, said Third-Party Complaint has been previously dismissed by
the Court on Motion of said parties.
48.

Defendant

doms1

Second

Amended

Counterclaim

seeking

damages against Plaintiff Ellen Anderson as Personal Representative
of the Estate of D.C. Anderson is barred by the three-month filing
period limitation for claims against an estate pursuant to Section
75-3-803 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, as said section relates
to the issues of damages.
49.
Jeanne

This Court has in

Scott pursuant

to

personam
a ruling

jurisdiction over Plaintiff
by

the Utah

Supreme Court

contained in an Amended Minute Entry denying Plaintiffs1 Petition
for an Extraordinary Writ under Rule 65B(B)4, Supreme Court Case
No. 890269. In said Amended Minute Entry, dated July 31, 1989, the
Utah Supreme Court denied said Petition for an Extraordinary Writ,
and ruled that this Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff Jeanne
Scott because she was a grantor on the Warranty Deed, and is a
proper party to Defendant Doms1 Second Amended Counterclaim under
Rules 13 and 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
50.

Plaintiffs1 remaining objections to the Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law, and Judgment dated September 9, 1991, are
denied.

-24-

51.

The

plaintiffs

should

be

awarded

attorney

fees

of

$27,185.00 for services rendered by plaintiffs1 counsel, James A.
Mcintosh, Esq.
52.

The

plaintiffs

should

be

awarded

attorney

fees

of

$13,790.00 for services rendered by plaintiffs1 counsel, Irving H.
Biele, Esq.
53.

The plaintiffs should be awarded $358.20 for costs which

they have incurred in these proceedings.
54.
percent

The plaintiffs should be awarded interest of fourteen
(14%) per annum on all principal amounts the court has

determined were due and owing on the Trust Deed Note dated March
10, 1982, both before and after default.
55.

The defendant Doms should not be awarded any attorney

fees for services rendered by his counsel in either Civil No. 8339
or Civil No. 10066.
56.
interest

The defendant Doms should not be awarded any prejudgment
on the $83,000.00

damages

described

in the original

Judgment dated September 9, 1991.
57.

The defendant Doms should be awarded $101.50 for costs

for prosecution of the Second Amended Counterclaim.
DATED this Ji_

day of June 1992.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH
District Court Judge
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IRVING H. BIELE, ESQ. — No. 0317
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
333 North 3 00 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506

Filed District Court
Third-Judicial District
Summit County
June 23, 1992

JAMES A. MCINTOSH, ESQ. -- No. 2194
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C.
A Utah Professional Law Corporation
Suite 14, Intrade Bldg. South
1399 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
Telephone: (801) 487-7834

bi^
Rokich, Judge

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate of
D. C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON :
personally, DAN SCOTT and
JEANNE SCOTT,

SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs

vs.
MICHAEL R. McCOY and EUGENE
E. DOMS,
Defendants
ELLEN ANDERSON as personal
representative of the Estate of
D.C. ANDERSON, ELLEN ANDERSON
personally, DAN SCOTT and
JEANNE SCOTT,
Third-party Plaintiffs
vs.

,
:
:
:
:
:

SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, a
Utah corporation,
Third-party Defendant

Civil No. 8339

(Judge John A. Rokich)

:
:

CONSOLIDATED HEADING CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate of
D. C. ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and
PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee,
Plaintiffs

vs.
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of
Utah; BLAKE L. FRAZIER, in his
official capacity as Summit
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS
REAL ESTATE, INC., a Utah
corporation; VICTOR R. AYERS;
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC., a
Utah corporation; EUGENE E.
DOMS; UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1,
2, 3, 4, and 5,

:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Defendants

:

::

Civil No. 10066
(Judge John A. Rokich)

Based upon the Second Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, entered contemporaneously herein, it is hereby ORDERED,
ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

In regard to Civil No. 8339 and Count II of Plaintiffs1

Complaint in Civil No. 10066, title to the property which is the
subject of the above-entitled

matters

is quieted

in Defendant

Eugene E. Doms, subject to the right of Plaintiffs, Ellen Anderson,
as Personal Representative of the Estate of D.C. Anderson, and Dan
Scott, to foreclose their Trust Deed against said property as
hereinafter set forth in this Judgment.

Said property is more

particularly described as follows:
PARCEL NO. 1:

All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32, Block 58,
Park City Survey, according to the amended plat

thereof, as filed and of record in the office
of the Summit County Recorder.
PARCEL NO. 2:

All of Lots 17 and 19, Block 59, Park City
Survey, according to the amended plat thereof,
as filed and of record in the office of the
Summit County Recorder, excepting therefrom
any portion located within the railroad rights
of way as described in those certain docunents
recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page
401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326,
and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373,
records of Summit County, Utah.

PARCEL NO. 3:

All of Lot 18, Block 59, Park City Survey,
according to the Amended Plat thereof, as filed
and of record in the office of the Summit
County Recorder,
excepting therefrom any
portion located within the railroad rights of
way as described in those certain documents
recorded as Entry No. 8176 in Book C at Page
401, Entry No. 13316 in Book H at Page 326,
and Entry No. 13610 in Book H at Page 373,
records of Summit County, Utah.

Together with an easement for utilities, including sewer and
water lines over the Southerly five feet and Northerly five
feet of the following described Lots.
All of Lot 14, the South 1/2 of Lot 15, Block 58, Park City
Survey according to the amended plat thereof as filed and of
record in the office of the Summit County Records.
2.

Plaintiffs' Complaint for foreclosure in Civil No. 8339

is premature, in as much as Defendant

Doms1

damages were not

determined and a Judgment has not been entered for said damages.
3.
his

Defendant Doms is awarded Judgment in Civil No. 8339 on

Second

Amended

Counterclaim

for

danages

for

breach

warranties and covenants against encumbrances contained
Warranty

of

in the

Deed conveying the Rossie Hills property, pursuant to

U.C.A. Section 57-1-12.
4.

Defendant Doms is awarded damages for said breach of the

warranties and covenants against encumbrances
Eighty-Three Thousand Dollars ($83,000.00).
-**-

in the amount of

5.

The original principal balance due from Defendant Doms

to Plaintiffs Ellen Anderson, as Personal Representative of the
Estate of D.C. Anderson, and Dan Scott, on the Trust Deed Note and
Trust Deed held by said Plaintiffs was One Hundred Ninety-Four
Thousand Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00), as of the date
of the execution of said Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed.
6.

Said amount

of One Hundred

Ninety-Four

Thousand

Two

Hundred Fifty Dollars ($194,250.00) due under said Trust Deed Note
and Trust Deed shall be offset by the Eighty-Three Thousand Dollars
($83,000.00) which the Court has awarded Defendant Doms as damages
for breach of the warranties and covenants against encumbrances.
7.

Therefore, the remaining unpaid principal balance due

from Defendant Doms to said Plaintiffs under the Trust Deed Note
and Trust Deed was One Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($111,250.00) as of March 23, 1982, the date of delivery
of the Warranty Deed.
8.

Since Plaintiffs received monthly interest payments in

the amount of Seventy-Two Thousand Five Hundred Twenty and 25/100
Dollars

($72,520.25), Defendant Doms is further entitled to an

additional off-set of Thirty Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-Six and
81/100

Dollars

($30,986.81),

which

represents

the

difference

between the interest paid on One Hundred Ninety-Four Thousand Two
Hundred Fifty Dollars

($194,250.00) and the interest which was

actually due on One Hundred

Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Fifty

Dollars ($111,250.00) for the same period.
9.

Therefore, the remaining unpaid principal balance due

under the Trust Deed Note is Eighty Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-
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Three and 19/100 Dollars ($80,263.19), as of January 25, 1985, the
date said principal amount was due under the terms of the Trust
Deed Note.
10.

Without

the

necessity

of

refiling

this

action

to

foreclose the Trust Deed, the Court will require said Plaintiffs
to give Defendant Doms a Notice of Default and Defendant Doms shall
have the right to pay the entire amount due under the terms of the
Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed, together with costs and attorney
fees, as determined by the Court, within 90 days form receipt of
the Notice of Default.

The giving of the Notice of Default shall

not take place until after the Judgment is entered and notice can
be served on Defendant Doms and/or his attorney.
Defendant

Doms may be made by mailing

Service on the

the said notice to the

Defendant's last known address.
11.

Said Plaintiffs are entitled to interest on the unpaid

balance of Eighty Thousand

Two Hundred

Sixty-Three and

19/100

Dollars ($80,263.19) from January 25, 1985, the date the unpaid
principal balance was due under the terms of the Trust Deed Note.
The

interest

rate

to be

used

in

determining

the

amount

due

Plaintiffs as interest on said unpaid principal balance shall be
fourteen percent (14%) per annum.
12.

If Defendant Doms fails to pay the balance due and owing

after notice, said Plaintiffs shall have Judgment of foreclosure
upon filing an affidavit that Defendant Doms has failed to pay.
The Plaintiffs will have the sole option at their discretion to a
Judgment

of

foreclosure

based

either

on

the

administrative

foreclosure proceedings set forth in Sections 57-1-23 et. seg.,

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, or the judicial foreclosure
proceedings provided in Sections 78-37-1 et. seg. .
13.

Defendant

Doms

is

not

entitled

to

the

remedy

of

rescission of the transaction conveying the aforementioned property
because the remedy of rescission

is barred by the doctrine of

laches.
14.

Defendant

Doms1

Second

Amended

Counterclaim,

as

it

relates to the remedy of damages, is dismissed as against Plaintiff
Ellen Anderson, as Personal Representative of the Estate of D.C.
Anderson, as said claim is barred by the three-month filing period
limitation for claims against an estate pursuant to Section 75-3803 of the Utah Uniform Probate Code.
15.

Defendant Doms1 causes of action relating to fraud and

misrepresentation

in Civil

No.

8339

are

dismissed,

the Court

finding no cause therefore.
16.
No.

In regard to Count I of Plaintiffs' Complaint in Civil

10066,

and pursuant

to Stipulation

of

the

parties and a

previous Order of the Court, the May 27, 1987, tax sale of the
Rossie Hills property by Summit County is declared to be null and
void.
17.

In regard to Count III of Plaintiffs1 Complaint in Civil

No. 10066, said Count III has been previously dismissed by the
Court on Motion of Defendant Summit County.
18.

In regard to Plaintiffs1 Third Party-Complaint against

Third-Party Defendant Summit County title Company

in Civil No.

8339, said Third-Party Complaint has been previously dismissed by
the Court on Motion of said parties.
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19.
fees

for

The plaintiffs are hereby awarded $27,185.00 in attorney
services

rendered

by

plaintiffs1

counsel,

James A.

Mcintosh, Esq.
20.

The plaintiffs are hereby awarded $13,790.00 in attorney

fees for services rendered by plaintiffs1 counsel, Irving H. Biele,
Esq.
21.

The plaintiffs are hereby awarded $358.20 for costs which

they have incurred in these proceedings.
22.

The plaintiffs are hereby awarded interest at the rate

of fourteen percent (14%) per annum on all principal amounts which
this court has determined were due and owing by the defendant Doms
pursuant to the terms of the Trust Deed Note dated March 10, 1982,
both before and after default in payment by the said defendant.
23.

The defendant Doms is not entitled to any attorney fees

for services rendered by his counsel in either Civil No. 8339 or
Civil No. 10066.
24.

The defendant

Eugene

E. Doms is not entitled

to any

prejudgment interest on the $83,000.00 damages.
25.

The defendant Doms is hereby awarded $101.50 for costs

for prosecution of the Second Amended Counterclaim.
DATED this j£_

day of June 1992.
BY THE COURT:

/ffl

M\v\ ft ./cjk<+

HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH
District Court Judge

ADDENDUM 17
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IRVING H. BIELE, ESQ. (Bar No. A0317)
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, ESQ. (Bar No. 2194)
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C.
1399 South 700 East #14
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Telephone: (801) 487-7834
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate
Of D. C. ANDERSON; ELLEN
ANDERSON personally; DAN SCOTT
and JEANNE SCOTT,

PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO
SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND SECOND AMENDED
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
MICHAEL R. MCCOY and EUGENE
E. DOMS,
Defendants,

Civil No. 8339

ELLEN ANDERSON as personal
representative of the Estate
of D. C. ANDERSON; ELLEN
ANDERSON personally; DAN
SCOTT and JEANNE SCOTT,

Judge John A. Rokich

Third-party
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CONSOLIDATED HEADING CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE

-1-

SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, a
Utah corporation,
Third-party
Defendant.

ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate of
D. C. ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and
PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of Utah
and BLAKE L. FRAZIER, in his
official capacity as Summit
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS
REAL ESTATE, INC. a Utah
corporation; VICTOR R. AYERS;
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC., a
Utah corporation; EUGENE E.
DOMS, UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1, 2,
3, 4 and 5,

Case No. 10066

Defendants.

Plaintiffs hereby enter their objections to those certain
documents which are entitled, "Second Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions

of

Law"

and

"Second

Amended

Judgment"

which

documents, by Order of the Court, were prepared by the undersigned
to

accommodate

the

defendant's

attorney

and

incorporate

the

court's most recent rulings and consolidate the separate Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment filed in relation to
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the

primary

case

and

the

subsequent

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law and Judgment prepared in relation to attorneys1
fees.

These objections are made pursuant to Rule 4-504, Rules of

Judicial Administration, and are based on the official records in
the case.

Plaintiffs specifically state objections and incorpo-

rate objections as follows:
1.

The only equitable cause pled was fcr rescission,

which cause the court denied.

The only cause presently before the

court is in contract and therefore is not subject to the court's
equitable dispositions, and judgment should be in dollars as of
the time of the court's determination of damage.
2.

The court's failure and refusal to apply the laws of

the State of Utah to the stated facts, all of which is exhibited
and defined in "Plaintiffs1 Objections to Defendant Domsf Proposed
Amended

Findings

of Fact

and Conclusions

of Law and Amended

Judgment" as set forth in Plaintiffs1 Memorandum dated May 11,
1992, which are incorporated herein.
3.

Plaintiffs also refer and incorporate herein their

Objections to the Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Memorandum in support thereof filed on the 5th day of
March, 1992.
4.

The court at the last hearing indicated it would not

hear any further oral arguments or discussions of the objections;
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therefore, plaintiff does not file a request for hearing and oral
argument.
DATED t h i s

£

--J

day o f J u n e , 1992.
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

H. BIELE
3unsel f o r P l a i n t i f f s
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES, P.C,

J m. &
JAMES A. MclNTOSH
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

)
:ss.
)

CAROL A. DeMILL, being duly sworn, says:
That she is employed in the offices of Nygaard, Coke &
Vincent, Co-counsel for Plaintiffs herein, and that she served
the attached: PLAINTIFFS1 OBJECTIONS TO SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND SECOND AMENDED JUDGMENT and
the MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT thereof upon Defendant's attorney of
record as follows:
Larry R. Keller, Esq.
257 East 200 South S-10 #340
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
by causing the same to be hand delivered on this 3rd day of June,
1992.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3rd day of June, 1992,

// Notary' Public
~^p
Residing at Salt Lake City, UT
My Commission Expires:

fir

C. -KSEY I
t
I
yj n Ex; ires I
.na 22,19*4
I
State or Utah
I

„
CA

Notary PuMo
•
¥Stf*t?%fi90KSEY I
*Jp3N°rth300Wett I
toUkeCto Utah84103'
My Committtai Expires I
June 22.19^4
i
State or Utah
!

(f(*?ll >

IRVING H. BIELE, ESQ. (Bar No. A0317)
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, ESQ. (Bar No. 2194)
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P. C.
1399 South 700 East #14
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Telephone: (801) 487-7834
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate
of D. C. ANDERSON; ELLEN
ANDERSON personally; DAN SCOTT
and JEANNE SCOTT,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO
SECOND AMENDED FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND SECOND AMENDED
JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
MICHAEL R. MCCOY and EUGENE
E. DOMS,
Defendants,

Civil NO. 8339

ELLEN ANDERSON as personal
representative of the Estate
of D. C. ANDERSON; ELLEN
ANDERSON personally; DAN
SCOTT and JEANNE SCOTT,

Judge John A. Rokich

Third-party
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CONSOLIDATED HEADING CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE
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SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, a
Utah corporation,
Third-party
Defendant.

ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate of
D. C. ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and
PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body c o r p o r a t e
and p o l i t i c of t h e S t a t e of U t a h
and BLAKE L. FRAZIER, i n h i s
o f f i c i a l c a p a c i t y a s Summit
C o u n t y A u d i t o r ; GUMP & AYERS
REAL ESTATE, INC. a U t a h
c o r p o r a t i o n ; VICTOR R. AYERS;
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, I N C . , a
U t a h c o r p o r a t i o n ; EUGENE E.
DOMS, UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1 , 2 ,
3 , 4 and 5 ,

Case No. 10066

Defendants.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
At a hearing on May 26, 1992, Judge Rokich, at the imprecation of counsel for defendant, directed plaintiffs to consolidate the heretofore entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Judgment with the Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Judgment into one document and include therein the
court's most recent rulings, and on May 28, 1992, the same were
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delivered to Mr. Keller, counsel for defendant.

It appears that

there are no remaining issues to be decided by the court; and
therefore, the Second Amended Judgment will be a final disposition
of all matters in this cause when the same is executed by the
court.
OBJECTIONS
POINT I
THE COUNTERCLAIM BY THE DEFENDANT PRESENTLY UNDER
ADJUDICATION IS A CLAIM UNDER THE WARRANTY DEED AND
THE COVENANT AGAINST ENCUMBRANCES CONTAINED THEREIN
The only appropriate remedy for violation of a contract
covenant is damages.

This court, contrary to plaintiffs' objec-

tions and contrary to the law of the State of Utah, has fashioned
a remedy which: (1) modifies the provisions of the Promissory Note
and Trust Deed; and, (2) modifies the application of principal and
interest as it is paid on the Promissory Note and Trust Deed; (3)
modifies the closing statements and application of closing funds
in order to accomplish its purpose; all of which are contrary to
the established law in the State of Utah.
The court's award of damages should be effective at the
time of the determination thereof by the court and the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment should so reflect.
POINT II
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND JUDGMENT ARE INCORRECT IN THAT THEY FAIL
TO SPECIFICALLY FIND THE DEFAULTS OF THE
DEFENDANTS AND APPROPRIATELY APPLY SAID DEFAULTS
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The provisions of the Promissory Note required the entire
Note to be paid by January 25, 1985, and the court has made no
specific finding that this Note was in default for failure to make
the January 25, 1985, payment.

Further, evidence was adduced and

showed that the defendants failed to pay taxes and the taxes were
required to be paid under the terms of the Trust Deed.

Failure to

pay the taxes was a default and the court failed to find that said
default had existed for the years 1982 and subsequent thereto.
The Promissory Note provided for interest after default at the
rate of 18% per annum and the court has failed to apply such
appropriate percentage to the amounts due under the Promissory
Note.
The Judgment must be revised to appropriately reflect the
defaults and the default interest.
POINT III
THE COURT FAILS TO RECOGNIZE AND INCLUDE IN
ITS FINDINGS THE FACT THAT THE DEFENDANT AND
CROSS-CLAIMANT DOMS ACQUIRED ONLY A ONE-HALF
INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT REAL ESTATE AND RECOGNIZE
THE HERETOFORE ENTERED JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE AS
TO THE OTHER ONE-HALF INTEREST IN THE REAL ESTATE
The deed vesting interest in Mr. Eugene Doms and Michael
R. McCoy vested the same as tenants in common, an undivided onehalf each.

This court heretofore

foreclosed

the interest of

Michael R. McCoy and sold the same at sheriff's sale so that the
court at the present time has jurisdiction only over an undivided
one-half interest in the real estate and its adjudication can
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affect only a one-half interest.

Further, the court fails to rec-

ognize that each defendant, jointly and severally, promised to pay
the Promissory Note and each executed the Trust Deed thereby binding their one-half interest to the security of the Note holder.
Therefore, any judgment in this case reflecting the reduced value
of the entire real estate resulting from the encumbrances must be
modified to reflect the fact that Eugene E. Doms was granted only
a one-half interest in the real estate and he is entitled to only
one-half interest in any damages that are determined by the court
wherein its judgment reflected

the reduced value of the real

estate.
POINT IV
RATHER THAN RESTATING IN DETAIL EACH OP ITS PRIOR
OBJECTIONS TO THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS, PLAINTIFF
REFERS TO AND INCORPORATES HEREIN, AS THOUGH SET FORTH
AT LENGTH HEREIN, ITS OBJECTIONS HERETOFORE FILED TO
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT,
NOTING THAT SOME PARAGRAPHS HAVE BEEN RENUMBERED
BUT THE STATEMENTS CONTAINED THEREIN REMAIN THE SAME
POINT V
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT
MUST BE REVISED TO TRULY REFLECT THE FACTS AND
APPLICABLE LAW
The revisions necessary are those which in general may be
described as follows:
1.

To determine that the cause of action of Doms is

barred by the statute of limitations.
2.

If

not

barred

by

the

statute

of

limitations,

Defendant Doms is entitled to only one-half of the damages that
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arose by reason of the covenant against encumbrances, and that
amount must be represented as of the effective date of the court's
determination

and

carry

a

judgment

interest

from

that

date

forward.
3.

The Counterclaimant Doms cannot make a claim under

the March 10, 1982, deed from the plaintiffs because, (1). Doms had
no interest in the real estate as he had conveyed all his interest
therein

to Domcoy

in August,

1983,

and

(2) Doms

is

a remote

grantee to the March 10, 1982, deed having acquired his interest
subsequent

to

filing

his

counterclaim

by

deed

from

Domcoy

Enterprises, Inc. dated August 26, 1988, and has failed to join
all prior grantors in his counterclaim.
4.

The Counterclaimant Doms cannot make a claim under

the August 26, 1988, deed from Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. because,
(1) Domcoy was a dissolved corporation and did not have power to
make the conveyance, (2) Doms did not give any consideration for
the conveyance, and (3) the conveyance violated the provisions of
§16-10-74 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, as interpreted in
Farr v. Brinkerhoff, 192 Utah Adv. Rpt. 35 (Ct. App. 1992).
5.
deceased,

by

The

amount

due

the

estate

reason of its one-half

of

interest

D.

C.

Anderson,

in the Promissory

Note and Trust Deed cannot be reduced or modified and the defendant must be required to pay to the estate of D. C. Anderson onehalf of the balance of the Promissory Note and Trust Deed, without
modification,

together with interest
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at 18% per annum from the

date of default and attorneys1 fees and costs.
6.

The Findings, Conclusions and Judgment should prop-

erly reflect all of the attorneys' fees incurred by plaintiffs'
counsel in defense of the title to the property, including, without limitation, the defenses relating to rescission and clearing
of title and such other matters as were required in order to protect the res and the interest in the Promissory Note.
7.

To allow the plaintiffs to proceed with a sheriff's

sale for the undivided one-half interest of the Defendant, Eugene
E. Doms, for the balance due under the Promissory Note and Trust
Deed.
8.

Title cannot be quieted in Eugene E. Doms as there

is no prayer therefor and no evidence of basic derivative title.
9.

No damages arise by reason of known easements and

encumbrances.

This court specifically found Doms made a personal

inspection of the property between October 22, 1981 and November
7, 1981, and had actual knowledge of all easements and encumbrances on the property during that period of time which was
approximately 4-1/2 months prior to the time the March 10, 1982,
deed was signed, the plaintiffs are not responsible for any damages for these open and notorious easements and encumbrances. See
Tabet Lumber Company, Inc.
1969.

v. Golightly, 80 NM 442 457 P.2d 374

See also the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice

Orme in the case of Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716
(Utah 1990).
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10.

Counterclaimant Doms elected his remedy and failed in

the trial thereof.

Prior to the trial of the case, the court, in

conference, asked Defendant Doms what was his preferred cause of
action, whereupon Defendant Doms elected the cause of action on
rescission.

The court thereupon scheduled a trial on the rescis-

sion claim and at the conclusion thereof issued a Memorandum
Decision denying the remedy.

Subsequently, the Defendant Doms

requested trial on the alternative remedy in contract and, over
the objection of the plaintiffs, a new and separate trial was
conducted.

The court should find and conclude that Defendant Doms

elected his remedy, failed therein, and was barred from proceeding
with the alternative remedy.
Respectfully submitted this ^J)

day of June, 1992.

NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

H: BIEL^4
^~
Cc^-(?ak/nsel for Plaintiffs
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES, P.C,

/ JAMES A. MCINTOSH
'- Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs
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IRVING H. BIELE, ESQ. (Bar No. A0317)
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
333 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801) 328-2506
JAMES A. MCINTOSH, ESQ. (Bar No. 2194)
JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C.
1399 South 700 East #14
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Telephone: (801) 487-7834
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate
Of D. C. ANDERSON; ELLEN
ANDERSON personally; DAN SCOTT
and JEANNE SCOTT,

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION UNDER
RULE 52(a)(b), RULE 59(e)
AND 60(a) FOR AMENDMENTS
AND ADDITIONS TO FINDINGS
OF FACT AND FOR THE ADDITION
OF CONCLUSIONS OF LAW TO
CORRECT OVERSIGHTS AND
OMISSIONS AND TO AMEND THE
JUDGMENT TO REFLECT THE SAME

Plaintiffs,
vs.
MICHAEL R. MCCOY and EUGENE
E. DOMS,
Defendants,

Civil No. 8339

ELLEN ANDERSON as personal
representative of the Estate
of D. C. ANDERSON; ELLEN
ANDERSON personally; DAN
SCOTT and JEANNE SCOTT,

Judge John A. Rokich

Third-party
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CXJNSOI&D^EBiHE^INGjXX)^
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SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, a
Utah corporation,
Third-party
Defendant.

ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate of
D. C. ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and
PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of Utah
and BLAKE L. FRAZIER, in his
official capacity as Summit
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS
REAL ESTATE, INC. a Utah
corporation; VICTOR R. AYERS;
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC., a
Utah corporation; EUGENE E.
DOMS, UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1, 2,
3, 4 and 5,

Case No. 10066

Defendants.

COME NOW, Plaintiffs under Rules 52(a)(b), Rule 59(e) and
Rule 60(a), and move the court to include rulings and findings in
relation to facts and law that have been submitted to this court
and by reason of irregularity or oversight, have been omitted in
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law executed by the court.
1. (a) Finding of Fact.

Domcoy Enterprises, Inc.'s deed

to defendant, Doms, who owned 50% of the outstanding stock of the
corporation,

which

corporation
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was

dissolved

prior

to

the

conveyance, was not executed by surviving directors as required by
law and there were outstanding creditors of the corporation at the
time the deed was executed.
(b)

Conclusion

of

Law.

An

officer

of

Domcoy

Enterprises, Inc., after the termination of its existence by the
State of Utah, did not have the power to convey real estate owned
by the said corporation to a stockholder owning 50% of the outstanding stock of the corporation and the deed was void abinitio.
2. (a)

Finding of Fact.

Mr. Eugene E. Doms and Mr.

Michael R. McCoy received title to the property as tenants in common by reason of a deed dated March 10, 1982.
(b)

Conclusion of Law.

The defendant Eugene E. Doms

was the owner of an undivided one-half interest in the real estate
at the time he executed the $194,250.00 promissory note dated
March 10, 1982, in favor of D.

C. Anderson as to an undivided

one-half interest, and Dan Scott as to an undivided one-half
interest.
3. (a) Finding of Fact*

D. C. Anderson died in Salt Lake

County, State of Utah, on September 20, 1983, and Ellen Anderson
was duly appointed the personal representative of his estate on
November 10, 1983, and is currently acting as such.
(b)

Finding of Fact.

Notice to Creditors was duly

published by the Estate of D. C. Anderson in 198 3 and the defendant and counterclaimant Eugene Doms did not have an interest in
the property at the time of D. C.
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Anderson's death or at the time

of publication of Notice to Creditors and did not file any claim
against the estate of D. C.

Anderson.

(c) Conclusion of Law* As between the Estate of Dewey
(D.C.) Anderson, now deceased, and Eugene E. Doms, the provisions
of the Promissory Note and the provisions of the Trust Deed cannot
be changed or modified or in any manner compromised and Eugene E.
Doms owes the Estate of Dewey
unpaid

principal

and

(D.C.) Anderson one-half of the

interest

due

on

said

Promissory

Note,

together with court costs and attorneys1 fees.
4. (a) Finding of Fact*

On the 30th day of August, 1983,

the defendants, Michael R. McCoy and Eugene E. Doms, transferred
and conveyed by warranty deed, for full value, all of their interest in the subject property to Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., a Utah
corporation, and such deed was recorded on the same day. Further,
the complaint in the action was filed June 6, 1985, and the Second
Amended Counterclaim was filed July 5, 1988.
(b-1)

Conclusion of Law*

At the time of filing the

complaint in this action and at the time of filing the second
amended answer and counterclaim to the complaint, the defendant
Eugene E. Doms had no interest whatsoever in the real estate which
is the subject of this action.
(b-2)

Conclusion of Law»

The transfer by warranty

deed executed by Eugene E. Doms and Michael R. McCoy to the corporation, Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., extinguished their rights to
claim under the deed from the plaintiffs unless their grantee,
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Domcoy Enterprises, Inc., within the period of the statute of limitations which commenced running on the date of the delivery of
the deed to the defendants, March 23, 1982, made a claim against
them.
5. (a)

Finding of Fact*

Eugene E. Doms was a director

and the president of Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. and Michael R. McCoy
was also an officer and director of Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. on
and before the date they delivered the deed to the subject properties to the corporation.

Defendants were the organizers of Domcoy

Enterprises, Inc., and had been its officers and directors from
the commencement thereof.
(b)

Conclusion of Law* Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. had

actual and constructive notice by the notice to their officers and
directors of the promissory note of Eugene E. Doms and Michael R.
McCoy in favor of the plaintiffs, Dewey (D.C.) Anderson and Dan
Scott and of the trust deed given as security therefor, and as a
result, Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. took such property subject to the
provisions of the promissory note and trust deed.
6. (a) Finding of Fact*

The corporate charter of Domcoy

Enterprises, Inc. was suspended on January 24, 1986, and involuntarily

dissolved

by

the

Department

of

Business Regulations,

Division of Corporations, on December 31, 1986.
(b)
August

30,

Finding of Fact*

1988,

Domcoy

On August 26, 1988, recorded

Enterprises,

Inc.,

a

dissolved

corporation, by warranty deed executed by an officer of the termi-
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nated corporation, purported to transfer the subject property to
Eugene E. Doms.
(c)

Conclusion of Law. The acquisition on August 26,

1988, by Eugene E. Doms from Domcoy Enterprises, Inc. of the property which is the subject of this action, subsequent to the joinder of issues, as a matter of law, cannot relate back and vest the
defendant and counterclaimant Eugene E. Doms, with title to the
subject property, as of the date of the filing of the complaint or
as of the date of the filing of the counterclaim in this action.
7. (a)

Finding of Fact.

This court in this action, in

due course, entered a judgment against the defendant Michael R.
McCoy

which

caused

his

undivided

one-half

interest

in the

property, as a tenant in common, to be duly sold by the Sheriff of
Summit County at a judicial sale and such sale was duly completed.
(b)

Conclusion of Law.

The judicial sale was effec-

tive to transfer an undivided one-half interest, the interest of
Michael R. McCoy, in the property which is the subject of this
action to the purchaser at the judicial sale.
(c)

Conclusion of Law.

Eugene E. Doms's undivided

one-half interest in the property is the only real estate now
involved in this lawsuit.
8. (a)

Finding of Fact. At the time of the institution

of this action by the plaintiffs, Dewey (D.C.) Anderson Estate and
Dan Scott, the payments required by the promissory note had not
been timely made and the defendants had failed to pay the taxes
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assessed against the subject property•
(b)

Conclusion of Law*

At the time of the institu-

tion of the action by the plaintiffs, the defendant Eugene E. Doms
was in default under the terms of the promissory note and under
the terms of the trust deed.
9. (a)

Finding of Fact,

The plaintiffs, under the pro-

visions of §57-1-23, Utah Code Annotated as amended, elected to
foreclose the interest represented by the trust deed securing the
payment of the promissory note as a mortgage, have not withdrawn
such election, and the defendant Eugene E. Doms was duly notified
thereof when joined in the action.
(b) Conclusion of Law*

This matter must be concluded

in accordance with the law pertaining to foreclosure of mortgages
and the undivided one-half interest of Eugene E. Doms must be sold
in the manner and form as provided for foreclosure of mortgages.
10.

(a)

Finding of Fact*

The estate of Dewey D. C.

Anderson, deceased, owned an undivided one-half interest in the
promissory note in the amount of $194,250,000, and secured by a
trust deed describing the D. C. Anderson interest as

"D. C.

Anderson as to an undivided one-half interest, beneficiary."
(b)
Doms

to

file

Conclusion of Law*
any

claim

against

Anderson, prohibits the court

The failure of Mr. Eugene E.
the

estate

of Dewey

(D.C.)

from changing or modifying

the

amount due the estate of D. C. Anderson by the defendant Eugene E.
Doms or the security interest of the Estate of Dewey (D.C.)
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Anderson in the subject property.
11. (a)

Finding of Fact*

Four grantors granted the title

to the subject property, one-half interest to Eugene E. Doms and
one-half interest to Michael R. McCoy, tenants in common, by deed
dated March 10, 1982, and recorded

March 23, 1982.

The first

action for any claim under said warranty deed against the four
grantors thereof was by a counterclaim dated June 24, 1988, and
filed July 5, 1988, more than six years after the date of the
deed.
(b)

Finding of Fact*

That the original plaintiffs in

their action made no claim or reference to the warranty deed, but
claimed only under rights arising by reason of a promissory note
and trust deed in favor of the two original plaintiffs.
(c)

Conclusion of Law*

An action arising under a

covenant against encumbrances arises immediately upon the delivery
of the deed, March 23, 1982, and more

than six years expired

before an action was brought by Eugene E. Doms to join all grantors of the deed and enforce said covenant; therefore, the statute
of limitations, U.C.A. §76-12-23, had expired and the counterclaim
must be dismissed.
12.
Ellen

(a)

Finding of Fact*

Anderson, personally,

and

The involuntary plaintiffs,

Jeanne

Scott, had no

interest

whatsoever in the promissory note and trust deed which were the
subject of the action filed by the original plaintiffs and over
six years had expired after the delivery of the deed before they
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were joined as parties to this lawsuit and then only in an action
by the defendant Eugene E. Doms under the deed contract, which
contract was not at issue in the original lawsuit.
(b)

Conclusion of Law*

The statute of limitations,

U.C.A. §76-12-23, is a bar against this action of the defendant,
Eugene E. Doms, as against the involuntary plaintiffs, Ellen R.
Anderson and Jeanne Scott.
(c)

Conclusion of Law*

The contract action arising by

reason of a warranty deed between four parties and in favor of the
defendants is a separate and distinct transaction from the trust
deed note and trust deed between the two original plaintiffs and
the two defendants.
(d)

Conclusion of Law*

The statute of limitations,

U.C.A. §76-12-23, is a bar to the action under the warranty deed
as more than six years have expired after the delivery of the deed
on March 23, 1982, before an action under the contract provisions
of the warranty deed was filed by Eugene E. Doms on June 29, 1988.
13. (a)

Finding of Fact*

The road described in the plat

of Block 58, Park City Survey, and denominated on the plat filed
on November 5, 1880, as McHenry Avenue, has never been used or
worked as a roadway from the date of the filing of said plat to
the date of this action.
(b)

Finding of Fact*

Section 1116 of Chapter 1 of

Title 25, Revised Statutes of the State of Utah, 1898, provided
that, "A road not used or worked for a period of five years ceases
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to be a highway," and is abandoned and adjacent land owners own to
the center of the abandoned highway.
(c)

Conclusion of Law*

McHenry Avenue, as described

in the Plat of Block 58, Park City Survey, is an abandoned highway
and

abutting

owners

own

the

property

to

the

center

of the

described highway.
CONCLUSION
Separate motions and briefs have been submitted in relation to each of the matters above set forth and are incorporated
herein by this reference.

In order to obtain a final judgment in

this case, rulings on each of the items above set forth must be
made and appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law
incorporated in the court's final Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law.

Failure to incorporate or rule upon each of the items

above indicated is an oversight or omission which must be corrected in order to give validity to the judgment rendered and the
judgment must be modified to reflect the appropriate law and ruling of the court.
Plaintiffs respectfully request the court to complete the
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment so as to properly reflect the facts and law applicable to this case.
DATED this _ ] l ^ _ r d a y

of

October, 1991.

Respectfully submitted,
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
JAMESx^Tl MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P-C.

(el for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
STATE OF UTAH

)
:SS.
)

County of Salt Lake

Carol A. DeMill, being first duly sworn, says:
That she is employed by the law firm of NYGAARD, COKE &
VINCENT, co-counsel for Plaintiffs herein, and that she mailed a
copy of the above and foregoing Plaintiffs1 Motion Under Rule
52(a)(b), Rule 59(e) and 60(a) For Amendments and Additions to
Findings of Fact and for the Addition of Conclusions of Law to
Correct Oversignts and Omissions and to Amend the Judgment to
Reflect the Same, by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an
envelope, postage prepaid and addressed to the following:
Larry R. Keller, Esq.
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid
thereon, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on
this 30th day of October, 1991.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 30th day of October, 1991.

My Commission Expires:

J

Notary
P u f c l i c ' y j
Residing/at Salt Lake Count^/ UT

ADDENDUM 18

MEMORY TO USE THAT DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE WHEN MR. DOMS
WANTED TO INSPECT THE PROPERTY?
A.

YES.

Q.

AND AFTER LOOKING AT THAT DOCUMENT, WHAT IS

THE TIME MR. DOMS TOLD YOU HE WANTED TO INSPECT THE
PROPERTY WITH YOU?
A.

ON OR BEFORE NOVEMBER 7TH OF 1981.

Q.

ALL RIGHT.

AND THE DATE OF THIS DOCUMENT

BEARS WHAT DATE?
MR. KELLER:
THE COURT:

OBJECTION.
THE OBJECTION IS SUSTAINED.

(BY MR. MCINTOSH)

Q.

DID YOU TAKE MR. DOMS TO

THE ROSSI HILLS PROPERTY ON OR BEFORE NOVEMBER 7TH,
1981?
I COULD NOT SAY THE EXACT DATE.

A.

I DON'T

KNOW THAT IT WAS BEFORE NOVEMBER 7TH, BUT I THINK IT
WAS ON OR AROUND THAT TIME.
MR. MCINTOSH:

ALL RIGHT.

THAT'S ALL I HAVE,

YOUR HONOR.
THE COURT:

OKAY.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. KELLER;
Q.

MR. SLOAN, WHERE ON PLAINTIFFS' MARKED

EXHIBIT 15 -- IS YOUR MEMORY REFRESHED AS TO INSPECTION?
WHERE ON THAT DOCUMENT--
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THAT HAS GOT TO DO WITH THE ONE ISSUE THAT YOU THOUGHT
YOU WANTED TO HEAR ABOUT-THE COURT:

THE OBJECTION IS SUSTAINED.

WHETHER HE MADE MONEY ON THOSE OTHER PROJECTS IS
IMMATERIAL.
Q.

(BY MR. KELLER)

MR. SLOAN, IT IS TRUE, IS

IT NOT, THAT YOU TOOK SEVERAL DEVELOPER INVESTOR TYPE
PEOPLE UP ON THE ROSSI HILLS PROPERTY AND AS PART OF
THAT TALKED WITH THEM?
A.

YES.

Q.

HOW MANY?

A.

TO MY KNOWLEDGE ONLY TWO.

Q.

WELL, DIDN'T YOU TESTIFY PREVIOUSLY IN YOUR

DEPOSITION THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL?
A.

I GUESS MAYBE WE NEED TO DETERMINE WHAT

"SEVERAL" MEANS.

"SEVERAL" CAN MEAN TWO TO ME.

I

MEAN, IF YOU GOT'VE A DEFINITION OF THAT, THEN I NEED
TO-Q.

SEVERAL TO YOU IS TWO?

A.

MORE THAN ONE.

Q.

ANYTHING MORE THAN ONE IS SEVERAL.

IT'S SEVERAL.

WHO ELSE DID YOU TAKE UP THERE?
A.

WHO ELSE?

Q.

YES.

A.

WELL, TO MY RECOLLECTION, I TOOK BRUCE

DEVELOPER INVESTOR COMPANIES.

f)fl7RF;G
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1

A.

2

WAS WITH ME.

3

Q.

TELL US WHOSE CAR YOU WENT IN.

A.

WE WOULD HAVE GONE IN MY CAR.

5

Q.

YOU REMEMBER THAT FOR CERTAIN?

6

A.

NO, I DON'T.

7

Q.

TELL US WHAT TIME OF DAY IT WAS?

8

A.

I DON'T--

9

Q.

TELL US WHAT DAY IT WAS?

10

A.

I CAN'T TELL YOU THAT.

11

Q.

TELL US WHAT YEAR IT WAS?

12

A.

TO THE BEST OF MY RECOLLECTION IT WAS 1981.

13

Q.

TELL US WHAT MONTH IT WAS?

14

A.

I CAN'T TELL YOU THAT.

15

Q.

WHEN YOU SAY TO THE BEST OF YOUR

4

16

I

I DON'T-- I DON'T BELIEVE THAT ANYONE ELSE

RECOLLECTION, COULD IT HAVE BEEN 1982?

17

A.

NO, I DON'T BELIEVE SO.

18

Q.

HOW MUCH SNOW WAS ON THE GROUND WHEN YOU

19
20
21

WERE UP THERE?
A.

I THINK-- AS I TESTIFIED, I DON'T REMEMBER

ANY SNOW ON THE GROUND UP THERE.

22

Q.

WHERE DID YOU PARK YOUR CAR?

23

A.

PARKED THE CAR UP ON THE LITTLE KNOLL.

24

JUST AS YOU DRIVE UP ONTO THE PROPERTY, THERE'S A STEEP

25

KNOLL AND THERE'S A FLAT SPOT THERE, RELATIVELY FLAT
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OF SCRUB OAK, TO GET TO THAT KNOLL?
A.

NO.

ACTUALLY THE WAY-- YEAH.

I WAS UP

THERE NOT TOO LONG AGO AND THERE'S NOT A LOT OF SCRUB
OAK TO CLIMB IN.
Q.

THANK YOU.

NOW, MR. SLOAN, YOU WERE AWARE

OF THE LOOP ROAD THAT WAS ON THE PROPERTY?
A.

I WAS.

Q.

AND DID YOU POINT THAT LOOP ROAD OUT TO

MR. DOMS?
A.

I BELIEVE THAT WE WALKED CLEAR TO THE END

OF IT.
Q.

DO YOU REMEMBER THAT FOR SURE?

A.

YES.

Q.

NO QUESTION IN YOUR MIND?

A.

NO.

Q.

HOW MUCH SNOW WAS THERE?

A.

THERE WAS NO SNOW.

Q.

NO SNOW?

A.

I DON'T BELIEVE THERE WAS ANY SNOW.

Q.

WHAT MONTH AND DATE?
MR. WALL:

OBJECTION, YOUR HONOR.

ASKED AND

ANSWERED.
THE WITNESS:
Q.

I DON'T KNOW.

(BY MR. KELLER)

DO YOU RECALL WHEN YOU

FIRST CALLED MR. DOMS IN CALIFORNIA TO TELL HIM ABOUT
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THIS PROPERTY, MR. SLOAN?
A.

I DO NOT.

Q.

DO YOU EVEN RECALL THE MONTH OF THE YEAR?

A.

NO, SIR, I DON'T.

Q.

HOW LONG AFTER YOU CALLED HIM WAS IT THAT

AN EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED BY ALL PARTIES?
DO YOU RECALL THAT?
A.

NO, I DON'T.

Q.

ARE YOU AWARE OF THE FACT THAT IN MOST

YEARS FROM OCTOBER TO APRIL A CAR CAN'T BE DRIVEN ON
THAT ROAD?
A.

I WOULD TAKE EXCEPTION TO THAT.

Q.

YOU DON'T THINK THAT'S RIGHT?

A.

I DON'T THINK THAT'S RIGHT.

Q.

YOU THINK A CAR CAN BE DRIVEN ON THAT ROAD

YEAR ROUND?
A.

NO, I DON'T.

BUT THEY DO IT.

Q.

WHEN DO YOU THINK A CAR CAN NO LONGER BE

DRIVEN ON THAT ROAD?
A.

THE 13 YEARS I HAVE BEEN HERE I WOULD SAY

BETTER THAN 50 PERCENT OF THE TIME YOU COULD DRIVE ON
THAT ROAD INTO THE MIDDLE OF NOVEMBER.
Q.

WHAT KIND OF CAR DID YOU HAVE IN 1981 THAT

YOU DROVE ON THAT ROAD?
A.

WELL, I HAD TWO DIFFERENT CARS THAT I COULD
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HAVE USED AT THAT TIME.
Q.

WHICH ONE DID YOU USE?

A.

I BELIEVE I USED THE '78 BMW.

Q.

YOU DROVE A BMW UP THAT ROAD?

A.

YES, I DID.

Q.

ISN'T THAT A DIRT ROAD, SORT OF A TRAIL

MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE?
A.

YES, IT IS.

Q.

AND ISN'T IT VERY STEEP WHEN YOU FIRST

START GOING UP THAT HILL?
A.

YES.

Q.

AND YOU DROVE YOUR BMW UP IT?

A.

YES, I DID.

Q.

OKAY.

NOW, WHEN YOU WERE STANDING ON THE

KNOLL, WHAT DID YOU AND MR. DOMS TALK ABOUT?
A.

I CAN'T REMEMBER THE EXACT CONVERSATION,

BUT I KNOW THAT WHAT I BELIEVE I WOULD HAVE TALKED
ABOUT WOULD HAVE BEEN THE VIEW THAT IS UP THERE,
BECAUSE IT'S AN OUTSTANDING VIEW.
Q.

OKAY.

NOW, I KNOW THERE'S A LOT OF THINGS

YOU THINK YOU WOULD HAVE DONE.

I'M ASKING YOU FOR WHAT

YOU DID.
WHAT DID YOU TALK ABOUT WITH THIS MAN, EUGENE
E. DOMS, WHEN YOU WERE UP ON THAT ROAD, MR. SLOAN?
A.

I COULD NOT TELL YOU.
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Q.

DID YOU POINT OUT THE FACT TO HIM THAT THAT

ROAD WAS NOT THE ANDERSON PARCEL ITSELF THAT YOU WERE
TRYING TO SELL HIM?
A.

WHICH ROAD ARE WE SPEAKING OF NOW?

Q.

THE ROAD YOU SAY YOU WALKED ALONG WITH HIM.

A.

ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT THE LOOP ROAD?

Q.

HOW MANY ROADS DID YOU WALK ALONG WITH HIM?

A.

WELL, WE MAY HAVE WALKED DOWN ON THE

RAILROAD CUT.

'

I DON'T RECALL, BUT I KNOW THAT I DID

TELL HIM THAT THE LOOP READ WAS ON THE PROPERTY.
Q.

YOU TOLD HIM THE LOOP ROAD WAS ON THE

PROPERTY?
A.

SURE, I WOULD HAVE.

I'M— I DON'T RECALL

THE CONVERSATION, BUT I FEEL PRETTY CERTAIN THAT WE
COULD HAVE.
Q.

YOU FEEL LIKE YOU PROBABLY WOULD HAVE?

A.

WE WALKED THE ROAD AND I WOULD HAVE TOLD

HIM THAT WE WERE ON THE PROPERTY.
Q.

DID YOU TELL HIM THAT THAT ROAD CONSTITUTED

ACCESS FOR THE PEOPLE ON ONTARIO AVENUE TO GET TO THEIR
PROPERTY?
A.

I DON'T BELIEVE I DID.

Q.

DID YOU TELL HIM THAT ROAD HAD BEEN THERE

SINCE AT LEAST 1941 ON THE PROPERTY?
A.

I'M SURE THAT I DID NOT.
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ANDERSON PARCEL?
A.

I DON'T BELIEVE I HAVE SEEN THAT ONE, NO.

Q.

WERE YOU AWARE AT THE TIME THAT YOU WALKED

THE ROAD WITH GENE DOMS THAT THE BOUNDARIES OF THIS
PROPERTY WENT INTO THE BACKYARDS OF SEVERAL OF THE
HOUSES ON ONTARIO AVENUE?
A.

YES.

CAN I LOOK AT THIS ONE?

COULD I GET

UP AND LOOK AT THIS ONE?
Q.

CERTAINLY.

A.

YES.

I DON'T RECALL THIS PARTICULAR

DRAWING, BUT THERE WAS ANOTHER SIMILAR DRAWING THAT I
SAW.

I'M NOT SURE WHEN I SAW IT.

IT SHOWED THAT THERE

WERE A COUPLE OF ENCROACHMENTS ON THESE SHEDS HERE.
AND THIS BOTTOM PART-- AND I DON'T RECALL THIS PART.

I

DON'T KNOW WHAT THIS IS.
Q.

THIS IS A FOURPLEX TO THE NORTH OF

SORENSON'S HOUSE,?
A.

I KNOW WHAT PROPERTY THIS IS.

I DON'T KNOW

WHAT THIS IS.
Q.

DID YOU KNOW THE FOURPLEX DECK ENCROACHED

UPON THE ANDERSON PROPERTY?
A.

NO, I DID NOT.

Q.

DID YOU KNOW THAT SEVERAL FEET OF THE

SORENSONS' LANDSCAPED YARD ENCROACHED UPON THE ANDERSON
PROPERTY?

(W7RR7

577

MR. WALL:

ASKED AND ANSWERED.

THE COURT:
Q.

GO AHEAD AND ASK.

(BY MR. KELLER)

DID YOU MAKE ANY

REPRESENTATION TO MR. DOMS AT ALL THAT THAT DEVELOPMENT
PARCEL COULD BE DEVELOPED AS A STAND-ALONE PIECE, THAT
ANDERSON PARCEL?
A.

I DON'T RECALL THAT I DID.

I DON'T

REMEMBER THAT.
Q.

YOU HAVE YOUR DEPOSITION THERE IN FRONT OF

YOU, MR. SLOAN.

I WOULD LIKE YOU TO PICK IT UP AND

TURN TO PAGE 46, PLEASE.

WOULD LIKE YOU TO READ TO

YOURSELF LINES TWO THROUGH FIVE; PAGE 46, AND TELL ME
WHEN YOU'RE DONE.
THE COURT:

THAT'S LINES TWO THROUGH FIVE?

THE WITNESS :
Q.

TWO THROUGH FIVE.

(BY MR. KELLER)

IF YOU WANT TO READ

SOMETHING EARLIER HERE OR AN EARLIER PAGE, OR LATER,
THAT'S FINE, TOO.
A.

OKAY.

Q.

DOES THAT REFRESH YOUR MEMORY AS TO WHETHER

OR NOT YOU MADE ANY REPRESENTATION TO MR. DOMS
REGARDING THE ABILITY OF THAT PARCEL TO BE DEVELOPED AS
A STAND-ALONE PARCEL?
A.

YEAH.

I 'FELT, WITHOUT QUESTION, THAT THE

BEST DEVELOPMENT FOR 'THAT PARCEL WAS IN TANDEM WITH THE
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IRVING H. BIELE, ESQ. (Bar No. A0317)
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
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NO.

2194)

JAMES A. MCINTOSH & ASSOCIATES P.C.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
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representative of the Estate
Of D. C. ANDERSON; ELLEN
ANDERSON personally; DAN SCOTT
and JEANNE SCOTT,
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MICHAEL R. MCCOY and EUGENE
E. DOMS,
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SCOTT and JEANNE SCOTT,
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vs.
SUMMIT COUNTY TITLE COMPANY, a
Utah corporation,
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Third-party
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ELLEN ANDERSON, as personal
representative of the Estate of
D. C. ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and
PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate
and politic of the State of Utah
and BLAKE L. FRAZIER, in his
official capacity as Summit
County Auditor; GUMP & AYERS
REAL ESTATE, INC. a Utah
corporation; VICTOR R. AYERS;
DOMCOY ENTERPRISES, INC., a
Utah corporation; EUGENE E.
DOMS, UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS
DESCRIBED AS JOHN DOES 1, 2,
3, 4 and 5,
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Defendants.

It is hornbook law that one must elect to sue in contract or in tort and in the same action both remedies cannot be
pursued or pursued in alternative.
In 1 Am.Jur.2d Actions § 32 (1961), it is stated at page
567 as follows:
In such circumstances, the plaintiff may choose
which remedy to pursue, and may maintain his
action either in tort or on contract.
The question whether, when, and by whom a tort
may be waived and an action in contract brought
for the wrong or injury done is important, notwithstanding the abolition of distinctions between
the forms of actions ex contractu and actions ex
delicto, since the principles of law governing
these actions remain unchanged.

Affirming the statement under Actions in 61A Am.Jur.2d
Pleadings § 385 (1981), it is stated at page 372 as follows:
Although a plaintiff may in certain circumstances waive a tort and sue in contract, if he
elects to sue in tort he cannot recover in
contract. Thus, where he sues for fraud, he cannot recover for money had and received or for
breach of warranty; . . . Conversely, a party cannot sue in contract and recover for a tort disclosed by the evidence.
The Utah courts have long recognized that a party must
elect

the

remedy.

In

the

case

of McKellar

Real

Estate &

Investment Co. v. Paxton, 218 P. 128 (Utah 1923), the court, citing another case, stated:
"The election of the purchaser to rescind must be
evidenced by unequivocal act, . . . ."

"The general rule that the purchaser waives his
right to rescind by failure to exercise it
promptly on discovery of the grounds applies where
the ground relied on is mistake, duress, failure
to procure the conveyance within the limited time,
or deficiency in quantity."
In the case of Cook v. Covey-Ballard Motor Co., 253 P.
196

(Utah 1927), which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A," the

court stated:
. . . (1) that there must be, in fact, two or more
coexisting remedies upon which the party has the
right to elect; (2) the remedies thus open to him
must be alternative and inconsistent; and (3) he
must by actually bringing an action or by some
other decisive act, with knowledge of the facts,
indicate his choice between these inconsistent
remedies. . . an election once deliberately made
by the institution of a suit, by which the remedy
is sought to be recovered, is final, and his failure to secure satisfaction by means of the remedy
which he has adopted furnishes no legal reason to

permit him to resort to the other, . . . The doctrine of an election rests upon the principle that
one may not take contrary positions, and where he
has a right to choose one of two modes of redress,
and the two are so inconsistent that the assertion
of one involves a negation or repudiation of the
other, the deliberate and settled choice of one,
with knowledge or means of knowledge of such facts
as would authorize a resort to each, will preclude
him thereafter from going back and electing again.
The Oregon court In Banc, in the action of McAllister
v. Charter First Mortgage, Inc., 567 P.2d 539 (Or. 1977), which is
attached hereto as Exhibit "B," states:
It is generally accepted that on a contract to
purchase property, a dissatisfied purchaser must
elect to either affirm the contract and sue for
damages or rescind and ask for the return of the
purchase money.
CONCLUSION
The counterclaimant Doms has obviously elected the remedy of rescission and, therefore, cannot now continue his action
to seek damages under the contractual provisions contained in the
Warranty Deed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^? 7 day of April, 1990.
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT

for Plaintiffs
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representative of the Estate of
D. C. ANDERSON; DAN SCOTT; and
PAUL D. VEASY, Trustee,
Plaintiffs,

vs.
SUMMIT COUNTY, a body corporate
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Defendants.
The Utah law on election of remedies might seem confused
or contradictory unless the same is reviewed from an historical
basis.

We will summarily and chronologically treat the key cases.

The key cases are attached for further reference by the court.
1.
253 P. 196

1927:

The case of Cook v. Covey-Ballard Motor Co.,

(Utah 1927), recognized

that Utah had

adopted the

Election of Remedies Doctrine and set forth the essential elements
of an election.
2.

KEY CASE - See Elements Exhibit 1, page 199.

March 14, 1962:

In the case of Smoot v. Lund, 369

P.2d 933, the Utah Supreme court made some rather general state-

-3-

ments in relation to our Rules of Civil Procedure and referred to
the Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8(a) and stated the Rules had
changed the common law and allowed a party to "join either as
independent or alternate claims . • . legal or equitable or both.
. ."

A careless reading of this case would indicate that there is

no longer an Election of Remedies Doctrine in the State of Utah,
but the subsequent cases indicate that the Doctrine is alive and
well.

This case stands for the principle that the mere act of

pleading a theory of recovery does not constitute an election of
remedy and alternative remedies may be pled.
3.

On November 27, 1962, only eight months after the

Smoot v. Lund decision (supra), the Utah Supreme Court in the case
of Wallace L. Rosander v. Rex A. Laren, 376 P.2d 146, (Utah)
stated, "To require a party to make an election between the alternative counts or defenses, particularly at the pretrial stage of
the proceedings, would be to emasculate the rule and render it
meaningless."

This case obviously

recognizes

that sooner or

later, if there is an appropriate motion, the moving party must
make an election.
4.

(Exhibit 2.)

On December 13, 1962, nine months after the date, of

the Smoot decision, the Utah Supreme Court in Gene Wheadon v.
George B. Pearson, 376 P.2d 946, indicated on page 948, that when
a party attempted to obtain his entire relief on one claim, "then
the matter should be laid at rest.
attempt

at substantially

He should be denied a second

the same objective under a different
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guise." These two cases indicate that the Utah Supreme Court still
recognizes the doctrine of election of remedies.
5.

September

15, 1967, five years

(Exhibit 3.)
after

decision, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah

the Smoot
in Mldvale

Motors, Inc. v. Saunders, 432 P.2d 37 (Utah) indicated that when a
party elected to sue for two inconsistent remedies, then on demand
of the other party an election has to be made and the other party
has the right during the course of the litigation to demand such
an election.
6.

KEY CASE, Exhibit 4, page 389.
On November 5, 197 9, seventeen years after the Smoot

case above referred to, the Utah Supreme Court in the case of
Royal Resources, Inc. v. Gibralter Financial Corp., Utah, 603 P.2d
793, page 796, 797, again addressed the problem of election of
remedies and indicated that the defense of election of remedies is
affirmative and must be raised by way of answer, motion or demand.
Further, in this case Justice Maughan in his dissenting opinion
even recognized the requirement of election stating, "A litigant
is not allowed

to maintain

inconsistent positions in judicial

proceedings." (Emphasis added.)
7.

(Exhibit 5.)

Our sister state, Colorado, in the case of Leo P.

Doyle v. Howard S. McBee, 420 P.2d 247 (Colo. 1966), the court, in
a case similar to the instant case, wherein the party had pled for
rescission and also for damages for breach of a covenant in the
deed ruled that when the party attempted to prove the case on the
breach of covenant and failed, then it could not proceed with the
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claim of rescission.

In the present case, the reverse is true.

The parties proceeded in rescission and failed and now wish to
proceed in contract and thereafter are barred by their election to
proceed in rescission (Exhibit 6).
8.

The same rule should apply!

The Idaho Court of Appeals, in May, 1986, in Jimmy P.

Keesee v. Joseph P. Fetzek, 723 P.2d 904 adopted the doctrine of
quasi estoppel election of remedies and on page 906 stated, "The
buyer has been unfairly prejudiced, and stands to suffer an unconscionable

detriment

position."
9.

as

a

result

of

the

sellers'

change

in

(Exhibit 7.)
In August of 1984, Colorado again reaffirmed the

election of remedies doctrine in the case of Gobbitz v. Marquette
Minerals wherein it stated, "Such an election is necessary since
to treat the contract as enforceable and to seek specific performance or damages for breach is Inconsistent with a request for
rescission."

Page 1130.

(Emphasis added.)

(Exhibit 8.)

This

case reaffirmed the Oregon 1977 decision in McAllister v. Charter
First Mortgage, 567 P.2d 538 (OR 1977), where the court stated on
page 54 3, "It is generally accepted that on a contract to purchase
property, a dissatisfied purchaser must elect to either affirm the
contract and sue for damages or rescind and ask for the return of
the purchase money."
10.

(Exhibit 9.)

The test that to allow proof of one theory must nec-

essarily disprove or defeat the other - election of remedies - is
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also recognized in our other sister states and the reference to
appropriate decisions is as follows:
Kansas
Patrons State Bank and Trust Company v.
Deane H. Shapiro
528 P.2d 1198, 1204
Oklahoma
Agusta S. Slsler v. Ellen Jackson
460 P.2d 903, 909
Washington
Bank of the West v. Wes-Con Development Co., Inc.
Wash. App. 548 P.2d 563, 567
Oregon App. 1983
Arthur Gentemann v. Sunaire Systems, Inc.
665 P.2d 875
Arizona App.
Delbert Fousel, et ux v.
Ted Walker Mobile Homes, Inc.
602 P.2d 507
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff made the motion for election of remedies at
at and before the commencement of the trial.

The counterclaimant,

Mr. Doms, after a conference with the court and other attorneys,
elected to proceed with his cause of action in rescission and,
after having presented evidence, rested his case in rescission.
Pursuant to Utah law, Mr. Doms made his election and the court
must rule that the Plaintiff cannot now proceed under the theory
of contract.
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ADDENDUM 20

Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings.
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall
so order, specifying the time therefor.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially similar to Rule 15, F.R.C.P.

F A K T IV.

PARTIES.
Rule 17. Parties plaintiff and defendant.
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of
the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee,
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may
sue in that person's name without joining the party for whose benefit the
action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use or
benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah. No action
shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection
for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of,
the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall
have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the
real party in interest.
(b) Minors or incompetent persons. A minor or an insane or incompetent
person who is a party must appear either by a general guardian or by a
guardian ad litem appointed in the particular case by the court in which the
action is pending. A guardian ad litem may be appointed in any case when it
is deemed by the court in which the action or proceeding is prosecuted expedient to represent the minor, insane or incompetent person in the action or
proceeding, notwithstanding that the person may have a general guardian
and may have appeared by the guardian. In an action in rem it shall not be
necessary to appoint a guardian ad litem for any unknown party who might
be a minor or an incompetent person.
(c) Guardian ad litem; how appointed. A guardian ad litem appointed by
a court must be appointed as follows:
(1) When the minor is plaintiff, upon the application of the minor, if
the minor is of the age of fourteen years, or if under that age, upon the
application of a relative or friend of the minor.
(2) When the minor is defendant, upon the application of the minor if
the minor is of the age of fourteen years and applies within 20 days after
the service of the summons, or if under that age or if the minor neglects so
to apply, then upon the application of a relative or friend of the minor, or
of any other party to the action.
(3) When a minor defendant resides out of this state, the plaintiff, upon
motion therefor, shall be entitled to an order designating some suitable
person to be guardian ad litem for the minor defendant, unless the defendant or someone in behalf of the defendant within 20 days after service of
notice of such motion shall cause to be appointed a guardian for such
minor. Service of such notice may be made upon the defendants general
or testamentary guardian located in the defendant's state; if there is
none, such notice, together with the summons in the action, shall be
served in the manner provided for publication of summons upon such

minor, if over fourteen years of age, or, if under fourteen years of age, by
such service on the person with whom the minor resides. The guardian ad
litem for such nonresident minor defendant shall have 20 days after appointment in which to plead to the action.
(4) When an insane or incompetent person is a party to an action or
proceeding, upon the application of a relative or friend of such insane or
incompetent person, or of any other party to the action or proceeding.
(d) Associates may sue or be sued by common name. When two or
more persons associated in any business either as a joint-stock company, a
partnership or other association, not a corporation, transact such business
under a common name, whether it comprises the names of such associates or
not, they may sue or be sued by such common name. Any judgment obtained
against the association shall bind the joint property of all the associates in the
same manner as if all had been named parties and had been sued upon their
joint liability. The separate property of an individual member of the association may not be bound by the judgment unless the member is named as a
party and the court acquires jurisdiction over the member.
(e) Action against a nonresident doing business in this state. When a
nonresident person is associated in and conducts business within the state of
Utah in one or more places in that person's own name or a common trade
name, and the business is conducted under the supervision of a manager,
superintendent or agent the person may be sued in the person's name in any
action arising out of the conduct of the business.
(Amended effective September 1, 1991.)
Advisory Committee Note. — Paragraph
(d) has been changed to conform to the holding
in Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 767 P.2d 499
(Utah 1988), which allows an unincorporated
association to sue in its own name. The rule
continues to allow an unincorporated association to be sued in its own name The final sentence of paragraph (d) was added to confirm
that the separate property of an individual
member of an association may not be bound by
the judgment unless the member is made a
party.
Technical changes in all paragraphs of the
rule make the terminology gender neutral. In
part (c) the word "minor" has replaced the
word "infant," in order to maintain consistency
with recent changes made in Rule 4(e)(2). In
Rule 4 an infant is defined as a person under
the age of 14 years, whereas the intent of Rule

17(c) is to include persons under the age of 18
years.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective September 1, 1991, substituted
"minor" for "infant" throughout Subdivisions
(b) and (c); in Subdivision (d), substituted "sue
or be sued" for "be sued" in the heading and
the first sentence, divided the former language
into the present first two sentences, in the second sentence substituted "the association" for
"the defendant" and "parties" for "defendants/*
and added the third sentence; and made stylistic changes throughout the section.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 17, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Guardians, § 75-5101 et seq.
Service of DroceR* IT R C P A

Rule 19. Joinder of persons needed for just adjudication.
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to service of
process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2)
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated
that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter
impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest. If
he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. If he
should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or,
in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue
and his joinder would render the venue of the action improper, he shall be
dismissed from the action.
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. If a person
as described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person
being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the
court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent
to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or
other measure, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a
judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether
the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
(c) Pleading reasons for nonjoinder. A pleading asserting a claim for
relief shall state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as described in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof who are not joined, and the reasons
why they are not joined.
(d) Exception of class actions. This rule is subject to the provisions of
Rule 23.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)

16-10-74. Sale or mortgage of assets other than in regular
course of business.
A sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other disposition of all, or
substantially all, the property and assets, with or without the good will, of a
corporation, if not made in the usual and regular course of its business, may
be made upon such terms and conditions and for such consideration, which
may consist in whole or in part of money or property, real or personal, including shares of any other corporation, domestic or foreign, as may be authorized
in the following manner:
(a) The board of directors shall adopt a resolution recommending such
sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other disposition and directing
the submission thereof to a vote at a meeting of shareholders, which may
be either an annual or a special meeting.
(b) Written or printed notice shall be given to each shareholder of
record entitled to vote at such meeting within the time and in the manner
provided in this act for the giving of notice of meetings of shareholders,
and, whether the meeting be an annual or a special meeting, shall state
that the purpose, or one of the purposes, of such meeting is to consider the
proposed sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other disposition.
(c) At such meeting the shareholders may authorize such sale, lease,
exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other disposition and may fix, or may
authorize the board of directors to fix, any or all of the terms and conditions thereof and the consideration to be received by the corporation
therefor. Each outstanding share of the corporation shall be entitled to
vote thereon, whether or not entitled to vote thereon by the provisions of
the articles of incorporation. Such authorization shall require the affirmative vote of the holders of at least a majority of the outstanding shares
of the corporation, unless any class of shares is entitled to vote as a class
thereon, in which event authorization shall require the affirmative vote
of the holders of at least a majority of the outstanding shares of each class
of shares entitled to vote as a class thereon and of the total outstanding
shares.
(d) After such authorization by a vote of shareholders, the board of
directors nevertheless, in its discretion, may abandon such sale, lease,
exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other disposition of assets, subject to the
rights of third parties under any contracts relating thereto, without further action or approval by shareholders.
History: L. 1961, ch. 28, * 74.

75-3-803. Limitations on presentation of claims.
(1) All claims against a decedent's estate which arose before the death of
the decedent, including claims of the state and any subdivision of it, whether
due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated,
founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis, if not barred earlier by other
statute of limitations, are barred against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented within the
earlier of the following dates:
<a) one year after the decedent's death; or
(b) within the time provided by Subsection 75-3-801(2) for creditors
who are given actual notice, and where notice is published, within the
time provided in Subsection 75-3-801(1) for all claims barred by publication.
(2) In all events, claims barred by the nonclaim statute at the decedent's
domicile are also barred in this state.
(3) All claims against a decedent's estate which arise at or after the death
of the decedent, including claims of the state and any of its subdivisions,
whether due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis are barred against the
estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented as follows:
(a) a claim based on a contract with the personal representative within
three months after performance by the personal representative is due; or
(b) any other claim within the later of three months after it arises, or
the time specified in Subsection (l)(a).
(4) Nothing in this section affects or prevents:
(a) any proceeding to enforce any mortgage, pledge, or other lien upon
property of the estate;
(b) to the limits of the insurance protection only, any proceeding to
establish liability of the decedent or the personal representative for which
he is protected by liability insurance; or
(c) collection of compensation for services rendered and reimbursement
for expenses advanced by the personal representative or by the attorney
or accountant for the personal representative of the estate.
History: C. 1953, 75-3-803, enacted by L.
1975, ch. 150, 5 4; 1992, ch. 179, ft 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective July 1, 1992, substituted
*within the earlier of the following dates" for
"as follows" at the end of the introductory Ian-

guage and rewrote Subsections (l)(a) and (b);
added new Subsection (2); redesignated former
Subsections (2) and (3) as present Subsections
(3) and (4); substituted "the later of three
months after it arises, or the time specified in
Subsection (l)(a)w for "three months after it
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NO.

LARRY R. KELLER, #1785
Attorney for Defendant
257 Towers, Suite 340
257 East 200 South - 10
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7282

Clerk oi Summit County

BY

.v/A
Depu+y Cleri

THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
OoOoo
ELLEN ANDERSON as personal
representative for the estate
Of D.C. ANDERSON and DAN SCOTT,

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Plaintiff,

MICHAEL R. MCCOY AND EUGENE
DOMS,
Case No. 8339
Defendants.
-ooOooOn or about May 10, 1988 the Honorable Pat B. Brian,
Third District Judge, entered a qualified order setting aside
default judgment as to the Defendant Eugene E. Doms.

Said

Order entered by the Court was qualified with the following
conditions to be met by Defendant Eugene E. Doms:
1.

Defendant, on or before June 1, 1988 pay the

Plaintiff by certified or cashier's check the amount of the
fees as indicated by the original affidavit for attorney's
fees and the supplemental affidavit for attorney's fees.

000076

2.

On or before June 1, a*88, n o w ooun^l «tv*ll to*

obtained to represent the Defendant, who shall file an
appearance in this case coincidently with the withdrawal of
Mr. Kinghorn.
Defendant Eugene E. Doms, hereby certifies to the Court
that the above conditions have been met as of this date, June
1, 1988 in that (1) an official check issued by Wells Fargo
and Company has been tendered to Mr. Irving Biele of Biele,
Haslam and Hatch representing the amount ordered by the Court
for payment of attorney's fees; and (2) Larry R. Keller, Esq.
has entered his appearance of counsel on behalf of Defendant
Eugene E. Doms as of June 1, 1988.
Defendant Doms understands that this Certificate of
Compliance triggers the actual date the default judgment is
set aside, and therefore Defendant's answer and counterclaim
are officially accepted by the Court.

Defendant Doms

understands that all attorneys involved in the case should
work from this date in complying with the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
DATED this

)

day of June, 1988.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Certificate of Compliance, first class
postage prepaid, this

/

day of June, 1988 to:

Irving Biele
Biele, Haslam and Hatch
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Gerald Kinghorn
9 Exchange Place, #1000
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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